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ABSTRACT
PREFERRED INSTITUTIONS: PUBLIC VIEWS ON POLICY
by
Shawn C. Fettig
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2017
Under the Supervision of Professor Sara C. Benesh
In this dissertation, I ask why people might prefer one institution of government (courts,
legislatures, executives) over another to handle certain issues. Previous research has
focused on legitimacy of the courts, whether institutions can legitimate policy, and how
public opinion is thus informed. This research is invaluable in understanding support for
and influence of specific institutions, but this only gets us so far. We still do not know
why people might feel that one institution is more legitimate than another to handle
policymaking on a specific issue. Here, I begin to examine this question arguing that
institutions act as source cues to individuals and that those individuals evaluate the
appropriateness of institutions to handle issues by considering institutional design
(majoritarianism v. countermajoritarianism), politics (political v. nonpolitical institutions
and issues), trust, and regret/disappointment. In short, I suggest that numerous factors
play into an individual’s preferences for one branch to handle certain issues and that these
factors have to do both with beliefs about the institution(s), and perceptions of the
issue(s).
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Up to now, extant literature in the area of policy acceptance has been severely limited in
its ability to inform us about how institutional and issue structure can inform levels of
acceptance. Here, I will do so, examining specific characteristics of policymaking institutions
and issues, positing that we can make better policy, conceptualized as being more widely
accepted by the general public, when we know these things. In doing so, I question the
traditional legitimacy index that has been utilized to explain judicial mechanisms of legitimating
policy. I argue that the index is too broad, including variables that measure both short- and longterm legitimacy, when it should be exclusively measuring long-term, diffuse support.
Additionally, I expand the body of research in this area by applying this legitimacy measurement
to the executive and legislative branches, as well. In addition, I argue that respondents have a
preference over which institutions handle certain issues, that they hold a preference about which
institution should is best-suited to make policy in certain areas, and that this informs their level
of acceptance of policies emanating from institutions. As such, I examine those variables that
predict ranking, which is conceptualized as an institutional preference. Finally, I take these
findings and apply them to policy acceptance, arguing that legitimacy and preference, along with
other important considerations (to be discussed in Chapter II), impact and inform public
acceptance, to varying degrees. In doing so, this project provides the legitimacy and acceptance
literature with a large step forward in our understanding of what matters to institutional
legitimacy (necessary to effective governance) and policy acceptance (necessary to stable
government).
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And so, in this dissertation, I examine the extent to which the public prefers one
governmental institution to another to make policy in a given area. I suggest that issues may be
deemed to be more or less “judicial,” or “legislative,” or “executive” by the public, and that, to
the extent that the “right” institution acts, policy is more fully accepted. There has been much
research that examines legitimacy of institutions (Gibson 1989; Gibson and Caldeira 1995;
Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2003; Tyler 2006; and many others), the ability of an institution to
legitimate (Gibson 1989; Mondak 1994; Gibson and Caldeira 2009), what drives the acceptance
of policies (Kramer 1975; Suh and Han 2003; Nie and Wyman 2005; Olson, Cadge, and
Harrison 2006), and preferences over which level of government (local, state, or national) should
handle certain issues (Schneider and Jacoby 2003). Additionally, in his research examining
respondent reactions to different governments in a federal system (local, state, and federal),
Arceneaux (2005) argues that individuals have preferences over which form of government
should handle issues based on which government they believe to be responsible for the issue and
evaluations of that government’s job performance. No research, however, examines the idea that
individuals may have preferences over which branch of government should make policy in
certain areas. I do so here with this dissertation project.
The courts have often been viewed as strong policy legitimators, given their consistently
high levels of public support (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002; Marshall 1989), and their ability
to legitimate policies exceeds Congress’ or the President’s’ (Hoekstra and Segal 1996; Franklin
and Kosaki 1989; Stoutenborough, Haider-Markel, and Allen 2006; Clawson, Kegler, and
Waltenburg 2001). Empirical support for why courts are different in this regard, however, is
lacking. Indeed, previous research has not considered the degree to which the public views the
courts as the “right,” the “best,” or the “most authoritative” decision maker to make policy and
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whether that determination differs across issues. Instead, most of the extant research would lead
us to believe that courts are always most preferred (and Congress always least preferred). As a
result, courts are also uniformly expected to more strongly influence public opinion (Mondak
1991; Mondak and Smithey 1997), and court policies are expected to be greeted with higher
(indeed, the highest) levels of legitimacy. But, given the backlash against the courts for stepping
into some policy debates (Schacter 2005), and the use of court involvement in some issues as
fodder for political campaigns (see, for example, Healy 2005), we might expect variation across
people and issues over the extent to which courts can function as policy legitimators. It may well
be that the public holds opinions not only over the resolution of certain issues, but also over
which institution of government is best-suited to make decisions in a given issue area, and those
notions, in turn, may affect the degree to which an institution can function as a legitimate policy
maker, let alone a policy legitimator, directly influencing public acceptance of a policy.
As we can see, legitimacy, and policy legitimation, has been tied to the institution, with
the general consensus being that the courts can legitimate any policy more than the legislative or
executive branches can, without regard to the issue at hand. My theory, however, is grounded in
the notion that the policymaking source (here, the institution) may have the ability to influence
policy acceptance and, further, that part of an individual’s evaluation of the source1 might
actually be an evaluation of how suitable the institution is to make policy in a given area.
Suitability of the institution, in turn, may also depend on an individual’s perception of the issue
itself. If an issue is considered to be “political,” an individual might believe that is resolution is
best left to the institutions associated with politics (legislatures and executives). If the issue
1

Much research, usually in psychology, suggests people are influenced both by information they receive and the
source from which they receive it (see, e.g., Chaiken 1980; Birnbaum and Stegner 1979; Huckfeldt 2001). Mondak
argues, for example, that source credibility can drive opinions on a policy (in low information contexts), while it is
only part of the evidence for decisions involving high degrees of personal relevance (or for those holding high
levels of information) (Mondak 1990, 1993b).
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involves rights claims, perhaps the courts, seen as above politics and as countermajoritarian,
are perceived to be the appropriate institution from which to seek redress (Gibson and Caldeira
2009).
Policy acceptance, on the other hand, has been examined primarily at the issue level,
without concern for the institution making the policy. This research has sought to explain
characteristics of an issue that may influence how well the public accepts policy related to
the issue, but it has not explicitly considered the idea that institutional preference over issue
resolution may also matter.2
It seems plausible that people hold beliefs that certain institutions should not be handling
questions on certain policy issues, or in certain policy areas. There are numerous examples of
survey respondents expressing preference for one branch over another to handle certain issues.
For instance, in late 2003, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts’s ruling in Goodridge v. Dept.
of Public Health3 mandated that the state legally recognize same-sex marriages. This decision
brought an unprecedented degree of national attention to the issue of gay marriage and much
debate ensued. Not long afterward, President Bush entered the fray by advocating an
amendment to the U.S. Constitution that would define marriage as a union between a man and a
woman. In his 2004 State of the Union address, he said, “If judges insist on forcing their
arbitrary will upon the people, the only alternative left to the people would be the constitutional

2

Other factors considered by the literature on policy acceptance include salience (May 1986; Grosskopf and
Mondak 1998), religion (Olson, Cadge, and Harrison 2006); ideology (Kramer 1975), the degree to which a policy
benefits a majority (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Ingram, Schneider, and Deleon 2007), or threatens other groups
(Hetherington and Globetti 2002), and the level of controversy and incivility surrounding the issue (Nie and
Wyman 2005; Mutz and Reeves 2005). My survey also controls for these factors.
3
798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
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process. Our nation must defend the sanctity of marriage.”4 Shortly thereafter, the proposed
amendment was introduced in both chambers of Congress, only to fail in each.
Not all state policy followed President Bush’s sentiment, but, by 2008, 45 states had
instituted some form of restriction on same-sex marriage. Some of these were passed by ballot
initiative, while others were passed in the state legislatures. Table 1 shows how each state in the
United States came to offer same-sex marriage benefits. Initially, judicial action seemed to drive
same-sex marriage recognition, however, over time, that pattern dissipated. Instead, judicial
action seems to have been the catalyst for the earliest state adoption of same-sex marriage
recognition, followed by a string of recognition via legislature and referenda. More recently,
however, court intervention picked up again. In 2014, the federal circuit courts began hearing
appeals and overwhelmingly overturned state bans on same-sex marriage. And, in late 2014, the
United States Supreme Court agreed to hear and decide on the issue of whether or not states can
constitutionally ban same-sex marriage, finally finding a constitutional right to same-sex
marriage that cannot be denied by any of the states in June 2015.5 In the end, on the issue of
same-sex marriage, all three branches of government played some role in expanding or limiting
same-sex marriage rights in the United States.
[Insert Table 1 Here]
The initial run of judicially conferred same-sex marriage rights, followed by positive
legislative intervention is interesting, though, in that it might suggest that the judicial branch acted
as a catalyst for legislators or that people and organizations began to push for these rights via
legislative enactment, perhaps due to concerns over the legitimacy or acceptability of the policy
coming from the judiciary. Indeed, a 2005 ABC News/Washington Post poll found that
4

Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/transcripts/bushtext_012004.html on June 27,
2014.
5
Obergefell v. Hodges (576 U.S. ___)
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40% of respondents felt that the state courts should handle the issue of same-sex marriage, while
45% felt that this issue was best left to state legislatures.6 By 2009, a Quinnipiac University poll
found that 43% of respondents felt that legislatures should handle the issue of same-sex
marriage, and only 25% felt that the courts should.7 While it is difficult to extrapolate any
meaningful inferences from this information without further analysis, it is fair to say that when it
comes to the issue of same-sex marriage, the public seems to deem to prefer the legislature make
policy in this area. These differences occur in other issue areas as well. For instance, when the
United States Supreme Court resolved the 2000 presidential election, only 24% of respondents
thought the issue should be left to either the U.S. Congress or Florida legislature, while 70%
thought the courts were the “right” actor (Gallup 2000).8 Likewise, in 2005, the country was
captivated by the fate of Terry Schiavo, a Florida woman in a persistent vegetative state. The
question facing the family was whether or not to end life support, and it became an issue with
national dimension when Congress attempted to legislate a solution. At that time, a CBS News
poll reported that 37% of respondents felt that the courts should be involved in resolving the
issue, while only 13% felt that Congress should intervene. While a majority of the public felt
that the government had minimal, if any, jurisdiction over the issue, they did see it as more
appropriate for resolution by the courts.
The conflict may also exist among the branches of government, with different branches
claiming to be the best-suited to make decisions, or actually making decisions that are in direct
conflict with the decision(s) of another branch of government. On the issue of closing
Guantanamo Bay, Americans have consistently shown a preference for keeping the detention

6

Retrieved from http://www.pollingreport.com/civil2.htm on June 27, 2014.

7
Ibid.
8

Retrieved from http://www.pollingreport.com/wh2post.htm on June 27, 2014.
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facility open.9 At the same time, Congress and President Obama have had a public disagreement
about the future of the facility, with the President calling for the closing of the facility, and
Congress having instituted a congressional ban on transferring detainees to the United States.10
And, on the issue of online taxation, Americans are divided, with Gallup11 finding that 57% of
survey respondents oppose requiring states to collect sales tax from online sales. Here, the
United States Supreme Court has held12 that merchants need not collect online sales tax from
sales in states in which they do not have a physical presence. The United States Senate, on the
other hand, passed the Marketplace Fairness Act in 2013, that would require online retailers to
collect sales tax for out-of-state sales. While the bill ultimately died in the House of
Representatives, the conflict between branches is evident. Indeed, there is often conflict between
the branches of government on important issues.
This recent poll data suggests that the public may deem some issues to be more
appropriately resolved by the other branches. We might expect, then, that the public will be
more willing to accept policies emanating from the “right” institution – the institution that most
people prefer to handle the policy. Policy acceptance, in this view, is not a simply story about
the court’s ability to enhance acceptance due to its increased legitimacy. Instead, the ability of
the institution to legitimate policy and enhance acceptance may be directly related to the public’s
view of which institution is best-suited to do so in the particular area of policy in which it is
working. The purpose of this dissertation is to begin to examine this phenomenon.

9

In 2007, Gallup found that 53% of survey respondents supporting keeping Guantanamo Bay open. In 2014, that
number had risen to 66%. Retrieved from http://www.gallup.com/poll/171653/americans-continue-oppose-closingguantanamo-bay.aspx on June 27, 2014.
10
Retrieved from http://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-weighs-options-to-close-guantanamo-1412899358 on June
27, 2014.
11
Retrieved from
http://www.gallup.com/poll/163184/americans-especially-young-oppose-internet-salestax.aspx on June 27, 2014.
12
Quill Corp v. North Dakota (504 U.S. 298).
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In Chapter II a theoretical foundation is provided about institutional legitimacy,
institutional preference, and policy acceptance. Legitimacy has been studied exhaustively, but
almost exclusively as it pertains to the judicial system. This is due to the fact that the courts have
no enforcement power of their decisions, as such relying on the other branches of government to
implement and enforce its decisions. If members of the other branches of government do not do
so, and/or if the public, en masse, decides to ignore the court’s decisions, then the power of the
judicial system evaporates. Institutional legitimacy is certainly important to all branches of
government; however, Congress and the presidency are constitutionally constructed in such a
way that make it appear to be more accountable (i.e., elections), so inhabitants of these
institutions can be removed from their offices if the public is unsatisfied with them. Additionally,
Congress and the presidency have enforcement mechanisms that the federal courts do not,
meaning that the courts, and their decisions, are, arguably, beholden to the goodwill and
acquiescence of the public in unique ways. Within this context, then, it takes no stretch of the
imagination to consider that the courts are especially sensitive to the shifting tides of legitimacy
in ways that Congress and the presidency are not. Therefore, legitimacy in the institution is
viewed as critical to the federal judicial system’s power, but it is also important to examine
legitimacy as it pertains to Congress and the presidency. Policy acceptance is tied to legitimacy,
in that increased legitimacy feeds increased acceptance of policies (Mondak 1992). This is
regardless of the institution making policy. As such, legitimacy, and our understanding of it, is
important to all branches of American government.
Chapter III focuses on comparative legitimacy of the three American institutions of
government, drawn from legitimacy literature that has been defined almost exclusively within
judicial scholarship. Legitimacy theory involves the normative idea than an institution has
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authority to make decisions (Gibson 2008). As previously mentioned, policy acceptance has
been tied to institutional legitimacy (Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2005), as has the fairness of
the process (Tyler 1990; 2006). Therefore, it is important to understand how individuals feel
about the branches of government as well as how individuals perceive the policymaking process
if we want to understand how well certain types of policies will be received. Indeed, enhanced
compliance is necessary to any functioning government. The theoretical premise accepted here is
that legitimacy influences acceptance, and acceptance influences compliance. Steps are taken in
Chapter III to determine which variables influence legitimacy for each of the three branches of
American government. Further, Chapter III deconstructs the established legitimacy index in an
effort to ensure that we are measuring what we say that we are measuring when we examine
legitimacy. A careful analysis of each of the variables is conducted in pursuit of a more perfect
index of legitimacy that reflects only long-term support in the institution(s).
Chapter IV focuses on institutional preference and those factors that matter to respondent
preference of which institution should handle which policy, including institutional legitimacy
and authority to make policy in certain issue areas. And, Chapter V examines the most important
factors to policy acceptance, which has been conceptualized as policy legitimacy (Mondak
1992). We already know that people “like” the courts more than the legislative and executive
branches. We know that this is due, in part to the fact that the courts are often seen to be less
conflictual and more fair in their decision making processes (Benesh 2006; Hibbing and TheissMorse 2002; Tyler and Rasinski 1991). We also know that people vary in their acceptance of
policies, based on certain aspects of the policymaking process (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995;
2002). Low acceptance can strain compliance, posing a challenge for democracy. Chapters IV
and V unravel the mysteries of which processes influence institutional preference and policy

9

acceptance in what ways. Understanding this can help us to craft better policy, by virtue of
adjusting the process by which we make those policies. The normative implications for
democracy cannot be understated. Efficiency is enhanced and waste is reduced when
compliance is high. To wit, high compliance may reduce lawsuits and other action to undo
unwanted policies. Also, higher compliance means less enforcement intervention is required,
pulling less on already-strained resources. At its most basic, high compliance portends a more
content populace. In order to get there, however, we must first understand the components that
matter to acceptance – chiefly, legitimacy and preference (rank). This is the purpose of this
dissertation.

10

Table 1: Same-Sex Marriage Legality, by State, Year, and Institution
Table 1. State Same-Sex Marriage Benefits, by Year and Branch

Massachusetts
Connecticut
Iowa
Vermont
New Hampshire
District of Columbia*
New York
Washington
Maine
Maryland
California
Delaware
Minnesota
Rhode Island
New Jersey
Hawaii
New Mexico
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Illinois
Indiana
Oklahoma
Utah
Virginia
Wisconsin
Colorado
Nevada
West Virginia
North Carolina
Idaho
Alaska
Arizona
Wyoming
Montana
South Carolina
Florida
Remaining States

Year

Branch

2003
2008
2009
2009
2010
2010
2011
2012
2012
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2015
2015

Judicial (State Court)
Judicial (State Court)
Judicial (State Court)
Legislative
Legislative
Legislative
Legislative
Legislative



Referendum

Referendum


Legislative Referendum

Judicial (State Court) Legislative

Legislative
Legislative
Legislative
Judicial (State Court)
Legislative
Judicial (State Court)
Judicial (Federal Court)
Judicial (Federal Court)
Legislative
Judicial (Federal Court)
Judicial (Federal Court)
Judicial (Federal Court)
Judicial (Federal Court)
Judicial (Federal Court)
Judicial (State Court)
Judicial (Federal Court)
Judicial (Federal Court)
Judicial (Federal Court)
Judicial (Federal Court)
Judicial (Federal Court)
Judicial (Federal Court)
Judicial (Federal Court)
Judicial (Federal Court)
Judicial (Federal Court)
Judicial (Federal Court)
Judicial (Federal Court)

*District of Columbia is included, because it is not bound to any state law and, therefore, can act as its own state
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CHAPTER II
THEORY AND METHODOLOGY
In this dissertation project, I examine policy acceptance, specifically, those institutional
and issue-related factors that might influence public acceptance of policies. Policy acceptance
may hinge on many factors; however, I argue that characteristics of both the institution making
the policy, and the issue itself, impact public acceptance of the policy. In this context, then, there
may be an institution that is “best-suited” to handle certain policies. The “best-suited” or “right”
institution is the one that embodies the institutional characteristics necessary to process certain
policies in such a way as to maximize public acceptance of those policies. And, this may change
dependent on those characteristics. I argue that different institutions may be the “right”
institution to handle certain policies due to institution- and issue-level characteristics that are
examined here. The “right” institution, then, is conceptualized as the one having the authority to
make policy on a particular issue. And, as such, it has legitimating capacity in that issue area; it
has the ability to enhance acceptance of that policy (Tyler 2004). When individuals feel that an
institution has legitimacy, they imbue that institution with a certain authority, and they are
willing to acquiesce to that authority (Tyler 2004). In fact, people feel a sense of responsibility to
follow the directions of legitimacy authority, even when it runs counter to their own preferences
(French and Raven 1959; Merelman 1966). It seems that as legitimacy increases, the need for
coercion to obtain compliance decreases (Dogan 1992). This willful compliance with any given
law is conceptualized here as policy acceptance.
I proceed by examining the influences of institutional legitimacy and institutional
preference to handle certain issues, or policy areas, before examining three specific policies –
same-sex marriage, online sales taxation, and the continued operation of the Guantanamo Bay
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Detention Facility – and those factors that influence acceptance of these three policies emanating
from each of the three branches of American government – the presidency, Congress, and the
United States Supreme Court. First, in the next chapter, I examine institutional legitimacy across
United States institutions, beginning with a well-established battery of survey questions that,
taken together, has been used to create an index of judicial legitimacy. For the first time, this
index is applied to all three branches of American government – the presidency, Congress, and
the Supreme Court – in an effort to talk about institutional legitimacy in a more holistic way than
has previously been done. In pursuit of a more perfect measure of legitimacy, this project
disaggregates the traditional judicial legitimacy index and analyzes the appropriateness of each
variable utilized in the index, ultimately offering a new, more precise, way to measure
institutional legitimacy. Further, and more appropriate to the purpose of this dissertation, I
examine the potential consequences of institutional legitimacy (Chapter III) and preference
(Chapter IV), focusing on public acceptance of certain policies (Chapter V), emanating from the
different branches of government, making the argument that the American public cares which
branch of government makes which types of policies. This research takes the work of Hibbing
and Theiss-Morse (2002) beyond an understanding that the American public cares about the
processes (irrespective of policy preference) by which policies are made, and unpacks the
question of which types of processes matter and why, suggesting that the unique constitutional
structure of each branch lends itself to certain processes that may be more, or less,
complementary to enhancing acceptance of certain types of policies. For instance, Congress’
constitutional duty to manage the country’s purse may naturally lead to increased public
acceptance of monetary policy emanating from that institution more so than from one of the
others. This provides the scholarship with a better understanding of policy acceptance, and may
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offer a roadmap for policy- and lawmakers when crafting law. If good law reflects the will of
the people, and receives high levels of public support, then any tools at the disposal of policyand lawmakers in crafting policy to enhance acceptance of the policy are invaluable.
These tools can be related to process and/or role expectation. If the process matters to
policy acceptance, then policymakers may be able to manipulate those processes to enhance
public acceptance. For instance, if it matters to acceptance that fair processes are followed in
making policy, then policymakers can highlight those processes to the public and/or take extra
steps to engage fair processes more openly, relying on public feedback or solicit input from
numerous experts. In addition, institutional characteristics may lend an institution some degree
of authority or legitimating capacity more so than another institution that could inform the
branch through which a policy may be funneled to maximize acceptance. This is tied to the fact
that we know that low levels of satisfaction with the process by which policy is made can lead
to less compliance with the policy, regardless of an individual’s policy preference (see, i.e., Nye
and Zelikow 1997; Scholz and Lubell 1998; Tyler 1990).
In this chapter a theoretical foundation is provided about institutional legitimacy,
preference (conceptualized via institutional rank to make policy in certain areas), and policy
acceptance. Legitimacy has been studied exhaustively, but almost exclusively as it pertains to the
judicial system. This is likely due to the fact that legitimacy is especially important to the courts,
which have no enforcement power of their decisions, relying on the other branches of government
to implement and enforce their decisions. If members of the other branches of government do not
do so, and/or if the public, en masse, decides to ignore the court’s decisions, then the power of the
judicial system evaporates. Institutional legitimacy is certainly important to all branches of
government; however, Congress and the presidency are constitutionally
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constructed to be more accountable, so inhabitants of these institutions can be removed from
their offices if the public is unsatisfied with them. Additionally, Congress and the presidency
have enforcement mechanisms that the federal courts do not, meaning that the courts, and their
decisions, are, arguably, beholden to the goodwill and acquiescence of the public in unique ways.
But, though legitimacy is viewed as critical to the federal judicial system’s power, it is still
important to examine legitimacy as it pertains to Congress and the presidency. Policy acceptance
is tied to legitimacy, in that increased legitimacy feeds increased acceptance of policies,
regardless of the institution making policy (Mondak 1992). As such, legitimacy, and our
understanding of it, is important to all branches of American government.
In this project, institutional legitimacy refers to legitimacy for a specific branch of
government, and policy acceptance refers to acceptance and support for a specific policy,
irrespective of the institution making the policy. Indeed, legitimacy scholarship has used many
different terms to talk about diffuse support – trust, confidence, support, legitimacy (see, i.e.,
Caldeira 1986; Tyler 1990; Caldeira and Gibson 1992; Hetherington 1998; Benesh 2006; Gibson
and Caldeira 2009b) – but, these terms have very specific definitions that do not completely
capture the essence of institutional legitimacy alone. Here, I will use the terms “institutional
legitimacy” and “diffuse support” exclusively to talk about long-term, enduring support for an
institution. Policy acceptance has also been referred to as policy legitimacy (Mondak 1992). To
avoid confusion, when I talk about “policy acceptance,” I am referring to respondent willingness
to abide by and not challenge a policy. More clearly, I assert that respondents accept policy
when the process by which that policy came to be is perceived to have merit; to have come about
“appropriately.” The necessity of this caveat highlights the difficulty that the scholarship has in
discussing legitimacy and its role in democratic policymaking. It is incredibly important that we
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start using appropriate, and exclusive, language when we talk about these concepts. To continue
to do as we have done confounds our understanding of legitimacy, acceptance, and compliance.
Here, I argue that institutional legitimacy and preference influence policy acceptance. This, in
turn, influences compliance (which is not examined here). And, so, to understand policy
acceptance, we must understand institutional legitimacy, and we must understand what drives
preference for one institution to make policy over another. I turn now to a discussion of
institutional legitimacy and what we know, thus far, about what influences legitimacy and how
legitimacy behaves.
LEGITIMACY
Institutional legitimacy, or diffuse support, has been conceptualized as enduring
support for an institution, irrespective of its inhabitants or its outputs (Easton 1965), that is not
influenced by short-term considerations or feelings. Instead, “diffuse support refers to a
‘reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will that helps members [of the public] to accept or
tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effects of which they see as damaging to their
wants’” (Easton 1965, 273). Subsequent research has suggested that diffuse support is a form of
“institutional loyalty; a support that is not contingent upon satisfaction with the immediate outputs
of the institution” (Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2003b, 356). Furthermore, these same researchers
argue that institutional loyalty precludes a loss of commitment to the institution even if it fails to
make pleasing policy in the short-term. In essence, diffuse support (i.e., legitimacy) is a robust
loyalty to an institution that is seemingly impervious to negative short-term perturbations. Specific
support, on the other hand, is “satisfaction with the immediate outputs of the institution” (Gibson,
Caldeira, and Spence 2003b, 356). Specific support can fluctuate, dependent on an individual’s
agreement, or disagreement, with any given decision, act, or
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behavior emanating from an institution. We can imagine that an individual may have a strong
level of disappointment or dislike for any given presidential action (a lack of specific support),
while still maintaining high regard for the office of the presidency (a high degree of diffuse
support). We may support the position of a specific Supreme Court Justice on any decision (high
degree of specific support), while still holding the Court, overall, in low esteem (low degree of
diffuse support). And, as we already know13, Americans tend to like their own representative in
Congress (high degree of specific support), but dislike Congress, as a whole (low degree of
diffuse support).
In a sense, measuring legitimacy in the court system is easier to do, in that the institution
is designed in such a way that we, as the public, rarely consider the inhabitants of the institution.
This differs from Congress and the presidency. We do not elect Supreme Court Justices, so this
insulates us from thinking about individual justices. And, when the Court does issue decisions,
there may be some attention to the writers of the majority opinion (or the concurrences and
dissents), but, largely, these decisions are referenced as products of the Court, and not an
individual person. This stands in stark contrast to Congress and the presidency, wherein we elect
our representatives, and the person inhabiting the office at any given time embodies the
institution for that period of time. This makes it difficult for us to differentiate between the office
and the inhabitant of the office sometimes. Often, when we measure any form of
“legitimacy” for Congress and the presidency, we rely on measures of job approval; however,
this is a short-term measure of support that is directly associated with a person, or persons, and
not the institution. Here, I apply the traditional legitimacy index, as it has been utilized with the
courts, to Congress and the presidency, altering some of the questions in an attempt to tap into
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Since 1994, Gallup has periodically asked survey respondents how they feel about Congress and how they feel about
their own representative. See, i.e., http://www.gallup.com/poll/178487/americans-member-congress-not.aspx
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diffuse support, true institutional legitimacy, or commitment to the governmental role of the
institution for these branches of government. In doing so, we can certainly draw from the
information gleaned from the judicial legitimacy literature, expecting that, perhaps, these
findings may also be important to the other two branches of government.
We know that, lacking adequate resources, people rely on cues or shortcuts to fill their
informational gaps, and when they do, the source of the information often influences the
perception of the information (Chaiken 1980; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1997; Mondak 1993a,
1993b; Birnbaum and Stegner 1979). Depending on how strongly attitudes are held about the
source, and in what direction, source effects can positively or negatively impact perceptions of
policy (Mondak 1993b). Hence, the same policy emanating from different institutions might be
perceived differently by the public. Mondak (1990), for example, considers policies about
student speech and search and seizure in an experimental design, varying the institution to which
the policy is credited from the Supreme Court, to a high school principal, to the police, finding
that, when the same policy is attributed to the Court, the policy gains higher levels of approval
than when the policy is attributed to either of the other two actors. Other scholars find similarly
(Clawson, Kegler, and Waltenburg 2001; Hoekstra and Segal 1996; Stoutenborough, HaiderMarkel, and Allen 2006; Grosskopf and Mondak 1998; Mondak 1994). Additionally, it appears
that the Court is able to confer legitimacy even among those individuals that oppose the Court’s
decision, suggesting that the Court may also possess a persuasive function that leads to policy
acceptance (Mondak 1994).
While the ability of the courts to confer legitimacy has been shown to be limited by
salience, political context, attitudes toward groups, and the structure of public opinion (Hoekstra
and Segal 1996; Franklin and Kosaki 1989; Stoutenborough, Haider-Markel, and Allen 2006),
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previous research has not considered the degree to which the public views the courts as the
“right,” the “best,” or the “most authoritative” decision maker to make policy in every issue. To
do so, at minimum, we must be able to provide some comparative analysis of legitimacy for each
of the three American lawmaking bodies – the judiciary, the executive, and the legislature.
Indeed, I expect that the public holds opinions over which institution of government is best
suited to make policy in a given issue area, and that those notions affect the degree to which an
institution can function as a policy legitimator (influencing policy acceptance).14 Legitimacy and
its derivatives will play a role in those appraisals. Therefore, I expect that, as institutional
legitimacy increases, so too does the extent to which a respondent prefers it (ranks it highly) to
resolve a certain policy. In addition, I also expect that as legitimacy increases, so does the
likelihood that acceptance of the policy will increase.
Short- vs. Long-Term Evaluations
Institutional legitimacy has been measured in many ways over time; however, almost all
legitimacy indices have included some variation of survey questions that tap into levels of trust,
confidence, willingness to do away with the institution, perceptions of whether the institution is
mixed up in politics, respondent willingness to challenge a decision with which they disagree,
and belief that the institution favors some groups over others. I will spend more time later in this
chapter talking about how these questions have been used in the literature. For now, though, it is
important to remember that a measure of institutional legitimacy, to be considered adequate,
must be tapping into long-term sentiment toward the institution. As such, each variable included
in a legitimacy index absolutely must be representing diffuse support for an institution. And, if it
does not, then we are not able to say anything meaningful about legitimacy and, therefore, policy
14

It is certainly the case that the religious right, in its use of the pejorative “activism” label would argue that some
issues should be kept from the courts. Justices on the Supreme Court itself often opine thusly (see, e.g., Justice

Scalia’s dissenting opinions in Atkins v. Virginia or in Lawrence v. Texas).
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acceptance. In fact, if we are not adequately measuring legitimacy, then the assumptions about
legitimacy, and subsequent inferences drawn, that we have come to accept as truth may be, to put it
bluntly, wrong. There is, at minimum, enough question about some of the oft-used variables that
throws the veracity of the index into question. Specifically, I critique the inclusion of trust,
confidence, whether the institution favors some groups over others, and whether the institution gets
too mixed up in politics as inappropriate measures of diffuse support for an institution.

In a representative democracy, the people must trust those who govern them, and, hence,
political scientists have frequently turned their focus to the study of that trust,15 as an indicator
of institutional legitimacy. Much of the research that examines trust in American politics
suggests that trust is a measure of satisfaction with the current outputs of an institution, and not
an enduring commitment or loyalty to an institution. In essence, most research eschews the idea
that trust is an indicator of some reservoir of good will. This is a distinctly different
conceptualization of trust than is used in the judicial legitimacy literature. This difference has
been noted, and Citrin (1974) argues that political events and expectations, specifically policy
dissatisfaction, have been the leading cause of any declining trust in American government. He
warns that researchers should be careful to distinguish “dissatisfaction with current government
policy positions, dissatisfaction with the outcomes of ongoing events and policies, mistrust of
incumbent officeholders, and rejection of the entire political system” (987). This research
suggests that the judicial legitimacy literature may be misrepresenting the role of trust in
American government.
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The terminology, of course varies from “trust” to “confidence” to “support” to “legitimacy,” but the attention
paid by scholars has been continuous over many years. (See, i.e., Easton 1975; Caldeira 1986; Tyler 1990; Caldeira
and Gibson 1992; Nye 1997; Hetherington 1998; Mondak and Smithey 1997; Benesh 2006; Gibson and Caldeira
2009a, 2009b; and many others).
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While we know that the Courts enjoy a higher degree of trust and confidence than
Congress or the presidency (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1998), we do not know very much about
why people differentially trust these institutions. Research speculates that procedures have
something to do with this, as the unliked Congress engages in public political combat (Hibbing
and Theiss-Morse 1995) while the well-loved courts proceed in ways seen as procedurally fair
and unbiased (Tyler 1990), but no empirical evidence has been brought to bear. Since Congress
and the presidency, unlike the federal courts, rely on direct election, this low level of trust is seen
as a challenge for democracy (Donovan and Bowler 2004; Putnam 2000). Positive assessments
of government are grounded in trust (Miller 1974; Tolbert and Mossberger 2006), and increased
trust in an institution is linked to increased confidence in that institution (Brehm and Rahn
1997). The analysis here goes further than just an examination of the influence of trust on
legitimacy, seeking instead to truly determine what drives legitimacy and, within that context,
what role short-term approval of decisions and personnel might have on that understanding.
Staton (2006) argues that judicial trust may be distinct from diffuse support altogether,
and Mishler and Rose (2001, 38) describe trust as a “running tally” of evaluations of past
governmental performance, in much the same way as Fiorina (1981) conceptualized party
identification. They (2001) find that institutional trust is influenced by performance, rather than
cultural factors, such as interpersonal trust in a society, or the state of its civic culture. Trust
grows with positive evaluations of government performance. Additionally, Keele (2005) finds
that trust is influenced by a number of factors, including presidential approval, economic
performance, congressional approval, scandal, and crime – all short-term measures of
satisfaction. Keele also finds that partisans trust government more when their own party is in
power, suggesting that trust is linked to expected outputs or policies dependent on those making
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them. Mutz and Reeves (2005, 1) make a further point by noting that “incivility in public
discourse” degrades trust in government, when they examine television talk-show shouting and
its impact on viewers. Together, these findings suggest that evaluation of incumbents, as well as
short-term indicators of satisfaction, strongly influence levels of trust in government.
Other short-term retrospective explanations have also been tied to gains and declines in
government trust. In a text dedicated to the examination of what we know about trust in
government, numerous authors find government inefficiency, financial irresponsibility, and poor
spending decisions to be strong determinants of declining trust. Each of these suggests that
recent performance of government is linked to trust in that government (Nye 1997). In fact, Nye
(1997) writes that, when individuals are queried about trust in government, their evaluations of
government are driven by evaluations of performance, and not by a general, encompassing
attitude about the scope of government or its institutions.
Some authors (Bok 1997, Lawrence 1997, and Mansbridge 1997) go further and suggest that,
beyond just evaluations of performance, expectations of performance also drive trust in government.
Some chapters examine specific events in American history, such as the Vietnam War and
Watergate, and suggest that these events may explain levels of trust in government (e.g., Lawrence
1997), and others point to party polarization as an explanatory factor (King 1997). Each chapter,
though, argues that declines in trust in government are driven by evaluations of performance, as
opposed to some long-term, institutional reservoir of good will. This runs strongly counter to judicial
legitimacy literature, which implicitly argues that trust is one measure, of many, that, taken together,
explain diffuse support for an institution (see, i.e., Gibson 1989; Caldeira and Gibson 1992; Gibson
and Caldeira 1995; Gibson, Caldeira, and Baird
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1998; Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2003a; Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2005; Gibson 2008;
Gibson and Caldeira 2009a, 2009b).
It is not that we should not consider trust to matter in evaluations of government. We
know that trust in government is influenced by, and, in turn, influences, perceptions of
lawmakers and political offices. And, some research has found that trust is incredibly important
to a strong democracy, since Congress and the presidency, unlike the federal courts, rely on
direct election (Donovan and Bowler 2004; Putnam 2000). Indeed, low levels of trust challenge
democracy, because trust has been linked to voter participation (Hetherington 1998, 1999),
acceptance of policies (Suh and Han 2003), and compliance with laws (Tyler 1990; Scholz and
Lubell 1998). However, trust ought not to be considered as a component of institutional
legitimacy as it has (Gibson 1989; Caldeira and Gibson 1992; Gibson and Caldeira 1995;
Gibson, Caldeira, and Baird 1998; Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2003a; Gibson, Caldeira, and
Spence 2005; Gibson 2008; Gibson and Caldeira 2009a, 2009b; and many others) which is
essential to the operation of the branches of government (specifically, the courts). If perceptions
of the economy (Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibab and Limongi 1996), scandals, crime levels
(Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn 2000), job approval (Hetherington 1998; Keele 2007; Mishler and
Rose 2001), media behavior (Mutz and Reeves 2005), partisanship, and ideological congruence
(Keele 2005; Rudolph and Evans 2005) all drive trust in government, and these are all decidedly
short-term factors, then including trust in an index purporting to measure diffuse, or long-term,
support seems to be less than desirable.
Further, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995; 2002) make the argument that the American
public has much distaste for the business of politics and, therefore, holds Congress and, to a
lesser degree, the presidency in lower esteem than the Supreme Court, given the extent to which
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politics drives decisions in those bodies. To be sure, it would appear that this belief about
politicization reflects poorly on the institution; however, there is an argument to be made that it
may be impacting approval of the inhabitants of an institution, which would be an indicator of
specific support. It is not difficult to imagine that when people think about politics, specific
politicians and other individuals come to mind, and there is evidence that we sometimes frame
questions about politics within that context. Take, for instance, questions that The Harris Poll16
asked of respondents in December 2000, following the disputed presidential election results in
Florida. Respondents were asked:
“Thinking of the decisions made by the courts concerning the
Florida election, do you believe that the decisions made by
individual judges in Florida mainly reflect the political views of the
judges or mainly reflect their impartial legal judgments,” and
“Thinking about the decisions made by the courts concerning the
Florida election, do you believe that the decisions made by
individual judges in the Supreme Court mainly reflect the political
views of the judges or mainly reflect their impartial legal
judgments?”
Likewise, in the same year, a Reuters/NBC News/Zogby poll asked respondents if they
felt that “the Supreme Court has maintained an objective balance or has it become too
political?”17 There is also evidence that individual members of Congress are held accountable
for an environment that is “too political.” When Reuters/Ipsos asked respondents in May 2015
about this, 57% of respondents stated that Congress operates better “when the extremists on
either side don’t have as much leverage.”18 This focus on “extremists” within the institution, as

well as a wide perception that these individuals negatively impact the institution, would lead us
to believe that, perhaps, institutions are punished for the bad behavior of its inhabitants.
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http://www.pollingreport.com/wh2post.htm

17
Ibid.
18

http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/15/us-usa-congress-poll-idUSKBN0O00C120150515
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These findings suggest that, at minimum, respondents may be having some difficulty
separating inhabitants of an institution from the institution when they think about the political
environment of the institution. If this is the case, then questions about how political an
institution is, as well as whether or not the institution favors some groups over others (meaning
that the public perception is that the outcomes of the institutions seem to benefit certain groups
over other groups), may not be tapping into pure diffuse support, or institutional legitimacy. At
the least, this confusion deserves some examination and, so, I will consider these variables
when determining short- vs. long-term evaluation of an institution.
Finally, I also take a closer look at the measure of confidence in an institution. Given that
confidence and trust have been so often studied in tandem, sometimes even being used
interchangeably (see, i.e., Easton 1975; Caldeira 1986; Tyler 1990; Caldeira and Gibson 1992;
Dogan 1992; Nye 1997; Hetherington 1998; Mondak and Smithey 1997; Gibson and Caldeira 2009),
it stands to reason that a critical look is necessary to parse the two concepts and determine which, if
either, is actually measuring long-term sentiment for an institution. Additionally, some research has
evidenced that disagreement with specific Court decisions reduces confidence in the Court,
suggesting a short-term affect to Court behavior. While most legitimacy indices have included some
measure of confidence in the institution (see, i.e., Caldeira 1986; Tyler 1990; Caldeira and Gibson
1992; Hetherington 1998; Benesh 2006; Gibson and Caldeira 2009a, 2009b), other research has been
explicit that confidence in an institution should not be confused with institutional legitimacy (Citrin
1974). Further, Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence (2003b) argue that confidence taps into both short- and
long-term sentiment for the courts, but that it is a much stronger indicator of specific, rather than
diffuse, support. Subsequent research has borne this out, showing that even a dramatic loss of
confidence does not translate to a subsequent drop in
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legitimacy (Lipset and Schneider 1983). If extant research can reveal that confidence and legitimacy
operate independently of each other and that a shift in confidence, even a dramatic one, does not
alter legitimacy, then it is, at minimum, incumbent upon any legitimacy researcher to examine the
efficacy of including confidence as a variable measure of institutional legitimacy.

I am not suggesting, however, that those shorter-term measures that have been included
in the legitimacy index are of no worth. Indeed, I argue that both short- and long-term
legitimacy (specific and diffuse support) are critical to the functioning of government. Dogan
(1992) posits that a decline in trust and confidence, both being short-term indicators of support
for an institution, can cause serious damage to the ability to govern. This is also true of valid
long-term institutional legitimacy – a steady and persistent decline could lead to a governing
crisis. The two concepts, though, do need to be understood, and evaluated, as distinct from each
other. Moving forward, having the information we now have with the research provided here,
we will be able to study institutional legitimacy more accurately. Chapter III tackles the
questions about legitimacy outlined here. However, understanding legitimacy and those factors
that influence institutional legitimacy are but just one facet of the necessary analysis to
understand policy acceptance. As previously mentioned, institutional preference to handle
certain issues is also important to understanding why individuals may be more accepting of
policies emanating from one institution rather than another.
INSTITUTIONAL PREFERENCE
Institutional preference to handle certain matters may help us to understand, not only
which branches of government respondents prefer to handle certain policies, but also how policy
can be made on certain issues to maximize acceptance. Conventional wisdom tells us that those
things that are ranked higher are more preferred. Numerous public opinion and trade-based
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polls19 rank businesses, programs, people, universities, products, etc., with the higher ranked
items being more highly valued. It follows then, that when respondents rank an institution higher
than others to make policy in certain issue areas, they will, likewise, be more accepting of those
policies emanating from that institution. Empirically, ranking is used in choice modeling to
determine respondent preferences (Hanley, Mourato, and Wright 2001), as well as to establish
expectations, which allows researchers to validate or challenge assumptions (Manski 2004).
Here, I expect that institutional legitimacy and institutional authority will matter to rank of
institutions to handle certain issues. These expectations are largely grounded in institution-level
characteristics that inform respondent perception about the appropriate institution to handle
particular issues. Specifically, given that institutional legitimacy informs acceptance and
compliance, as explained earlier, I expect that respondent preference for a certain institution
over another to make policy on certain issues to also matter to acceptance and, thus, compliance.
In the same vein, I expect an increasing belief that an institution holds authority to make policy
in certain areas to influence preference for that institution to make policy in those issue areas.
Rank-ordered logistic regression (Beggs, Cardell, and Hausman 1981) allows researchers
to examine rank-ordering of preferences to determine what drives rank, and has been utilized in
numerous research areas, including economics (Porter and Zona 1993), social psychology
(Kamakura and Mazzon 1991), marketing (Chintagunta 2002), and sociology (Allison and
Christakis 1994). Further, and specific to ranking institutions to make certain policies, Benesh
and Fettig (2011) find that ranking matters to the Court on the issue of same-sex marriage, such
that, the higher the rank, the more approving of the decision emanating from the institution.
Given this extant research, the expectation here is that higher ranked institutions to handle
certain policies will garner greater acceptance for the decisions they make on those policies than
19

See, i.e., http://www.usnews.com/rankings for numerous examples.
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lower ranked institutions. As such, respondents were asked to rank each branch of government
as to its appropriateness to make policy on three distinct issues. Specifically, respondents were
asked to rank the institutions from best- to least-suited to make policy on each of the issues.
Chapter IV examines the implications and determinants of these rankings, wherein the primary
dependent variable will be respondent ranking of institutions from best- to least-suited to
handle each issue. It is these rankings that embody an institutional preference to make policy in
certain issue areas.
POLICY ACCEPTANCE
In examining what factors influence a respondent’s acceptance of a policy (legalization of
same-sex marriage, closing of Guantanamo Bay, and online taxation), I expect both institutional
legitimacy and preference to matter. As previously mentioned, I define policy acceptance as the
willingness to mitigate public challenges to, and enhance compliance with, a policy.20
We know that the threat of sanctions increases acceptance and compliance with policy
(He 2005), and that “process matters” (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2001), specifically that when
members of the public feel as if they have been actively heard in the policymaking process
(Skogstad 2003; Wallner 2008), that the process was fair (Tyler 2001; Sunshine and Tyler 2003;
Ohnuma, Hirose, Karasawa, Yorifuji, and Sugiura 2005; Machura 1998), and that their wishes
were considered (Skogstad 2003; Smoke 1994), they are more likely to accept a policy. As these
variables will be considered as drivers of institutional legitimacy, they will not be included in the
policy acceptance models. Rather, any influence they may play in acceptance may be reflected in
the predictors of institutional legitimacy. In addition, the perceived level of controversy
20

Policy acceptance has been referred to by many monikers, including policy legitimacy (see i.e., Hanberger
2003; Mondak 1994; Smoke 1994). While I do not intend to argue that the language here confounds distinct
concepts, I will reference policy acceptance throughout this dissertation. This clarification is especially necessary
when we know that legitimacy informs acceptance (Tyler 2006a, 2006b; Tyler and Darley 2000), and crosstalk
will further confuse the discussion.
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surrounding an issue impacts acceptance of policy on that issue, such that increased
controversy tends to decrease acceptance (Nie and Wyman 2005).
However, the extant literature does not much pay much heed to the source of the policy,
and the subsequent ability of that source to influence acceptance of its policies. There are, then,
numerous institution- and issue-level characteristics that may influence policy acceptance. I
examine these characteristics here.
In the American constitutional system, each of the three branches has specific “jobs,” as
outlined in the Constitution, and, as such, I expect that people have constitutionally-based
expectations about each institution (Petrie 1997). For instance, Congress is assigned the “power
of the purse,” tasked with managing the country’s budgeting and finances, including taxation.
The Supreme Court holds both original and appellate jurisdiction, and is expected to settle
existing controversies between participants about United States law. And the President is
constitutionally bound to command the country’s armed forces, make treaties, and appoint
persons to specific governmental postings. In addition to these constitutional constructs, the
institutions have evolved in such a way as to occupy more normative space in the American
governmental system; space that is separate from functions outlined in the Constitution. More
generally, the Supreme Court is tasked with protecting the Constitution (Barak and Fried 2002).
Congress is expected to write laws that can withstand judicial review (Burbank 2004), while the
President is expected to act in the national and public interest, focusing on building consensus
across the branches (Smith 1981). The examination of these variables, conducted in Chapter II,
is expected to explain institutional legitimacy, leading me to expect that as more legitimate
institutions make policies, people are more likely to accept those policies (Tyler and Fagan 2008;
Mondak 1990; Mondak 1993a; Mondak 1994; Tyler 2006a; Tyler and Darley 2000), which then
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increases compliance (Tyler 1997; 2006a; 2007). Therefore, institutional legitimacy should
drive policy acceptance.
A preference for a specific institution to make policy in certain issues areas should also
matter to levels of policy acceptance. Examining respondent ranking of institutions as to its
“suitedness” to make policy in each of the issue areas, I expect that authority and legitimacy
will drive these preferences. Further, I expect that these preferences, driven by institutional
legitimacy and authority, will also be important to policy acceptance.
The level of politicization of an issue21 could be important to policy acceptance.
Politicization is tied to electoral politics. Remember, as mentioned earlier, the design of the
Supreme Court insulates it from politicization, in that its members need not seek public favor to
maintain their jobs. Congress and the presidency, on the other hand, are inherently political
institutions, in that the inhabitants much stand for election at regular intervals, making them
sensitive to public opinion. Politicization of an issue, then, happens when politicians seek to
influence public opinion on an issue. Here, I am not interested in whether or not this is actually
happening, but rather, whether respondents perceive an issue to have been politicized. For the
purposes of this dissertation project, it does not matter if respondents believe politicization to be
related to conflict between political parties or between institutions; only that they believe it
exists. As a result, level of politicization is conceptualized only inasmuch as respondents believe
that it exists on the three issues in the survey. While the court system in America is one of three
branches of political institutions, it is often considered to be the least political, or non-political
entirely, subject to no political accountability (Bickel 1986; Gibson and Caldeira 2009b; Choper
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For each of the issues, respondents were asked, “Do you consider the issue of (same-sex marriage; online sales
taxation; Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility’s operation) to be primarily: a moral/religious issue, a political issue,
a social issue, an economic issue, an issue about rights? I make no theoretical argument that any of the issues are
more or less political. Instead, I rely on respondents to determine this, based on their own perceptions.
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1980). Federal judges are not subject to elections, the very presence of which politicizes
(Bonneau and Hall 2009). Some argue that presenting and maintaining an image as an apolitical
institution is important for courts to maintain and enhance their legitimacy (Clark 2011).
This does not mean that the courts do not consider the public’s wishes. In fact, research
has shown that the courts do tend to consider public opinion in their rulings (Hoekstra and Segal
1996; Flemming and Wood 1997; Hoekstra 2000; McGuire and Stimson 2004); however, this
responsiveness is not tied to a judge’s desire to curry favor for reelection and so may seem less
political. And, most research also suggests that judges are informed more by a personal ideology
than any other factor (Segal and Spaeth 2002). As compared to the elected branches, then, courts
have more latitude to rule against the majority. Of course, the courts may be used to political
ends by the elected branches (Gillman 2002; Whittington 2005). Political partisans may leave
specific issues to the courts to avoid taking responsibility for a vote on the issue. Interest groups
may advance agendas in the friendly courts to circumvent an unfriendly legislature (Whittington
2005). Additionally, the appointment process is politically driven (Scherer 2005), with the
dominant parties seeking ends through the judiciary. Regardless of these possibilities, the
institutional design of the federal courts is decidedly not political in the same ways as the elected
branches.
Politics introduces conflict into a decisionmaking situation. We know from past research
that conflict increases the level of discomfort for people and that the courts benefit by not
displaying conflict publicly, unlike Congress and the President (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse
1998). Additionally, the decisionmaking process in the courts is widely perceived to be fair and
unbiased (Tyler 1990; 2006a), precisely because individuals involved in the conflict have the
ability to present their case and have it heard before the decision makers.
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Issues can be politicized, though. Quite often, policy can be framed in terms that
delineate sides or issues positions that are in opposition. For instance, advocates of same-sex
marriage argue for equal rights, while opponents argue against “special rights.” When political
elites become involved in framing the debate in this way, the issue becomes politicized.22
However, the extant literature supports two competing arguments, making it difficult to
draw a clear expectation about how politicization will impact an individual’s perception of
which institution should handle an issue. Given the levels of discomfort associated with the more
political branches, we might expect that people would seek the less political branch, the courts,
to address contentious issues. We might also expect, however, that people would assign political
issues to a political branch, as political issues should be considered by politicians. I expect that
perception of the politicization of an issue, that an issue is primarily about “politics,” will
influence the extent to which an institution is perceived to be appropriate to its resolution which,
in turn, will influence acceptance of the policy coming from that institution.
Countermajoritarianism, a characteristic of the American Constitutional design, could
have both institutional- and issue-level influence: for example, an issue perceived to be about
preserving rights may seem best resolved by an institution removed from majority influence.
The concern that a majority may be able to impose its will on a minority and, in fact, tyrannize
that minority, was considered in designing the American constitutional system (see, i.e., the

Federalist Papers published in Madison 1961). Indeed, the judiciary was constructed with this
in mind. Justices were to be appointed to life terms in order that they would remain insulated

22

When Republicans made same-sex marriage a platform issue in 2004, for example, campaigning against it and
introducing state ballot initiatives across the country to prevent it, they were framing the issue in a political context
(rather than a human rights context), such that the issue became ideologically charged and separable by
partisanship. While this may fit within the responsible party government framework (APSA 1950) as the
Republican Party establishes a clear position that allowed voters to determine which party was closer to their own
ideals, it just as surely politicizes the issue.
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from the politics of the legislature, and by extension, changes in public opinion (Murphy and
Tanenhaus 1990; Mishler and Sheehan 1993). The courts are the only of the three branches in
the American system designed in such a way that the minority may have as much access to it
as the majority.
The countermajoritarian tendency, then, is built into the institutional design of the
courts, and has been further embraced in the court’s own rules (e.g., the rule of four). The
countermajoritarian tendency is also apparent in the Court’s outcomes and courts are often seen
as protectors of minority rights and access (Gibson and Caldeira 2009b; Rosenberg 1991;
Scheingold 2004; McClain and Stewart 2006).23 While the ability of the courts to affect social
change may be questioned (Rosenberg 1991; Scheingold 2004), the fact that they provide an
avenue for the minority to be heard is one reason the judicial branch is considered to be
countermajoritarian.24
In addition, the Bill of Rights was designed to protect against government action
curtailing individual freedoms. Given that the federal courts interpret the Constitution (Barak
and Fried 2002), they inherently have the opportunity to hold the government accountable for
rights violations (Perry 1982). So, I expect that as an individual perceives an issue to address
rights, that individual will be more likely to deem the courts to be the appropriate institution to
address the issue. It follows, then, that when a decision on a “rights issue” is made by the courts,
it is more likely to be accepted.
METHODS

23

This depends heavily, however, on the ideological preferences of its members (Segal and Spaeth 2002) and is
discussed in further detail below.
24

Of course, this does not necessarily make the Court undemocratic given the extant executive and legislative
checks on the court and the role of minority rights protection in democratic governments (Madison 1961). In fact,
Whittington (2003; 2005) argues that the Court can be a friendly supporter of both Congress and the President,
subject to public opinion via these institutions, mitigating countermajoritarianism.
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Data for this dissertation was drawn from a specifically designed survey that was
administered via Qualtrics, and using Amazon.com’s MTurk platform to recruit survey
respondents. MTurk allows researchers to “hire” respondents (MTurkers) to complete tasks
online. Here, 1806 respondents were each paid $0.60 to complete a specially designed quasiexperimental survey over the course of three weeks in May 2013. An online survey was
deliberately chosen as the vehicle through which to gather response for a number of reasons.
First, responses times are shorter with online survey than they are with mail surveys (Sheehan
and McMillan 1999; Griffs, Goldsby, and Cooper 2003; McDonald and Adam 2003). Online
surveys are also faster and less expensive than face-to-face surveys (Scholl, Mulders, and Drent
2002). Second, online surveys have much higher response rates (60%) than do telephone surveys
(14%) (Rubin 2000). Given that time is important in any research project, but especially here,
where it was important to gather information about policies prior to one (or another) branch of
government settling the matter in real world time. For instance, had the issue of same-sex
marriage been settled prior to the fielding of the survey, it may have confounded findings for the
purposes of the project at hand. Certainly, at least on the issue of same-sex marriage, the debate
had been a salient public policy issue for a number of years prior to the fielding of the survey,
such that many respondents had probably already established a position on the issue. And, those
positions may have evolved over time. Nonetheless, preferences about which branch of
government should make policy on the issue would still remain the personal sentiment of each
respondent. Finally, online surveys are preferable when certain conditions exist. When the
researcher was strong methodological control over question ordering and presentation, online
surveys provide an opportunity that is more difficult with other survey methods (Evans and
Mathur 2005). The survey for this project required that respondents 1) move certain components
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to rank institutions, 2) be “taken” to different sections of the survey based on expressed
preferences, and 3) be randomly selected to receive one of eighteen vignettes outlining policy on
an issue area emanating from one of the institutions that ran counter to an earlier expressed
policy preference. These nuances are best handled by an online survey that can mechanically
handle these process challenges. Online surveys are also preferable when interviewer interaction
is not necessary (Evans and Mathur 2005). Here, no interviewer interaction was required or
necessary. In fact, given some of the complex methodological requirements, interviewer
interaction could have confused the respondent more so than the clearly defined requests
outlined in the online survey format. Indeed, Duffy et al. (2005) argue that, in some cases, social
desirability bias (the tendency of some respondents to seek to please their interviewers) is so
strong and potentially damaging to research outcomes that online surveying may be a better
avenue with which to survey individuals. Finally, fewer and fewer households have landlines in
our contemporary era, making it difficult to ensure an adequate cross-section of the American
public is sampled with the usual random digit dial.
Hence, an online survey was the best way to gather information necessary to this
dissertation project, and Amazon’s MTurk presented an unique opportunity to reach a national,
representative audience. While research has shown that MTurkers are slightly more liberal and
young (Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz, 2012), other research has identified MTurkers as “slightly
more demographically diverse than are standard Internet samples and are significantly more
diverse than typical American college samples (Buhrmester, Kwang, and Gosling 2011, 3). In
fact, “put simply, despite possible self-selection concerns, the MTurk subject pool is no worse
than convenience samples used by other researchers in political science” (Berinsky, Huber, and
Lenz 2012, 366). This is supported by other similar research, as well (Mason and Suri 2012).

38

While convenience samples can suffer from a lack of generalizability (Butler et al. 2005), survey
respondents utilized through MTurk “exhibit the classic heuristics and biases and pay attention
to directions at least as much as subjects from traditional sources” (Paolacci, Chandler, and
Ipeirotis 2010, 417), and focused research on MTurk respondents has revealed no significant
difference between MTurkers and other traditional samples drawn through other surveying
methods (Goodman, Cryder, and Cheema 2012). It has been noted that “MTurk participants
produce reliable results consistent with standard decisionmaking biases” (Goodman, Cryder, and
Cheema 2012), and classic research has been replicated using MTurk respondents with satisfying
results (Horton, Rand, and Zeckhauser 2011; Suri and Watts 2011). In sum, a diverse array of
questions may be utilized in ways with online surveys, and specifically Mechanical Turk, that
may not translate as well in other formats, a wide section of the intended population can be
reached at a relatively low cost, few staff are required, data can be collected quickly, questions
can be presented in a diverse array of formats, and respondents can take them, often, at a
convenient time of their choosing (Evans and Mathur 2005; Mason and Suri 2012).
Nonetheless, some challenges exist with online surveys. There is always the concern that
respondents may return and take the survey more than once, especially when being provided an
incentive, in this case monetary. Being sensitive to this fact, I recruited MTurk respondents via
the MTurk website and funneled them to Qualtrics to complete the survey. Qualtrics allows
researchers to limit the ability of any IP address to visit and complete the survey more than once,
which I did. Of course, this does mean that public computers may be “locked out” once the
survey has been taken once; however, this is a small and acceptable eventuality to ensure the
integrity of the survey. The likelihood of two respondents sitting down at the same public
computer to take the same national survey is scant and, even if that did occur, any potential
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respondent could still take the survey at another computer with no problems. Additionally, there
is a concern with online surveys that respondents may be able to gather information online to aid
them in answering questions posed to them. I did not neutralize this concern, because it simply
did not exist for my project. My survey sought to gather respondent preferences and perceptions
and, therefore, could be not compromised by any factual online search aid. Finally, the quality
of the MTurkers themselves may be in question. A concern exists that online survey takers
answer questions with no real thought or consideration, critically crippling results. This concern
is mitigated by some research showing that the quality of data provided by MTurkers meets or
exceeds the quality of survey respondents in other published research (Burhmester, Kwang, and
Gosling 2011). In order to be doubly indemnified, and in a further effort to inoculate against
“cheap” responses, however, I also chose to only accept MTurk respondents that had received a
95% or greater approval rating for prior work. Additionally, I conducted my own manipulation
check in the survey.25
Taken together, these findings suggest that collecting data in this way for this dissertation
project is efficient and inexpensive, and the findings are just as scientifically sound - perhaps,
more valid, and equally reliable and generalizeable – as many other, more traditional, methods of
surveying. Specific to generalizability, some research suggests that convenience samples are just
as generalizable as random samples (Hultsch et al. 2002). Having considered these things, then,
polling a national sample of 180626 adults in the United States, I employed a quasi-experimental
survey design to determine whether a policy decision from a given institution is accepted at
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Each respondent was asked, relevant to the vignette that s/he received, “Do you happen to recall which of the
following institutions made the policy regarding (the Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility's operation; same-sex
marriage; online sales taxation) in this survey?” 86.78% of the survey respondents accurately identified the
institution that made the policy in the vignette they received.
26
1800 is the required sample size for a survey of this kind with a confidence level of 95% and confidence interval
of 4.
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different levels depending, in part, on respondents’ views of the institution and its suitability to
make policy in the given area. Respondents were asked about their level of support for three
issues - the closing of the Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility, online sales taxation, and samesex marriage, - perceptions of issues and institutions, and diffuse support for each institution.
Respondents were also asked to rank the institutions in order of their aptitude to handle the three
issues presented. The three issues were carefully chosen for the survey to present respondents
with three distinct areas of policy making. These issues are distinctly different from each other,
representing different areas of policy with which to examine effects. In fact, two of the issues
(same-sex marriage and taxation) were considered to be such distinct policy areas that they have
been used in other survey research about policy (Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 2012).
Additionally, national survey and poll questions have routinely asked questions in these areas
(see, i.e., Gallup and Pew),27allowing me to draw from different sources to develop my
argument. Further, these issues may be considered more or less “judicial,” “legislative,” or
“executive” by respondents. For instance, given the historical perception of the courts as being
protectors of individual rights, respondents may be more inclined to assign same-sex marriage
to the Supreme Court. Likewise, online sales taxation may be most appropriately handled by
Congress, given its enumerated power to lay and collect taxes, and Guantanamo Bay may be
assigned to the President, given the office’s constitutional duty to manage foreign affairs,
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On the issue of online sales taxation, see http://www.gallup.com/poll/163184/americans-especially-young-opposeinternet-sales-tax.aspx. On the issue of Guantanamo Bay, see http://www.gallup.com/poll/119393/Americans- OpposeClosing-Gitmo-Moving-Prisoners.aspx, http://www.gallup.com/poll/124727/Americans-Oppose-Closing- Gitmo-MovingPrisoners.aspx, and http://www.gallup.com/poll/113893/Americans-Send-No-Clear-Mandate- Guantanamo-Bay.aspx. On
the issue of same-sex marriage, see http://www.people-press.org/2009/06/18/obamas- ratings-remain-high-despite-somepolicy-concerns/4/, http://www.people-press.org/2013/06/06/changing-attitudes- on-same-sex-marriage-gay-friends-andfamily/, http://www.people-press.org/2013/06/24/final-court-rulings-public- equally-interested-in-voting-rights-gaymarriage/, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1651/Gay-Lesbian-Rights.aspx, and http://www.gallup.com/poll/1651/GayLesbian-Rights.aspx.
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including commanding the country’s armed forces. Of course, there is room for disagreement
and, so, likely variation, as to issue perception among respondents.
Respondents randomly received one of eighteen vignettes for each issue, in which a
story was presented about a policy on one of the issues opposed to the respondents’ preference
(as revealed earlier in the survey), emanating from one of the three institutions.28 I asked some
follow-up questions related to the respondent’s agreement with the policy espoused in the
vignette and what action s/he might take as a result to determine acceptance of the policy.
There are three primary dependent variables of particular interest in this project, each
examined in the subsequent chapters: institutional legitimacy, the respondent’s institutional
preference to handle each issue, and the respondent’s acceptance of policy emanating from each
of the institutions. As mentioned, legitimacy is measured using an index of five traditionally
used questions. Methodologically, the determinants of legitimacy are examined utilizing
Ordinary Least Squares Regression. I employ a Rank-Ordered Logistic Regression (Beggs,
Cardell, and Hausman 1981) to determine which factors influence the institutional ranking on
each issue presented to the respondent. Finally, Ordinary Least Squares Regression determines
which factors influence respondent level of policy acceptance, which is measured using an
index of four previously utilized questions in earlier research (Mondak 1994), as outlined in the
next section.
In the legitimacy models, the primary independent variables included in the models
include whether the institution fulfills its role, whether the institution uses fair procedures in its
decisionmaking, whether the institution considers public interest when making policy decision,
ideological distance from respondent and perceived ideology of the institution, and, when
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It is important that respondents confront a policy that is opposed to their preferences in order to fully measure
the institution’s legitimizing capacity (see, e.g., Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2005).
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appropriate, institutional trust. In the preference (ranking) models, the primary independent
variables in the models include institutional legitimacy and institutional authority to make
decisions in the three issue areas. In the policy acceptance models, the primary independent
variables included in the models are institutional legitimacy, first ranking to handle each issue,
whether the respondent considers the issue to be controversial, and whether the issue is primarily
a moral, political, economic, social, or rights issue. In addition, all models control for gender,
race, ideology, political party, age, family income, attention to news, ideological distance, level
of education, and age. Five of these – race, sex, age, education, and ideology – are oft-used
independent variables in similar models (see, i.e., Mondak 1994; Johnston and Bartels 2010).
Operationalization and Measurement of Concepts29
Policy Preferences. Each respondent was asked the following three questions:
1) Same-sex marriage should be recognized as a legitimate and legal institution by the
United States government;
2) Businesses that sell items online should be required to collect the purchaser's state
and local sales tax; and
3) The United States government should continue to detain prisoners without trial
offshore at the Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility.
These questions were, primarily, asked to determine which of the 18 vignettes (which are
discussed next) respondents would receive. It is important for a research project like this,
seeking to determine acceptance of policies, that respondents receive a vignette with a policy
outcome that runs counter to their preferences (Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2005). If
respondents received a vignette with an outcome that was complementary to their own

29

A full copy of the survey instrument is included in the Appendix.
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preferences, then it would make sense that they would accept that decision. As such, these three
questions help to direct respondents to an outcome (on one of the three aforementioned issues)
emanating from one of the institutions. The institution making the policy was randomly chosen
by Qualtrics.
Vignettes. As mentioned, 18 vignettes were written for the survey, highlighting two
actions each from each of the three institutions – presidency, Congress, and the Supreme Court –
on each of the three issues – same-sex marriage, Guantanamo Bay, online sales taxation (see
Tables 2a, 2b, and 2c for question wording). Each institution makes policy in different ways, so
the wording of the vignettes reflects a policymaking option that is unique to that institution. The
Supreme Court does not issue executive orders. Congress does not issue opinions. And the
President does not vote on policy options. Instead, each institution has unique structural
mechanisms to make policy, and the vignettes reflect these mechanisms. As a result, the policy
options presented in the vignettes are not identical; however, the outcomes reflect the support, or
lack of support, for each issue, within the constraints of each institution.
Each respondent was randomly chosen to receive one vignette, in which an institution
made policy in one of the issue areas that ran counter to their earlier stated policy preference
(see earlier discussion). For instance, if a respondent expressed support for same-sex marriage,
they would randomly receive one of the vignettes from one of the institutions, in which the
institution made policy against same-sex marriage.
[Insert Tables 2a, 2b, and 2c Here]
Legitimacy. The legitimacy literature, as it has been utilized to examine court systems,
has relied on a number of indicators that, taken together, are supposed to tap into the concept
diffuse support for the institution. For the past few decades, a handful of survey questions have
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been designed and compiled, in varying configurations (see Table 3a for a list of questions that
have been used), into an index of legitimacy that is then used to explain some enduring level of
support for the courts. As a result, we might expect that these questions are adequate indicators
of diffuse support - long-term sentiment for the institution - distinct from short-term reactions to,
or satisfaction with, decisions or policy.
[Insert Table 3a Here]
While the indices that have been used in the courts literature to explain legitimacy have
varied, as mentioned earlier, most often the indicators have relied on a number of survey
questions that have focused on a respondent’s perception of the court’s involvement in politics,
on whether the court favors certain groups or people over others, whether it holds too much
power or independence, whether the court can be trusted to do the right thing or to consider the
best interests of the people (or the public) in making decisions, and whether the court’s
constitutional power should be limited (or eliminated) should it begin making a number of
decisions that are bad for the country or with which the respondent disagrees. But, as Table 1a
highlights, no uniform number or set of questions has been utilized to comprise a legitimacy
index to measure diffuse support. Instead, this pool of questions has been drawn from differently
for differing research projects, with no established standard of which questions should be
included to accurately explain institutional legitimacy, and little discussion as to the
consequences of not adhering to some standard.
Table 3b highlights how these measures have been utilized in research works examining
legitimacy, as well as the investment that the scholarship has put into these types of questions as
being accurate measures of diffuse support for an institution. Recently, some scholars have
begun to question the index, as it has been understood, constructed, and accepted for the past few
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decades. Johnston and Bartels (2010) utilize the legitimacy questions to make comparisons
between what drives long- and short-term court support, as it relates to media coverage, finding
that diffuse support is more malleable than, perhaps, previously thought. In essence, they argue
that declining public opinion can negatively impact diffuse support for the Court. Gibson
(2011a) recently questioned the use of trust as an adequate measure of diffuse support, ultimately
arguing that trust may actually be a more adequate measure of specific, rather than, diffuse
support.
[Insert Table 3b Here]
Most indices include some variant of a question asking respondents how willing they would
be to do away with the Court altogether if it started making decisions that most people disagreed
with. While this question is certainly a measure of diffuse support, it is also a relatively “easy” one
with which to disagree. Caldeira and Gibson (1992), in their first attempt to create an index of
diffuse support, argued that such an index should contain questions that ask respondents to make
difficult decisions about their “willingness to accept, make, or countenance major changes in
fundamental attributes of how the high bench functions or fits into the U.S. constitutional system”
(638). While the index Caldeira and Gibson (1992) utilized relied on questions related to a
respondents’ willingness to do away with the Court, eliminate its power to declare acts
unconstitutional, limit its right to decide controversial issues, defeat any proposal to do away with it,
and willingness to rewrite the constitution to reduce its powers, most recent research also includes
some variant of a question related to trust in the Court to make the “right” or “best” decisions for the
people. This can be problematic, given what we know about trust in

American government.
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If we intend to accurately understand how people form opinions about our governing
institutions, then it is incredibly important that legitimacy measurements are true indicators of
long-term diffuse support for the institution. Therefore, the research presented here seeks to
apply established measures of legitimacy to all three branches of American government –
Supreme Court, Congress, and the presidency – while also taking care to carefully analyze any
potential conflict between those measures that are clearly long-term indicators of legitimacy and
those that might be more appropriately seen as measuring short-term support for decisions or
people. Without doing so, inadequate measurement may flourish, leading us to “mistakenly
conclude that Court legitimacy is more volatile than it is in fact were a more valid measure of
legitimacy available” (Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2003b, 357).
The research here relies on variants of traditionally utilized questions that comprise the
legitimacy index; however, since this research expands legitimacy literature beyond simply the
courts, to include Congress and the presidency, some of the questions have been altered to be
more appropriate to the institution. Each respondent was asked to what extent they agree with
the following:
•

Overall, how much confidence would you say you have in [the United States
Supreme Court; Congress; the President of the United States]? 



•

Overall, how much trust would you say you have in [the United States Supreme
Court, which sits in Washington, D.C.; the President of the United States;
Congress] to make decisions that are right for the country? 



•

If [the United States Supreme Court; Congress; the President of the United States]
started making decisions that most people disagree with, it might be better to do
away with the [institution] altogether. 
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•

The United States Supreme Court gets too mixed up in politics; and [Members of
Congress; the President of the United States] put the interests of their/his/her party
over the interests of the American people. 



•

The decisions made by the [United States Supreme Court; Congress; President of the
United States] favor some groups more than others. 

Questions aimed at making structural changes to the institution’s constitutionally granted
authority were altered to be specific and appropriate for each institution. Given that institutional
legitimacy taps into a long-term sentiment toward an institution, it seems apropos that a question
designed around a specific structural change that is relevant to each unique institution is a more
adequate indicator of sentiment than a general, generic question about changes to institutional
structure. Further, while each institution has some ability to make rule changes to its own body, or to
the body of another institution, it is a constitutional change that suggests some true dedication to
changing the long-term functioning and structure of an institution. It seems much more likely that
making a constitutional change to an institution would invoke much more pause than a short-term
rule change, suggesting that respondents willing to make a constitutional change to the structure of
an institution are truly representing some critical dissatisfaction with the current structure of the
institution. As such, my survey asks respondents two specific questions about constitutional changes
to each of the branches of government that are 1) entirely possible, and 2) appropriate to the
structure of each institution. Each institution has prescribed constitutional roles, as discussed earlier,
which may inform expectations about those institutions. Some of those roles involve a check to
another institution. For instance, Congress can choose whether to ratify treaties that are negotiated
by the President. Congress can also override a presidential veto and confirm, or deny, presidential
appointments. Congress can change the
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Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction. The Supreme Court can determine the constitutionality
of legislative and executive action. And, the President can veto legislation and appoint Supreme
Court justices to life terms. These are just some examples of constitutional powers that are
imbued in each institution. Each of these contributes to perception of constitutional role. They
provide a framework within which we can expect each institution to operate. Arguably, changes
to the constitutional role of these institutions would also change public expectations. I argue that
commitment to such constitutional changes would reflect actual dissatisfaction with the
institution and its current structure. Each respondent was asked:
•

It would make no difference to me if the United States Constitution were rewritten to
eliminate lifetime appointments of Supreme Court justices, limiting their terms to 20
years; AND, it would make no difference to me if the United States Constitution were
rewritten to provide for the election of Supreme Court Justices by the people, rather
than appointment by the President. 



•

It would make no difference to me if the United States Constitution were rewritten
to reduce Congress’ power to approve or deny presidential appointments; AND, it
would make no difference to me if the United States Constitution were rewritten to
reduce Congress’ power to make its own procedural rules, such as the filibuster. 



•

It would make no difference to me if the United States Constitution were rewritten to
reduce the President’s power to make lifetime appointments to the judiciary; AND, it 
would make no difference to me if the United States Constitution were rewritten
to reduce the President’s power to veto congressional legislation.

I fully understand that there are weaknesses with these questions. For instance, it cannot
be stated that these questions are tapping into exactly the same thing across institutions. And,
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further, it is not uniformly the case that each of the questions for each institution taps into some
separation of powers sentiment; however, it is true for the questions related to the presidency.
Admittedly, these are weaknesses that may influence the results. I do think, though, that these
new questions move the debate forward and strengthen a measure of institutional legitimacy
that suffers under the weight of its own inadequacies. Part of the problem with trying to conduct
comparative analysis using the traditional legitimacy index is that the questions are specific to
the courts. One example: respondents have always been asked to respond to some variant of the
following question: “It would make no difference to me if the Constitution were rewritten to
reduce the powers of the court.”
There are, at least, two problems with a question like this when trying to comparatively
apply them to other institutions. First, if we care about comparing institutions on the same
sentiment, then our questions to that end must be as specific as possible. To apply this question
broadly for all institutions would leave us wondering which powers respondents are
considering. In providing them with real examples of powers that could be constitutionally
reduced, as do the new questions I have constructed, researchers can be sure that respondents
are truly considering practical scenarios, even if the powers differ across institutions.
Second, the question is so broad that, while a large number of respondents may support
reducing some powers of the courts in certain circumstances, researchers can draw no inferences
about the strength of this conviction. Some respondents may be willing to reduce relatively
insignificant powers. These respondents cannot be differentiated from those that would be
willing to dramatically reduce the court’s powers. By asking respondents if they are willing to
reduce real powers significant to each of the institutions, I can be sure that all respondents taking
the survey were considering the same reduction of powers when answering these questions. As a
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result, I can be confident that institutional legitimacy, as it then applies to each institution, is
a genuine, measureable response that is uniform across respondents.
Finally, as will be revealed in the next chapter (see Figures 2a, 2b, and 2c of Chapter III),
these questions tap into similar sentiments, loading on the same factor for each institution. I
argue that, while my questions about structural changes are different for each institution, they
are 1) more relevant to the legitimacy of each institution, and 2) tapping into very real
possibilities that respondents could imagine supporting (or not). As such, I argue that the
legitimacy index constructed using these new, institution-specific questions is a more accurate
reflection of institutional legitimacy than the dizzying configuration of questions that has been
randomly constructed and utilized in the past.
To that end, an additive legitimacy index was composed for each institution from all of
the above questions. In Chapter III, I examine the efficacy of including each of these variables
in one index of diffuse support, ultimately arguing that some variables measure short-term
legitimacy, or specific support, more so than long-term institutional legitimacy.
Ideological Distance. Bartels and Johnston (2013) argue that respondent ideological
disagreement with the Supreme Court markedly decreases legitimacy for the Court. This would
suggest that the Court’s legitimacy is sensitive to political winds, which would weaken the
argument that legitimacy is long-term sentiment for an institution that does not waver. Gibson
and Nelson (2014) find fault with the research and reiterate the enduring power of institutional
legitimacy, not subject to changes in the immediate political environment. Given this
disagreement in the literature, I have included a measure of ideological distance in my
legitimacy, preference, and acceptance models that is calculated utilizing the following
questions:
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•

What is your perception of the ideological makeup of the United States Supreme
Court, which sits in Washington, D.C.? 



•

What is your perception of the ideological makeup of the United States House of
Representatives? 



•

What is your perception of the partisan makeup of the United States Senate? 

•

What is your perception of the ideological inclinations of the President of the United


States? 


•

When it comes to politics, do you usually think of yourself as: Conservative,
Moderate, Liberal? 




o

Those that responded “liberal,” were then asked if they considered themselves 

“strong” or “not strong” liberals, and 


o Those that responded “conservative,” were then asked if they considered
themselves “strong” or “not strong” conservatives.” 
Respondents were presented with five options: strongly conservative, moderately
conservative, evenly balanced, moderately liberal, and strongly liberal. The responses for the
United States House of Representatives and the United States Senate were combined to create
one variable of perceived congressional ideology. Given the disagreement in the literature (see
the conflict between Bartels and Johnston 2013 and Gibson and Nelson 2014), and the fact that
it has only focused on the Supreme Court, I have no expectation for this variable to influence
legitimacy in any particular way, however, the results here may help to settle the debate.
Institutional Preference. It is important to determine which institution a respondent
deems is “best-suited” to deal with an issue and which s/he deems least, in order to examine
whether that consideration influences policy acceptance. As previously mentioned, people may
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have preferences about which institution makes which types of policies and these preference
may, in turn, influence acceptance for the policies emanating from the institutions (Benesh and
Fettig 2011). To do this, I ask respondents: “Of the following institutions, please tell me which
you think is best- (least) suited to make decisions about (same-sex marriage, online sales tax,
Guantanamo Bay).” Respondents were then presented with three options: presidency, Congress,
the United States Supreme Court.
Policy Acceptance. Policy acceptance, utilized as a dependent variable, is captured in the
survey instrument via an index of four questions asked of respondents following a vignette in
which one of the three American government institutions makes a policy (liberal or
conservative) on same-sex marriage, online sales tax, Guantanamo Bay. These questions are
variations of questions utilized in other research to determine policy acceptance and agreement
(Mondak 1994). For each institution, and on each issue, the index created from these four
questions load neatly onto one factor, meaning that these questions “hang” together well as a
singular measurement of policy acceptance. Essentially, these questions are speaking to the
same, general sentiment about acceptance of a policy emanating from an institution.
1) “The (Supreme Court, Congress, President) made the right decision.”
2) “The (Supreme Court’s, Congress’, President’s) decision ought to be the final
decision on the matter.”
3) “I would encourage groups with opposing views to challenge the (Supreme Court’s,
Congress’, President’s) decision.”
4) “Issues like this ought to be kept out of the (courts, Congress, President’s office).”
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Respondents were presented with four options for each question: strongly disagree,
disagree, agree, and strongly agree. Responses were coded to reflect increasing acceptance and
combined into an additive index of policy acceptance.
It is worth noting at this point, that this index does not receive the same critical treatment
that the legitimacy index does in this dissertation project. This is done for two reasons. First, this
project is, primarily, about determining which factors influence policy acceptance. The story
revolves around the argument that people have preferences about which branch of government
makes which certain policies, contingent on a number of variables that are outlined here. To that
end, much time is spent examining those independent variables that, theoretically, drive policy
acceptance. Second, and maybe more importantly, there is no true conflict in the policy
acceptance literature about the measurement of acceptance. This does not necessarily mean that
the traditional index measure deserves no scrutiny, but it does offer some confirmation that,
perhaps, policy acceptance is conceptualized well. The traditional measure of institutional
legitimacy, on the other hand, has been experiencing increased scrutiny in recent years (see i.e.,
Gibson 2011a; Weinschenk, Fettig, and Benesh 2013), making further examination critical to
understanding institutional legitimacy and, consequently, policy acceptance.
Countermajoritarianism. I include questions about the nature of the issues being
considered in the research, asking respondents if they consider each of the issues primarily to be:
political questions, social issues, moral issues, economic issues, or about rights of individuals.
These categories are offered as distinct and clear options for respondents from which to choose.
Additionally, they lend themselves to institutional differences, given aforementioned
expectations (constitutionally and otherwise) about the institutional roles. For instance, as
mentioned earlier, those that perceive an issue to be about rights might also rank the judiciary,
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an, arguably, countermajoritarian institution, highly in that issue area. And, those that perceive
an issue to be primarily economic might also prefer Congress to handle that issue. Of the three
issues chosen for examination here, I expect respondents to consider online sales taxation to be
primarily an economic issue. I expect same-sex marriage to be considered primarily a rightsbased issue. On the issue of Guantanamo Bay, however, I am agnostic. This issue could,
arguably, be perceived as primarily about rights, morality, or politics.
Role Fulfillment. We might expect that if an individual perceives that
an institution has consistently fallen short of fulfilling its role, as identified by the individual,
then s/he might have less faith in that institution to handle any given issue (see, i.e., Barak and
Fried 2002, Burbank 2004, and Tyler and Huo 2002 for examples of institutional roles). To
measure perception of institutional role fulfillment, respondents were asked the following
question:
•

“Thinking about the role of (the United States Supreme Court, the President of the 


United States, Congress) in our democratic system of government, would you say
that (the United States Supreme Court, the President of the United States, Congress)
fulfills the role you perceive he/she/it ought to play?” 
Respondents were presented with four options: all of the time, some of the time, rarely, or
never.
Procedural Justice/Fairness. Respondents were asked one question for each institution
about the fairness of its procedures. This question is drawn from previous work on procedural
justice (Sunshine and Tyler 2003) and is utilized as an independent variable in the legitimacy,
preference, and policy acceptance models. While numerous variants of the question have been
used in previous procedural fairness research (see, i.e., Tyler and Caine 1981; Hibbing and
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Theiss-Morse 1995), consistency has been scarce, and so I rely on this very direct approach to
ascertain respondent perception of procedural fairness, asking respondents:
•

“(The United States Supreme Court, the President of the United States, Congress)
uses fair procedures to make decisions in a fair way.” 

Respondents were presented with four options, ranging from almost always to almost
never.
Considers the People. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1998) argue that Congress and the
presidency suffer from low approval numbers because they engage in political posturing,
which the public finds unseemly, but that the public does care that their voices are heard, that
public opinion is considered, by their elected officials. To tap into this sentiment, respondents
were asked:
•

“(The United States Supreme Court, the President of the United States, Congress)
considers the interests of the people when making decisions.” 

Respondents were asked to choose from four options (“strongly disagree” to
“strongly agree”).
Scope of Authority. Remember that authority enhances acceptance (Tyler 2004) and
fosters acquiescence to policies, even when they run counter to personal preference (French
and Raven 1959; Merelman 1966). So, respondents were also asked a question for each issue
area about whether or not the issue is within that institution’s scope of authority.
•

“It is within the authority of (the United States Supreme Court, the President’s office, 



Congress) to make policy on the issue of (same-sex marriage, Guantanamo Bay,
online taxation).” 

56

Respondents were presented with the usual four options (“strongly disagree” to
“strongly agree”).
Controversial Issue. The level of perceived controversy surrounding an issue may affect
acceptance. Specifically, being conflict avoidant, an increase in the level of perceived
controversy related to an issue may depress acceptance of policies made by certain institutions in
that area. Remember that increased controversy leads to decreased policy acceptance (Nie and
Wyman 2005) and, therefore, is included in the policy acceptance models in Chapter V.
Respondents were asked:


•

“The issue of (same-sex marriage, online sales taxation, Guantanamo Bay Detention 
Facility’s operation) is controversial.” 

Respondents were asked to choose from four options (“strongly disagree” to
“strongly agree”), and the resultant independent variable is included in the acceptance model.
Socioeconomic Variables. As controls, I also ask various SES questions, including age,
gender, family income, race, political party identification, ideology, ideological distance,
education level, and knowledge (via a measure of respondent level of attention to news).30
CONCLUSION
In the next chapter, I examine legitimacy comparatively across the three branches of
American government – the presidency, Congress, and the Supreme Court. In doing so, I
deconstruct the traditional legitimacy index and tease out subtle implications related to including
each of the variables – specifically, I argue that, perhaps, some of the measures are capturing
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These are oft-used independent variables in legitimacy and acceptance literature (see, i.e., Mondak 1994;
Benesh 2006; Johnston and Bartels 2010; Bartels and Johnston 2013). Each variable is coded onto an increasing
scale and they are utilized in all models of institutional legitimacy, rank, and policy acceptance. Given our
understanding of how these variables matter to legitimacy (again, see, i.e., Mondak 1994; Benesh 2006; Johnston
and Bartels 2010) coupled with the argument that I assert here – that policy acceptance follows from legitimacy
and rank – that these independent variables may matter to each of the models. While no extant literature explains
how these variables predict institutional preference or policy acceptance, I explore this possibility.
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short-term, rather than long-, sentiment for the institutions and, as such, reconsideration should
be given to how we have come to measure institutional legitimacy. In doing so, I argue that only
those measures that truly capture long-term support for the institution should be included in any
index measuring institutional legitimacy. It may be that those remaining variables still matter to
policy acceptance, however. And, therefore, I will construct a true institutional legitimacy index,
comprised of only those long-term variables, and a short-term legitimacy index of the variables
that are both theoretically and functionally capturing specific support for an institution. Both
indices will be utilized in Chapter V, examining influences of policy acceptance.
In Chapter IV, I examine respondent preference of institution best-suited to make policy
in certain issues areas, making the argument that people care which branch of government
handles certain issues at certain times. I test a model via rank-ordered logistic regression to
understand which factors that influence institutional preference to handle certain policies. This
model includes institutional legitimacy and authority to make policy as the primary
independent variables.
Relying on the analysis in this chapter, I then turn to answering the question that lies at
the heart of this project in Chapter V – what drives policy acceptance? While extant research in
legitimacy and policy acceptance is both vast and varied, heretofore we have been unable to
truly evaluate the influences that matter to acceptance, for a couple of reasons. First, legitimacy
measurements have been inconsistent and, worse, inadequate measures of what they purport to
measure – long-term support for an institution. By disaggregating and investigating the
contribution of each oft-used variable in the legitimacy index, I am able to remove those
variables that inadequately measure legitimacy, or offer no true long-term sentiment, thereby
strengthening the overall legitimacy measure. Second, for the first time, a legitimacy index,
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similar to the one that has been utilized to explain long-term support for the judiciary, is applied
to the presidency and Congress, as well. This allows us to 1) speak comparatively about
legitimacy in an authoritative way, and 2) furthers our understanding of how legitimacy may, or
may not, matter to each of the branches of American government. Finally, relying on theoretical
framework, we can explain how the source of policy can influence acceptance, offering
policymakers a valuable tool in crafting policy. As such, the research here offers a big step
forward in 1) explaining policy acceptance, and 2) modeling those factors that can mitigate
resistance, and enhancing acceptance, of policy. Good government is, in part, government that
garners willful acquiescence and compliance. This project provides a roadmap to those ends.
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Table 2a: Vignette Wording, Guantanamo Bay
Guantanamo Bay – Remain
Open

Guantanamo Bay - Close

Presidency
The President of the United
States has the ability to issue
executive orders in certain
circumstances that have the
force of law. Keeping this in
mind, consider the following
situation. After the other
institutions failed to act,
suppose the President of the
United States issued an
executive order ensuring the
continued use of the
Guantanamo Bay Detention
Facility to hold and
interrogate prisoners offshore.

Congress
Consider the following
situation. After the other
institutions failed to act,
suppose Congress passed
legislation, by a veto-proof
margin, requiring that the
Guantanamo Bay Detention
Facility stay in operation and
continue to accept and hold
prisoners for interrogation
offshore.

The President of the United
States has the ability to issue
executive orders in certain
circumstances that have the
force of law. Keeping this in
mind, consider the following
situation. After the other
institutions failed to act,
suppose the President of the
United States issued an
executive order to close the
Guantanamo Bay Detention
Facility and transfer all of its
prisoners to super-max
prisons on the United States
mainland by August 1, 2013

Consider the following
situation. After the other
institutions failed to act,
suppose Congress passed
legislation, by a veto-proof
margin, requiring the closure
of the Guantanamo Bay
Detention Facility and the
transfer of all of its prisoners
to super-max prisons on the
United States mainland by
August 1, 2013.
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Supreme Court
Consider the following
situation. After the other
institutions failed to act,
suppose the United States
Supreme Court, which sits in
Washington, D.C., heard a
case challenging the
constitutionality of the United
States government's practice
of holding prisoners offshore
indefinitely without trial. The
Supreme Court then issued a
ruling upholding the
constitutionality of the
facility's use, thereby
ensuring that the Guantanamo
Bay Detention Facility
continue to accept and hold
prisoners for interrogation
offshore.
Consider the following
situation. After the other
institutions failed to act,
suppose the United States
Supreme Court, which sits in
Washington, D.C., heard a
case challenging the
constitutionality of the United
States government's practice
of holding prisoners offshore
indefinitely without trial. The
Supreme Court then issued a
ruling ordering the closing of
the Guantanamo Bay
Detention Facility and the
transfer of its prisoners to
super-max prisons on the
United States mainland by
August 1, 2013.

Table 2b: Vignette Wording, Online Sales Taxation
Online Sales TaxationCollect

Online Sales Taxation – Do
Not Collect

Presidency
The President of the United
States has the ability to issue
executive orders in certain
circumstances that have the
force of law. Keeping this in
mind, consider the following
situation. After the other
institutions failed to act,
suppose the President of the
United States issued an
executive order requiring all
online businesses conducting
transactions to collect state
and local sales taxes, just like
physical stores in your
community must, beginning
August 1, 2013.

Congress
Consider the following
situation. After the other
institutions failed to act,
suppose Congress passed a
bill, by a veto-proof margin,
that required all online
businesses conducting
transactions to collect state
and local sales taxes, just like
physical stores in your
community must, beginning
August 1, 2013.

The President of the United
States has the ability to issue
executive orders in certain
circumstances that have the
force of law. Keeping this in
mind, consider the following
situation. After the other
institutions failed to act,
suppose the President of the
United States issued an
executive order exempting
online businesses from
collecting state and local
sales taxes in the same way
that physical businesses in
your community must.

Consider the following
situation. After the other
institutions failed to act,
suppose Congress passed
legislation, by a veto-proof
margin, that exempted online
businesses from collecting
state and local taxes in the
same way that physical
businesses in your
community must.
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Supreme Court
Consider the following
situation. After the other
institutions failed to act,
suppose the United States
Supreme Court, which sits in
Washington, D.C., heard a
case alleging that treating
online businesses differently
from physical stores in your
community violates the
Constitution. The Supreme
Court subsequently ruled that
online businesses conducting
transactions must collect state
and local sales taxes, just as
physical businesses in your
community must, beginning
August 1, 2013.
Consider the following
situation. After the other
institutions failed to act,
suppose the United States
Supreme Court, which sits in
Washington, D.C., heard a
case alleging that treating
online businesses differently
from physical stores in your
community violates the
Constitution. The Supreme
Court subsequently ruled that
businesses are not
constitutionally required to
collect state and local taxes
and could not be compelled to
do so in the same way that
physical stores in your
community must.

Table 2c: Vignette Wording, Same-Sex Marriage
Same Sex Marriage - Support

Same Sex Marriage – Do Not
Support

Presidency
The President of the United
States has the ability to issue
executive orders in certain
circumstances that have the
force of law. Keeping this
in mind, consider the
following situation. After
the other institutions failed
to act, suppose the President
of the United States issued
an executive order requiring
all federal agencies to
provide same-sex marriage
benefits to all federal
employees equal to those
provided to opposite-sex
married couples, to begin
August 1, 2013.

Congress
Consider the following
situation. After the other
institutions failed to act,
suppose Congress passed a
law, by a veto-proof margin,
recognizing same-sex marriage
as a legal institution in the
United States.

The President of the United
States has the ability to issue
executive orders in certain
circumstances that have the
force of law. Keeping this
in mind, consider the
following situation. After
the other institutions failed
to act, suppose the President
issued an executive order
that same-sex couples
working for the federal
government are not to
receive federal marriage
benefits equal to those
benefits offered to oppositesex couples.

Consider the following
situation. After the other
institutions failed to act,
suppose Congress passed a
law, by a veto-proof margin,
that went further than the
federal Defense of Marriage
Act, which defines marriage as
an institution between one man
and one woman, explicitly
outlawing same-sex marriage
in the United States.
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Supreme Court
Consider the following
situation. After the other
institutions failed to act,
suppose the United States
Supreme Court, which sits in
Washington, D.C., heard a
case challenging the federal
Defense of Marriage Act,
which limits marriage to
relationships between one
man and one woman. The
Supreme Court subsequently
issued a ruling that the
Defense of Marriage Act
discriminates against samesex couples and established a
federal right to marry for
same-sex couples in the
United States.
Consider the following
situation. After the other
institutions failed to act,
suppose a case was presented
to the United States Supreme
Court, which sits in
Washington, D.C., by a samesex couple, challenging the
federal Defense of Marriage
Act, which defines marriage
as an institution between one
man and one woman. After
hearing arguments, the
Supreme Court rendered a
decision supporting the
constitutionality of the
Defense of Marriage Act,
affirming that same-sex
marriage is not required to be
federally recognized.

Table 3a: Measures of Legitimacy
Question

Paper(s)

1. The power of the (relevant court) to declare acts of
Congress unconstitutional should be eliminated.
2. If the (relevant court) continually makes decisions that the
people disagree with, it might be better to do away with
the Court altogether. (or some variant of doing away with
the court)

Gibson 1989; Gibson and Caldeira 1992
Gibson 1989; Gibson and Caldeira 1992; Gibson and Caldeira
1995; Gibson, Caldeira, and Baird 1998; Gibson, Caldeira, and
Spence 2003; Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2005; Gibson
2007; Gibson 2008; Gibson and Caldeira 2009a; Gibson and
Caldeira 2009b; Gibson and Caldeira 2009c; Gibson,
Gottfried, Delli Carpini, and Jamieson 2010; Johnston and
Bartels 2010; Gibson and Caldeira 2011
Gibson 1989; Gibson and Caldeira 1992; Gibson and Caldeira
1995; Gibson, Caldeira, and Baird 1998

3. It would not make much difference to me if the U.S.
Constitution were rewritten so as to reduce the powers of
the Supreme Court. (or some variant of power reduction)
4. The right of the (relevant court) to decide certain types of
controversial issues should be limited by the Congress (or
reduced in some way).

Gibson 1989; Gibson and Caldeira 1992; Gibson, Caldeira, and
Spence 2003; Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2005; Gibson
2007; Gibson 2008; Gibson and Caldeira 2009a; Gibson and
Caldeira 2009b; Gibson and Caldeira 2009c; Gibson,
Gottfried, Delli Carpini, and Jamieson 2010; Gibson and
Caldeira 2011
Gibson 1989; Gibson and Caldeira 1992

5. People should be willing to do everything they can to
make sure that any proposal to abolish the Supreme Court
is defeated.
6. The political independence of the (relevant court) is
essential. Therefore, no other (relevant institution) should
be able to override Court opinions even if it thinks they
are harmful to the (relevant) community.
7. The (relevant court) can usually be trusted to make
decisions that are right for the country (or state) as a
whole/trusted to operate in best interests of American
people

Gibson and Caldeira 1995

Gibson, Caldeira, and Baird 1998; Gibson, Caldeira, and
Spence 2003; Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2005; Gibson
2007; Gibson 2008; Gibson and Caldeira 2009a; Gibson and
Caldeira 2009b; Gibson and Caldeira 2009c; Johnston and
Bartels 2010; Gibson and Caldeira 2011
Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2003; Gibson, Caldeira, and
Spence 2005; Johnston and Bartels 2010
Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2003; Gibson 2007; Gibson
2008; Gibson and Caldeira 2009a; Gibson and Caldeira 2009b;
Gibson and Caldeira 2009c; Gibson, Gottfried, Delli Carpini,
and Jamieson 2010; Johnston and Bartels 2010; Gibson and
Caldeira 2011
Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2003; Gibson 2008; Gibson,
Gottfried, Delli Carpini, and Jamieson 2010

8. The decisions of the (relevant court) favor some groups
more than others.
9. The (relevant court) gets too mixed up in politics. (or
some other variant of the court being too mixed up in
politics)

10. The (relevant court) should have the right to say what the
(relevant constitution) means, even when the majority of
the people disagree with the Court’s decision. (or some
other variant of the court’s constitutional interpretation in
conflict the majority interpretation)
11. Judges of the (relevant court) who consistently make
decisions at odds with what a majority of the people want
should be removed from their position as judge.
12. The (relevant court) ought to be made less independent so
that it listens a lot more to what the people want. (or some
other variant of limiting the court’s independence)

Gibson 2008; Gibson and Caldeira 2009b; Gibson, Gottfried,
Delli Carpini, and Jamieson 2010; Gibson and Caldeira 2011
Gibson 2008; Gibson and Caldeira 2009b; Gibson, Gottfried,
Delli Carpini, and Jamieson 2010; Gibson and Caldeira 2011
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Table 3b: Indices Used
Index
Index 1:
Index 2:
Index 3:
Index 4:

Questions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5
Questions 2, 3, and 6
Questions 2, 3, and 7
Questions 2, 4, 7, and 9

Index 5: Questions 2, 4, 7, and 8
Index 6: Questions 2, 7, 8, and 9
Index 7: Questions 2, 4, 7, 8, 9, and 10
Index 8: Questions 2, 4, 7, 9, 11, and 12
Index 9: Questions 2, 4, 9, 10, 11, and 12
Index 10: Questions 2, 4, 7, 9, 10, 11, and 12

Paper(s)
Gibson 1989; Gibson and Caldeira 1992
Gibson and Caldeira 1995
Gibson, Caldeira, and Baird 1998
Gibson 2007; Gibson and Caldeira 2009a; Gibson and
Caldeira 2009c
Johnston and Bartels 2010
Gibson and Caldeira 1995
Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2003
Gibson and Caldeira 2009b; Gibson and Caldeira 2011
Gibson, Gottfried, Delli Carpini, and Jamieson 2010
Gibson 2008
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CHAPTER III
INSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY: A COMPARISON ACROSS BRANCHES
Institutional legitimacy, being an enduring support for an institution, is an important
concept for researchers to understand. Much research has been dedicated to understanding
judicial legitimacy, including an index of survey questions that has been employed in furthering
our comprehension of the concept, and those variables that impact legitimacy. As discussed in
the previous chapter, until now, our understanding of how legitimacy has been exclusively
limited to the judiciary. We assume that the same concepts that have come to be utilized as
traditional measures of judicial legitimacy will also apply to the other branches. And, we do so
with no concrete comparative evidence to support this. Here, I take that step (conducting
comparative analysis of legitimacy across the other branches of government) and one further,
analyzing the entire index, disaggregating the variables, and arguing for a new conceptualization
of institutional measurement of legitimacy. First, though, in pursuit of the larger dissertation
goal of understanding what drives policy acceptance, it is important to discuss how legitimacy
informs acceptance.
As we know, increased legitimacy leads to an increased capacity to legitimate policy,
meaning that levels of acceptance are enhanced (Mondak 1994). Therefore, in order to
understand acceptance, we must be able to establish an understanding about what influences
legitimacy. And, since each of the three branches of government can make and change policy in
a number of issue areas, it is important to understand how legitimacy applies to each of the
branches, something that, heretofore, we have been unable to do. The purpose of this chapter,
then, is to utilize the unique survey that I designed and administered to comparatively examine
institutional legitimacy. Further, exhaustive analysis is applied to the traditional legitimacy
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index and a new conceptualization of legitimacy measurement is posited. The new institutional
legitimacy index established in this chapter is then utilized, as appropriate, moving forward with
this study of policy acceptance.
Legitimacy and legitimation has been tied to the institution, with the general consensus
being that the courts can legitimate any policy more than the legislative or executive branches
can, without regard to the issue at hand (Mondak 1994; Hibbing and Theiss Morse 1995). This
is all posited with a blind eye to the fact that we have no comparative evidence suggesting that
the concept of legitimacy, as it has come to be measured for the courts, can also be applied, and
interpreted in the same way, to the other policymaking branches of American government, the
legislature and the presidency. This theoretical argument about legitimacy is grounded in the
notion that the policymaking source (here, the institution) may have the ability to influence
public opinion about policy outcomes and, further, that part of an individual’s evaluation of the
source31 might actually be an evaluation of how suitable the institution is to make policy in a
given area. If suitability is tied to legitimacy, as has been posited, then it is important to
understand legitimacy, as it relates to all three branches of American government. Here, for the
first time, legitimacy, or diffuse support, as it has been conceptualized in judicial literature, will
be applied to Congress and the presidency in the same way.
In pursuit of such a goal, and given the extant literature on the power of the courts to
legitimate policy, it is first imperative to examine the legitimacy that each branch of American
government enjoys. As noted, up until now, legitimacy research has focused almost exclusively
on the courts. While such legitimacy is important, the lack of comparison with the other
31

Much research, usually in psychology, suggests people are influenced both by information they receive and the
source from which they receive it (see, e.g., Chaiken 1980; Birnbaum and Stegner 1979). Mondak argues, for
example, that source credibility can drive opinions on a policy (in low information contexts), while it is only part
of the evidence for decisions involving high degrees of personal relevance (or for those holding high levels of
information) (Mondak 1990, 1993).
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branches of government severely limits our ability to truly talk about policy legitimation. Here, I
offer a comparison of legitimacy, relying on established legitimacy measures, across all three
policymaking branches of American government – judicial, legislative, and executive. In doing
so, this research provides the scholarship with a new understanding of how the public perceives
each branch of government beyond mere approval or even trust. Further, when we talk about the
ability of a branch of government to legitimate policy and, thus, enhance support of policy, we
will be able to say something important about which branch is truly considered to be the most
legitimate policymaking body on any given issue, and account for those legitimacy levels in
explaining legitimation. In essence, institutional legitimacy (diffuse support) can inform levels of
policy acceptance (specific support). This provides the foundation for the analyses to follow in
subsequent chapters, examining where policy acceptance originates and, ultimately, arguing that
consideration of where acceptance comes from can dramatically influence how lawmakers,
legislators, and others pursue policymaking in American government.
Additionally, close scrutiny is applied to the legitimacy index to determine whether the
index is adequately measuring what it purports to measure: an enduring, long-term commitment
to the institution. While some oft-used measures that are included in the legitimacy index are
clearly measures of long-term support, others are, arguably, more appropriate measures of shortterm attitudes about specific decisions, policies, or persons. It is important to analyze this
carefully, as any measure of institutional legitimacy, or diffuse support, should tap only into
long-term commitments, since any short-term measures would contaminate our understanding of
long-term institutional legitimacy. To be sure, there may be much merit in the idea that there is a
difference between long-term legitimacy and short-term legitimacy. Short-term legitimacy, or
specific support, is found in measures like job approval and specific policy outcomes, and is
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often attached to the inhabitants of an office (Easton 1975), whereas long-term legitimacy, or
diffuse support, is a sentiment for an institution that is insulated from the actions of any given
inhabitants (Easton 1965; 1975; Caldeira 1986). To be sure, however, short-term legitimacy can
influence long-term legitimacy. Sustained negative affective reaction to an institution, as a result
of short-term actions can lead to an aggregate depletion of institutional legitimacy (Caldeira and
Gibson 1992).
First, in this chapter, I will do some comparative analysis of institutional legitimacy,
relying on the traditional legitimacy index as the dependent variable. I do so because the
traditional legitimacy index has become codified in legitimacy literature, accepted as a firm
measure of institutional legitimacy, and, therefore, the first logical step is to apply that same
understanding to the other institutions. At minimum, we should, as a first step in comparative
analysis, understand institutional legitimacy within the same context that we have come to
understand judicial legitimacy. I will then dissect the legitimacy index with the intent to
scrutinize the efficacy and power of each variable included in the index, arguing that some oftused variables in the index are better measures of short-term support for institutions. Then, I will
make the argument that some short-term variables impact long-term institutional legitimacy,
providing evidence, as well as an explanation, for this phenomenon. Finally, I will construct a
new legitimacy index comprised of only the variables that truly capture long-term support for the
institutions and run regression analyses utilizing this new institutional legitimacy index, making
the case that it is a better measure of institutional legitimacy and, therefore, should be embraced
by legitimacy researchers in future discussions and analysis of long-term support for institutions.
I do this in an effort to understand what drives true institutional legitimacy, as, ultimately, with
this dissertation project I argue that legitimacy informs policy acceptance. In order to fully
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understand what predicts policy acceptance, it is crucial to truly measure the concept of
institutional legitimacy.
The dependent variable for all models in this chapter is some form of institutional
legitimacy, which is an index comprised of some variation of the oft-used variables compiled to
measure legitimacy – confidence, trust, do away with the institution, too mixed up in politics,
favors some groups over others, and constitutional changes to the institution. Remember, as
outlined in the previous chapter, the legitimacy index utilized here does differ somewhat,
though, in that the questions about constitutional changes to the structure of the institution are
very carefully designed to change specific constructs uniquely pertinent to each institution. This
is done for a couple of reasons. First, since institutional legitimacy has been studied almost
exclusively in the courts, the questions that have been used are often specific to judicial
structures (i.e., “the right of the relevant court to decide certain types of controversial issues
should be limited by the Congress.”), but would not directly translate to the other institutions.
Therefore, some changes to question wording are necessary to make the questions applicable to
the relevant institutions. Second, the questions are somewhat broad and I argue that broadness
can also be somewhat vague. It makes more sense that specific constitutional powers unique to
each institution (i.e., presidential veto power; power of Congress to confirm presidential
appointees; power of the Supreme Court to find congressional acts to be unconstitutional, etc.) be
addressed in the survey. Respondents can, then, consider very real and very possible
consequences to each of the institutions for a series of “bad” decisions, or policies that run
counter to majority opinion. This, in turn, may coax more thoughtful responses from
respondents.
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As has been discussed in the previous chapter, the legitimacy models constructed and
examined here include theoretically supported independent variables, such as perception that the
institution fulfills its role (see, i.e., Barak and Fried 2002; Burbank 2004; Smith 1981), considers
the people when making decisions (see, i.e., Skogstad 2003; Wallner 2008), and uses fair
decisionmaking processes (see, i.e., Tyler and Rasinski 2001; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2001;
Tyler 2001; Sunshine and Tyler 2003). In addition, respondents were asked about their level of
attention to news. This may be a measure of some level of knowledge and, given that we know
that knowledge matters to legitimacy (Benesh 2006), this is also included in the models. Further,
education (Benesh 2006) is included in the models. Ideological distance (discussed in the next
paragraph) is also included (Bartels and Johnston 2013). Finally, a number of demographic
variables are included in the models (sex, race, age, income, party identification, and ideology).
Rooted in theoretical groundwork, I expect that two of the variables measuring constitutionally
structured characteristics of the institutions – fulfills its role; uses fair processes – will be
significantly related to institutional legitimacy, such that as perception in these areas increases,
so too will legitimacy in the institution. The third such variable – considers the people when
making decisions – may be more closely associated with the presidency and Congress, as these
institutions are considered to be more representative of the people, whereas the courts are often
considered to be removed from the political process and public opinion. As such, I expect that
this variable will be less influential on institutional legitimacy for the Supreme Court than it is
for Congress and the presidency. Also, as discussed in the previous chapter, ideological distance
may matter to legitimacy, such that as perceived distance between the respondent and the
institution increases, legitimacy will decreases (Bartels and Johnston 2013); however, subsequent
research argues that this relationship does not exist (Gibson and Nelson 2013). In an attempt to
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contribute to the debate, I include the variable in my models here; however, I expect to find no
influence, especially when measuring diffuse support in a theoretically careful manner. Finally,
and in keeping with prior research in this area, as knowledge and education increase, I expect
that institutional legitimacy will also increase.
DATA AND ANALYSIS
Preliminarily, from an institutional comparative perspective, survey findings suggest that,
of the three branches of government, the Supreme Court seems to enjoy the highest level of
legitimacy, followed closely by the President, and finally Congress (see Figure 1). This seems to
comport with public approval, as the Supreme Court tends to hold the highest approval levels,
while Congress tends to languish with low approval numbers.
[Insert Figure 1 Here]
Indeed, at the time that the survey for this article was conducted, the president’s job approval
was at 48%32, Congress’ was at 16%33, and the Supreme Court’s was at 52%34.
One model for each of the three institutions, totaling three models (see Table 4), helps us
to understand the variables that most influence the legitimacy of each institution (see Chapter II
for a discussion about how the index is constructed). For each institution, an Ordinary Least
Squares regression model was run with the traditional legitimacy index as the dependent
variable, and including the institution-specific questions related to reduction of constitutional
powers as independent variables, as outlined in the Methods section of the previous chapter.
While I will later make the case against this traditional legitimacy index, it is important to first
establish a comparative analysis of institutions utilizing the extant methods and measurements.

32

Retrieved from http://www.gallup.com/poll/113980/Gallup-Daily-Obama-Job-Approval.aspx on June 27, 2014.
Retrieved
from
http://www.gallup.com/poll/163964/congress-approval-rating-remains-near-historicallows.aspx on June 27, 2014.
34
Retrieved from http://www.people-press.org/files/2013/03/3-25-13-1.png on June 27, 2014.
33
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From there, the remainder of the chapter will focus on disaggregating the index and determining
which variables are contributing to measurement of long-term sentiment for the institutions, and
which may be capturing a more specific, short-term support for the institutions.
[Insert Table 4 Here]
For all three institutions, perceptions that the institution fulfills its role and uses fair
procedures in its decision making processes are statistically significant predictors of institutional
legitimacy.35 These variables move in the expected direction, such that as each variable measure
increases, so does that institution’s legitimacy. The fact that a respondent’s perception that the
institution fulfills its role predicts institutional legitimacy for all branches is important, in that the
question is specifically about institutional design and, as such, should be tapping into a longterm level of support. Likewise, perception that the institution uses fair procedures in its decision
making is also tapping into a design-level construct and should, therefore, be touching upon
long-term considerations. In this context, it is then easy to grasp how these concepts, in general,
may also lead to increased levels of legitimacy in that government’s institutions.
There are other indicators of legitimacy that are not uniform across institutions. For
instance, females have significantly more legitimacy in the office of the presidency than do
males; however, respondent sex is not a factor in legitimacy levels for either Congress or the
Supreme Court. Asians assign less legitimacy to Congress. African Americans also assign less
35

The large coefficients for these variables suggests that, perhaps, these variables might actually be capturing
sentiment about the dependent variable itself, institutional legitimacy. Despite the theoretical reasoning for
maintaining these variables as independent predictors of legitimacy, it is important to examine how these variables
correlate with the indicators utilized in the legitimacy index. Factor analysis, and factor loadings, reveal that, for all
three institutions, these three independent variables load on a different factor than do the three most long-term of
variables in the legitimacy index – do away with the institution and changes to constitutional structure of the
institution (of which there are two for each institution, as outlined in the previous chapter). These three independent
variables do correlate much more closely with the more short-term variables utilized in the index. A discussion
about short- vs. long-term variables utilized in the traditional institutional legitimacy index will come later in this
chapter. For now, suffice to say that the three independent variables are best used as independent variables in the
models and that they are strong indicators of institutional legitimacy.

83

legitimacy to Congress, but greater legitimacy to the presidency than do other races.
Conservatives assign more legitimacy to Congress and Republicans assign less to the presidency.
And, contrary to Bartels and Johnston (2013), as respondent distance from their own professed
ideology and the perceived ideology of the institution increases, legitimacy for the presidency
decreases, but not for the other institutions. These findings may suggest that short-term approval
affects this measure of legitimacy, given that, at the time of the survey, the United States House
of Representatives was dominated by the Republican Party, while the President was the first
African American President. These findings will be examined more closely in the next section.
Increasing age predicts decreased legitimacy for the Supreme Court only. And, increased
education predicts increased legitimacy in Congress and the Supreme Court, but not in the
presidency. These results, at least for the Court, conform to the established literature that
education is a significant predictor of legitimacy.
Perception that the institution considers the people when making decisions is statistically
significant for Congress and the presidency; however, as expected, it is not significant for the
Supreme Court. This may be due to the fact that the Court is often considered to be arbiters of
conflicts between two parties and, so, may be less attached to belief that it should consider the
greater public in its decisionmaking. Additionally, with its inhabitants being unelected, the
Court is not tied to public opinion in the same ways that Congress and the presidency are.
Finally, for the Supreme Court and the presidency, increased attention to news also predicts
increased legitimacy in the institution. Level of attention to news does not matter to legitimacy
in Congress. This variable may be tapping into some level of respondent knowledge, albeit
rather roughly. Now that we understand, for the first time, which factors influence institutional
legitimacy for all three branches of American government, utilizing the traditional index
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measure, I turn to a closers examination of the variables that are most often used to
measure legitimacy.
Short- vs. Long-Term Considerations
Short-term approval of an institution and/or its inhabitants is not institutional legitimacy.
Therefore, measures of short-term approval must be handled distinct from measures of long-term
support when examining legitimacy. I have already discussed the fact that trust (although, as we
will see, it is not just trust that poses a problem) is, at best, misunderstood and, at worst, actively
working against the intent of the legitimacy index. As such, it is important to unpack this index
and take a closer look at trust and how it contributes to legitimacy. Table 5 reveals the results of
regression analyses when trust has been disaggregated from the traditional legitimacy index and,
instead, is utilized in the models for each institution as a stand-alone independent variable. In
these models, perceptions that the institution uses fair procedures in its decisionmaking
processes fulfills its role, attention to news, and trust all positively predict legitimacy, as
expected. As was highlighted in Table 4, here too we see that, for Congress and the presidency,
but not the Supreme Court, perception that the institution considers the interests of the people
when making decisions leads to increased legitimacy for the institution. Again, this is a new
understanding for the literature. As previously noted, this may be due to the fact that justices are
not necessarily associated with needing to reflect the will of the people, but, perhaps, more so the
rights of the individual. In this case, it would make sense that this variable would not be a large
consideration for the courts as a predictor of legitimacy.
[Insert Table 5 Here]
Asians imbue all of the institutions with less legitimacy than any other race, which
comports with other research that suggests that Asian Americans have less confidence in

85

American government than other races (Hero and Tolbert 2004). This is a change from the
models in Table 1 that included trust in the legitimacy index. For the Supreme Court and
Congress, increased education also seems to increase legitimacy for the institution, just as it did
when trust was included in the index. While this finding is expected (Benesh 2006), it is
interesting to find that education does not matter to legitimacy for the presidency. This is a new
finding for the legitimacy literature. Further, females assign statistically significantly more
legitimacy to the presidency than males. African Americans and Hispanics (along with Asians,
as mentioned above) have less legitimacy for Congress, while conservatives assign more
legitimacy to Congress. In this model, increasing age predicts decreased legitimacy in the
Supreme Court.
Across all institutions, increasing trust significantly predicts increased legitimacy. This
does not necessarily mean, however, that trust should be included in the legitimacy index. When
trust is disaggregated from the index, findings change. Most notably, whereas Asians have no
difference in terms of legitimacy for any institution when trust is included in the legitimacy
index, they have significantly less legitimacy for all institutions than other races when trust is
disaggregated. Likewise, Hispanics have less legitimacy for Congress when trust is
disaggregated. When trust is included in the index, Republicans have significantly less
legitimacy for the presidency, but when it is disaggregated, this significance evaporates. The
significant and positive relationship that African Americans have for legitimacy in the
presidency also disappears when trust is disaggregated. When trust is included in the index,
increasing ideological distance predicts decreased legitimacy for the presidency, but when trust
is removed from the index, this significant disappears. Finally, when trust is included in the
index, increasing attention to news significantly predicts legitimacy for Congress; this was not
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the case when trust is disaggregated. These findings highlight the fact that, perhaps, including
trust in an index of legitimacy introduces short-term considerations into a measure of long-term
support. It appears that, when trust is included in the legitimacy index, short-term influences
matter to legitimacy. When it is removed, those things go away. Essentially, as we see, trust
does play a role in predicting long-term legitimacy, but theoretically, it also plays a role,
arguably larger, in short-term legitimacy. By including trust in a measure of long-term
legitimacy, the impact that trust has on both short- and long-term legitimacy is lost. Also,
perhaps it goes without saying, but if trust is capturing short-term sentiment much more so than
long-term sentiment, then any long-term legitimacy index that includes that variable is critically
undermining results and conclusions drawn from the analyses.
The concept of trust has, largely, been seen as driven by short-term considerations, but it
has been institutionalized in an index of long-term legitimacy. This is confounding, in that,
while trust has been shown to influence both specific and diffuse support, it seems to drive
specific support much more so than diffuse (Gibson 2011). Given this, as well as the findings
here, that removing the trust variable from the legitimacy index leads to significant changes in
drivers of institutional legitimacy, it would seem that trust should be disaggregated from longterm institutional legitimacy measures. Additionally, it begs the questions of whether trust is the
only component of the oft-used index that taps into short-term rather than long-term institutional
legitimacy. Specifically, questions that ask about confidence in an institution, whether an
institution favors groups, and whether an institution is too political may actually be activating
considerations related to a respondent’s feelings toward a particular occupant, or occupants, of
an institution or their policies. It may be that respondents answer after having considered
whether or not an institution is currently too political or currently favors certain groups over
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others. I now turn to a closer examination of each of the variables included in the traditional
legitimacy index, including critical analysis of the variables in the index that may be primarily
tapping into specific, rather than diffuse, support.
Closer examination of the trust variable reveals that trust is much more closely correlated
with other short-term measures in the index, including perceptions that the institution is too
political, puts party interests first, and favors some groups over others. This holds true for all
three institutions.
[Insert Table 6 Here]
In essence, there is a clear distinction between the questions used in the legitimacy
measure; those that seem to capture short-term considerations or feelings about an institution
(and, perhaps, the occupants of the institution), which is traditionally known as specific support,
and those that are decidedly more deep-seated in nature (i.e., constitutional changes to the
institution, doing away with the institution altogether), conceptualized as true diffuse support.
Factor analysis can determine overall variability between correlated variables by identifying
patterns and collapsing variables into requisite factors. Variables that highly correlate to explain
a phenomenon – here, institutional legitimacy – will collapse into one factor, while those that
correlate to explain a different phenomenon – here, short-term, or specific, support – will
collapse into one, or more, separate factors. For all three institutions, factor analysis confirms
that a clear distinction exists. Factor loadings reveal that the seven variables in the index of each
institution are collapsing into two distinct clusters. For each institution, the variables about doing
away with the institution and making constitutional changes to the institution load on a different
dimension than do the questions about trust, confidence, putting party or politics first, and
favoring certain groups or people over others. Substantively, this means that the variables in
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the traditional legitimacy index are diverging, speaking to different concepts. For the Supreme
Court, when loading onto the first factor, the variances for trust (0.8577), confidence (0.8594),
putting party or politics first (0.6770), and favoring certain groups or people (0.7306) are
grouped much closer together than the remaining variables, which group closer together: limit
terms (0.0028), elect justices (0.0745), and do away with the institution (0.3555). For Congress,
we see the same pattern. When loading onto the first factor, trust (0.8486), confidence (0.8471),
putting party interests or politics first (0.6921), and favoring some groups or people over others
(0.7595) cluster together, while restricting presidential appointments (0.0183), restricting the
institution’s ability to make its own rules (0.0508), and doing away with the institution (0.0720)
group together (and load better on the second factor). Finally, the presidency exhibits similar
findings, with trust (0.9030), confidence (0.8923), puts party interests or politics first (0.8518),
and favors some groups or people over others (0.8195) group together and load best on the first
factor. Conversely, limiting the president’s ability to make lifetime appointments to the judiciary
(0.0743), restricting the president’s ability to veto legislation (0.1641), and doing away with
the institution (0.1864) all group together and load better on the second factor.
[Insert Figures 2a, 2b, 2c Here]
I argue that those questions that countenance structural changes to the institution, all
loading onto Factor 1, are most likely tapping into longer-term dispositions related to an
institution. And, those remaining questions about trust, confidence, politics, and favoring certain
groups, all loading onto Factor 2, are capturing short-term specific support. And, as it has been
shown, these findings are theoretically supported. When these questions are broken into two
indices – short- and long-term – we see that there is a real distinction between the two different
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indices for each of the institutions. The short-term legitimacy index contains the following
questions:36
•

Overall, how much confidence would you say you have in [the United States Supreme
Court; Congress; the President of the United States]? 



•

Overall, how much trust would you say you have in [the United States Supreme Court,
which sits in Washington, D.C.; the President of the United States; Congress] to make
decisions that are right for the country? 



•

The United States Supreme Court gets too mixed up in politics; and [Members of
Congress; the President of the United States] put the interests of their/his/her party
over the interests of the American people. 



•

The decisions made by the [United States Supreme Court; Congress; President of the
United States] favor some groups more than others. 

The long-term legitimacy index includes the following questions:
•

If [the United States Supreme Court; Congress; the President of the United States]
started making decisions that most people disagree with, it might be better to do
away with the [institution] altogether. 



•

It would make no difference to me if the United States Constitution were rewritten to
eliminate lifetime appointments of Supreme Court justices, limiting their terms to 20
years; AND, it would make no difference to me if the United States Constitution were 

36

In addition to the factor analyses supporting these configurations, extant literature provides some support, as
well. On the issue of trust, Mishler and Rose (2001) and Keele (2005) argue that trust is influenced by short-term
measures. Lipset and Schneider (1983) show that a drop in confidence does not translate to a drop in institutional
legitimacy. Additionally, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995; 2002) make the case that the business of politics is
distasteful to the public and that inhabitants of institutions suffer when they are perceived as being overly political
– a short-term affect.
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rewritten to provide for the election of Supreme Court Justices by the people, rather
than appointment by the President.
•

It would make no difference to me if the United States Constitution were rewritten to
reduce Congress’ power to approve or deny presidential appointments; AND, it would
make no difference to me if the United States Constitution were rewritten to reduce 



Congress’ power to make its own procedural rules, such as the filibuster. 



•

It would make no difference to me if the United States Constitution were rewritten to
reduce the President’s power to make lifetime appointments to the judiciary; AND, it
would make no difference to me if the United States Constitution were rewritten to
reduce the President’s power to veto congressional legislation. 
[Insert Figures 3a and 3b Here]
When we compare mean levels of institutional legitimacy (coded so that an increasing

mean translates to increasing legitimacy) between the two indices –short- and long-term – we
see that our traditional understanding, and the understanding mirrored in the research here earlier
(see Figure 1), is much more nuanced than previously considered. Figures 3a and 3b reveal that
the Supreme Court is not, necessarily, the “most legitimate” of American government
institutions. The findings of the short-term index comport with the findings revealed with the
traditional legitimacy index – that Congress suffers with the lowest levels of legitimacy, the
Supreme Court enjoy the most, and the presidency falls in-between. When the legitimacy index
is comprised of only clear long-term measures, this picture changes. Here, the presidency enjoys
the most legitimacy, while the Supreme Court and Congress hold nearly identical levels of
legitimacy, with Congress enjoying just a fraction more than the Supreme Court. These findings
flip convention wisdom on its head. With the traditional legitimacy index, the Supreme Court
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enjoys the most legitimacy, while Congress enjoys the least. When we include just long-term
variables in the legitimacy index, however, the Supreme Court enjoys the least legitimacy.
Indeed, should these results hold true over time, the institution of the presidency may be
perceived as the most legitimate institution. Table 7 highlights mean respondent support for each
of the variables in the traditional legitimacy index, derived from the scale for each variable (the
range for each was 0-4, such that increasing numbers equate to increasing support in that area).
For each institution, there is a column for short-term variables and a column for long-term
variables. The results for short-term support bear out much like the mean results of traditional
legitimacy – the Supreme Court enjoys the most, while Congress enjoys the least. The story
changes dramatically, however, when the average of means for long-term legitimacy are
compared. Here, the presidency enjoys the highest legitimacy (2.0690), while the Supreme Court
has the least (1.7612). For the short-term legitimacy index, for each institution, the perception
that the institution favors some groups over others pulls legitimacy down, and for the long-term
legitimacy index, unwillingness to do away with the institution, even if it consistently makes
decisions that run counter to majority public opinion, for all three institutions, pulls institutional
legitimacy up. As mentioned earlier, with levels of institution legitimacy being tied to the ability
to legitimate policy and, thus, enhance public acceptance of policy, these findings have,
potentially, important implications for policy development in the United States.
[Insert Table 7 Here]
Table 8 sketches a legitimacy continuum – change in respondent level of professed
legitimacy for institutions – for both the short- and long-term indices (from low legitimacy to
high legitimacy), allowing a comparison of legitimacy levels across institution based on each of
these indices. Here, the numbers reflect the percentage of respondents that exhibit those levels
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of legitimacy for each of the institutions, dependent on whether the index includes on short- or
long-term variables.
[Insert Table 8 Here]
For all three institutions, there is a significant difference between the picture of
legitimacy for the institution we obtain when only short –term measures are included in the
index, as opposed to an index composed of only long-term measures of support for the structure
of the institution. For the Supreme Court, when only short-term measures are included, 2.95% of
respondents profess high legitimacy, as compared to 15.44% when only long-term measures are
included. For Congress, 0.17% of respondents express high legitimacy with the short-term index,
while 15.58% express high legitimacy with the long-term index. And, for the presidency, 5.25%
express high legitimacy with the short-term index, as opposed to 25.68% expressing high
legitimacy with the long-term index. For all institutions, respondents express higher degrees of
institutional legitimacy when the index contains only long-term measures than when it contains
only short-term measures. Conversely, for all three institutions, respondents express much
greater levels of low legitimacy with the short-term measures, as compared to the long-term
index. This supports my argument(s) that certain measures in the traditional legitimacy measure
are capturing long-term sentiment for institutions than others. In fact, some measures are clear
measures of short-term support for institutions. Specifically, questions about changes to the
constitutional structure of institutions and doing away with the institution are tapping into longterm support for institutions, while questions about favoring certain groups, confidence in
institutions, trust in institutions, and getting too mixed up in politics are tapping into shorter-term
sentiments. As such, it comes as no surprise that we would see respondents expressing higher
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degrees of legitimacy in all institutions when only these long-term measures are included in the
index than when only short-term measures are in included in the index.
Further evidence is revealed when each of the variables in the short-term index is utilized
as a separate dependent variable to model the predictors of each variable. The goal is to
determine if short-term legitimacy influences short-term variables and long-term legitimacy
influences long-term variables, in an effort to ascertain that these groupings of variables, as
conceptualized, are actually acting within their respective short- and long-term capacities. Tables
9a, 9b, and 9c do just this, with the primary independent variables in each of the models being
the short- and long-term legitimacy indices. The short-term legitimacy index utilized in each
model lacks the variable that is utilized as the dependent variable in that model. Each of the
dependent variables is coded such that positive signage equates to increased support for the
institution.
Ordinary Least Squares Regression reveals that ideological distance has an inconsistent
role in explaining each of the short-term variables. Ideological distance explains none of the
short-term variables for Congress. For the presidency, increased ideological distance predicts
decreased trust and increased perception that the presidency favors some groups over others.
And, for the Supreme Court, increased ideological distance predicts decreased confidence and
increased perception that the Court favors some groups over others. These inconsistencies
provide further support for Gibson and Nelson (2014), that ideological distance is not a
significant predictor of institutional legitimacy (see Tables 4 and 5) or short-term legitimacy.
In addition, short-term legitimacy predicts all short-term variables for all three branches of
government, such that as short-term legitimacy increases, so does institutional trust, institutional
confidence, lower perception that the institution puts party or political interests first,
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and lower perception that the institution favors some groups over others. Long-term legitimacy,
on the other hand, plays a much weaker role in explaining each of the dependent variables.
Indeed, for Congress, long-term legitimacy predicts none of the short-term variables, and for the
presidency, it only predicts trust. For the Supreme Court, on the other hand, long-term
legitimacy is more intertwined with the short-term variables, predicting trust, party/political
interest, and favors groups. This may be due to the fact that respondents are more “shocked”
when the Court is involved in these activities, given its perceived role as above politics, and, so,
there is a disparate impact on legitimacy if respondents believe that the Court is somehow
entangled in these practices or behaviors. This is a fascinating finding, in that it suggests that,
perhaps, institutional legitimacy might need to be measured differently for each of the branches
of government. It may be that short- and long-term variables are more, or less, short- or longterm, contingent on the institution. For instance, variables that definitely tap into short-term
support for one institution may tap into long-term support for another. Here, perhaps, short-term
perturbations may not impact overall institutional legitimacy for Congress or the presidency as
much as they may for the Court. This is supported by Gibson (2009), which argues that
perceptions that the Court gets too mixed up with politics or interest groups can influence the
Court’s legitimacy over time; however, this research was conducted in a vacuum, with no
comparison to other institutions supporting the theory. Here, for the first time, comparative
analysis confirms the argument. The findings here reveal that 1) the Supreme Court’s
institutional legitimacy is impacted by the perception that it engages in political behavior in
ways that do not affect legitimacy for Congress or the presidency, and 2) perhaps, the legitimacy
of Congress and the presidency are insulated from deteriorating legitimacy, hinging on these
factors, because those two institutions are expected to engage in “politicking,” whereas the Court
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is expected to remain removed from it. Therefore, when Congress and the presidency engage in
politics, they receive no ramifications, but when the Supreme Court engages in it, it is punished.
These findings further supports the argument I am making here, that great attention must be paid
to the variables included in an institutional legitimacy index.
[Insert Tables 9a, 9b, and 9c Here]
In an attempt to further understand this phenomenon, I have run models of short- and
long-term institutional legitimacy separately, in which the dependent variables for each model
are the disaggregated measures of the other legitimacy index, to determine which, if any, are
driving the two differing levels of legitimacy. So, in the long-term legitimacy models, trust,
confidence, perception that the institutions favors some groups over others, and perception that
the institution is too political or puts party interests first, are utilized as independent variables.
And, in the short-term legitimacy models, willingness to do away with the institution and
support for constitution changes to the institutional structure are used as independent variables of
interest.
[Insert Tables 10a and 10b Here]
The results of the model of long-term legitimacy (see Table 10a) highlight the fact that 1)
short-term indicators drive, in some capacity, long-term institutional legitimacy for all three
branches of government, and 2) the critical variables differ across branches. But, they differ in
understandable ways. For Congress, long-term institutional legitimacy is driven by none of the
short-term legitimacy variables. For the presidency, long-term institutional legitimacy is driven
by trust and perception that the institution puts politics or political party interests before the
people. For the Supreme Court, institutional legitimacy is driven by trust and the perception that
the institution puts politics or party first. These are incredibly interesting findings. First, and to
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reiterate, these findings provide evidence that short-term factors influence long-term sentiment
for each institution. This, alone, is new ground. But, the factors that influence each are also
illuminating. Congressional legitimacy is not influenced by perceptions that it puts party or
political interests first, or influence peddling. This makes sense, because Congress is often
considered to be a political body that is subject to the changing winds of public opinion. These
findings suggest that the American public is aware of that and, therefore, does not punish the
institution if it behaves politically. Individual members may be punished at election season, but
the legitimacy of the institution does not suffer. Presidential legitimacy is also driven by trust,
but also by perception that the office puts political or party interests before the public. At first
blush, this seems confounding; however, if you consider the role of the presidency (as outlined
in Chapter II), as being a representative of the people, of needing to consider the best interests of
the whole American public, then it makes sense that the institution would be harmed by
perceptions that the office does, at turns, put political or party interest first. So, when this
happens, the institution, as a whole, suffers. Finally, the Court’s legitimacy is driven by trust and
the perception that the institution puts political or party interests before the interest of the people.
Again, this makes sense, when considering, as has been mentioned, that the Court is expected to
be above politics, free of influence from outside interests. When the Court is perceived to have
become involved in these activities, its long-term institutional legitimacy deteriorates.
Some interesting demographic patterns emerge, as well. Increasing education and
attention to news informs long-term institutional legitimacy for all institutions. Increasing age
leads to less legitimacy in the Supreme Court. Asians have less long-term institutional
legitimacy in all institutions, while African Americans and women have less in Congress.
Conservatives have more long-term institutional legitimacy in the Supreme Court.
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In addition, increased ideological distance between a respondent and his/her perception of
an institution matters to long-term legitimacy in the Supreme Court and presidency, such that
ideological distance increases, long-term institutional legitimacy increases. This is an interesting
finding, but may suggest that long-term sentiment for an institution is truly impervious to shortterm fluctuations. In fact, the expectation may be that the inhabitants and, thus, outcomes,
change occasionally. This may be, in its truest form, a reflection of American democracy in
action. If so, then it makes sense that respondents might actually have a stronger sense of longterm institutional legitimacy when they see this occurring, even when it means that, at times,
they may be more, or less, ideologically distant from an institution and its outcomes.
Finally, the perception that the institution fulfills its role matters to legitimacy in the
Supreme Court and the presidency, and the perception that the institution uses fair procedures
matters to long-term institutional legitimacy in the Supreme Court and Congress. The perception
that the institution considers the people when making decisions is significant to long-term
legitimacy in all institution, but it is positively related to Congress and the presidency, and
negatively related to the Supreme Court. This may, again, be capturing the idea that the Supreme
Court is not, necessarily, expected to consider the wishes of the public when it makes decisions.

Likewise, some long-term institutional legitimacy variables also predict short-term
institutional legitimacy (see Table 10b). As respondent willingness to do away with the Supreme
Court or Congress increases, short-term legitimacy is impacted. For Congress, short-term
legitimacy decreases (as might be expected), but for the Supreme Court, short-term legitimacy
increases. Also, the increasing belief that the terms of Supreme Court justices should be limited
and that the ability of Congress to confirm presidential appointments should be eliminated, if
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each institution were to making a large number of decisions that run against public opinion, leads
to increased short-term legitimacy for both institutions. These findings may seem confounding;
however, they may also reflect a sense of empowerment on the part of the respondent, such that
when s/he believes that there are very real actions that could be taken to limit the power of these
institutions if they started to run against public opinion could actually increase short-term
legitimacy in the institutions. Perhaps it leads to an increased sense that the institutions would be
less likely to make “bad” decisions if the people occupying them are well aware that they could
lose real power if they do.
Additionally, women have more short-term legitimacy in the Supreme Court and the
presidency. African Americans and Asians also have more in the presidency, while Republicans
have less in the presidency. Conservatives have less short-term legitimacy in the Supreme Court,
and more in Congress. Also, increased attention to news predicts less short-term legitimacy in
the Supreme Court and Congress. These findings highlight a short-term affect for the institutions
in very real terms. At the time of the survey, the president was an African American Democrat,
so it is expected that African Americans might have enhanced short-term legitimacy in the
office, and Republicans would have less. The House of Representatives was controlled by
Republicans, and this may explain why conservatives have more short-term legitimacy in
Congress.
Finally, for all three institutions, the perception that the institution fulfills its role, uses
fair procedures, and considers the people when making decisions significantly predicts shortterm legitimacy. These findings suggest that structural and demographic variables inform our
short- and long-term institutional legitimacy.
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Knowing this, the next question is what variables drive each of the indices – short- and
long-term, fully constructed. So, here, I am interested in determining, very specifically, how
short- and long-term legitimacy for each of the institutions is predicted. Table 8 highlights the
results of regression analyses, in which the dependent variable, legitimacy, is modeled separately
as short-term and long-term. The question here is whether different variables predict short-versus
long-term legitimacy for American governmental institutions. I expect that the questions about
the institution fulfilling its role and using fair procedures will significantly impact long-term
legitimacy for the institutions. The variable measuring whether the institution considers the
people should matter to institutional legitimacy for Congress and the presidency. Given
conflicting extant literature on the subject (Bartels and Johnston 2013; Gibson and Nelson 2014),
as well as the findings here, I expect ideological distance to not matter, especially to true longterm legitimacy. Further, I expect that certain demographic variables should matter in the shortterm, but not the long-term. For instance, given that the president at the time of the survey was a
Democrat, I expect that conservatives and Republicans will have less short-term legitimacy for
the presidency. On the other hand, given that the president at the time of this survey was also the
first African American president, I expect African Americans to have greater short-term
legitimacy for the presidency. I also expect that conservatives and Republicans will have less
short-term legitimacy for the Supreme Court, as Republicans had much lower approval for the
Court than other Americans at the time of this survey.37
[Insert Table 11 Here]
Perceptions that the institution fulfills its role, uses fair procedures (except for long-term
legitimacy for the presidency), and considers the people when making decisions are significant

37

See http://www.gallup.com/poll/184160/republicans-approval-supreme-courtsinks.aspx?utm_source=alert&utm_medium=email&utm_content=heading&utm_campaign=syndication
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for all models of legitimacy – short- and long-term. All are positively signed, except for
perceptions that the Supreme Court considers the people when making decisions, which is in
keeping with an earlier finding (see Table 11). It seems that perception that the Supreme Court
considers the people when making decisions predicts decreased long-term legitimacy for the
institution. As mentioned earlier, this this may be related to the idea that respondents do not
believe that the Court should be considering the mass public when making decisions. Instead,
perhaps, courts are perceived as resolving individual conflict between parties. Also, the Court,
being removed from the election process, may also be seen as less accountable, leading to less
public perception that the Court should be expected to consider public opinion in its
decisionmaking processes. There is no significant difference between the influence of
commitment to institutions – as captured by the variables about role fulfillment, fair procedures,
and considering the people – for short- versus long-term legitimacy, which has been captured by
previous models presented here (see Tables 4, 5, 9a, 9b, and 9c). This leads me to believe that
these variables matter to both job approval and enduring support for the institution.
Attention to news, which may be acting as a proxy for knowledge (although, this is far
from definite) reveals that increased attention to news predicts increased long-term legitimacy
for all three institutions, and decreased short-term for the Supreme Court and Congress. This
may reveal that avid news watching, in the aggregate, increases knowledge and, thus, impacts
long-term legitimacy in the positive; however, at the individual level, short-term legitimacy
may be taking a hit as respondents consider specific, salient news stories that, again, may be
activating some form of evaluation of job approval.
Finally, results show that certain demographic characteristics do seem to matter
differentially for short- versus long-term legitimacy. For instance, as expected, African
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Americans have significantly more short-term legitimacy for the presidency than do other races;
however, they have significantly less long-term legitimacy for Congress. Also as expected,
Republicans have significantly less short-term legitimacy for the presidency, while conservatives
have significantly more short-term legitimacy for Congress, than do moderates/liberals and
Independents/Democrats. Conservatives also have significanctly less short-term, and
significantly more long-term, legitimacy for the Supreme Court. Asians have significantly less
long-term legitimacy for all branches, suggesting that Asians tend toward less support for
government, overall, but they do exhibit higher short-term legitimacy for the Supreme Court.
Females have significantly less long-term legitimacy for Congress and significantly more shortterm legitimacy in the presidency than do males. Increasing education predicts increased longterm legitimacy for all branches. Increasing age predicts decreased long-term legitimacy for the
Supreme Court. And, ideological distance is inconsistent, with it significantly mattering to shortand long-term legitimacy for the Supreme Court and the presidency, but not at all for Congress.
Increasing ideological distance predicts decreased short-term legitimacy for the Supreme Court
and the presidency, while increasing ideological distance predicts increased long-term legitimacy
for both institutions. While this does not settle the debate between Bartels and Johnston (2013)
and Gibson and Nelson (2014), it does offer a new perspective; that ideological distance matters
differentially to the institutions. For the Supreme Court and the presidency, it makes sense that
short-term legitimacy would be negatively impacted by increasing ideological distance. It seems
that people do, in fact, evaluate these institutions negatively, in the short-term, when they feel as
if the institution (its inhabitants and/or its outcomes) does not share their own ideological
perspective. The significant and positive findings on this variable for the Supreme Court and the
presidency are more confounding, however. Here, it may be that people expect institutions, in
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the long-term, to fluctuate in membership and outcomes, as functions of their design. This
would mean that, at times, institutions will be ideologically divergent from an individual
and his/her preferences. Perhaps, when people see this happening, it comports with
democratic expectations and, therefore, leads to an increased legitimacy in the institutions.
In short, these findings suggest that it is important to consider that legitimacy can exist in
both short- and long-term capacities, and that each is influenced by different variables, and that
each taps into a distinct phenomenon. Indeed, when short- and long-term considerations are
evaluated distinctly from each other, we see interesting things, such as the fact that African
Americans hold significant short-term legitimacy for the presidency, but not long-term, due,
perhaps to the presence of the first African American president. Additionally, the fact that
conservatives and Republicans exhibit significantly lower levels of short-term legitimacy for the
presidency, but are no different from other partisan identifiers in terms of long-term legitimacy,
suggests that the measures I consider “short-term” are tapping policy agreement/approval
expectations while the long-term legitimacy measures are tapping something else.
CONCLUSION
Heretofore, studies of legitimacy have been limited to court literature. As a result, we
have known what drives legitimacy for the Court and have speculated that high levels of
legitimacy explain the Court’s ability to legitimate policy. Until now, however, we have not
been able to compare what drives legitimacy on the courts with what drives legitimacy on the
legislative and executive branches, or even really compare their levels using the same metric.
Some research suggests that the courts are often “most-loved” because the media portrays the
institution as being apolitical (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002), while focusing much harsh
coverage on Congress (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995). Additionally, Hibbing and Theiss-
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Morse (2002) argue that the American public prefers the courts over the other branches of
government, in part, because we value consensus in the policymaking process. Since
decisionmaking in the courts is often made out of sight, we get the impression that the courts are
much more congenial than the more visible and rancorous decisionmaking in Congress and the
presidency. The analysis here provides a true comparison and suggests that those factors that
matter to judicial legitimacy also matter to the legitimacy of the legislative and executive
branches. In essence, the belief that the institution fulfills its role and that the institution uses fair
procedures in decisionmaking positively impacts legitimacy for each of the branches. These
findings do not refute Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) outright; however they offer an
expanded context that must be considered when explaining institutional legitimacy. Hibbing and
Theiss-Morse (1995; 2002) suggest that it is the Court’s high legitimacy that allows it to
legitimate policy and, thus, enhance acceptance. I argue that, while the Court may be able to
legitimate policy more so than the other branches (Chapter V provides a more thorough analysis
of this), it is not necessarily due to its legitimacy. In fact, as shown here, when institutional
legitimacy is examined utilizing only long-term measures, the Court does not appear to be as
legitimate as we have thought. In fact, when measuring with solely long-term variables, the
presidency enjoys the most institutional legitimacy.
Further, the analysis provided here highlights some vulnerabilities with the legitimacy index
as it has been comprised and utilized to study the courts. Legitimacy theory argues that legitimacy is
an enduring loyalty to an institution. As such, any measures of legitimacy should also tap into
enduring, long-term feelings toward an institution. Of the measures that have traditionally comprised
the legitimacy index, some are clearly measures of support for the institution, while others are clearly
short-term measures of support for policies or people in them.
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This poses a theoretical challenge to the legitimacy literature, which argues that “measures that
purport to tap into support for the institution ought to be measures that ask respondents to
countenance structural change in the judicial institution” (Weinschenk, Fettig, and Benesh,
2013, 17). Taken together, the results here suggest, at least preliminarily, that trust is actually a
more appropriate measure of specific support. But, the inferences do not stop with trust. The
findings also suggest that three other variables consistently used to measure diffuse support (gets
mixed up in politics/puts party interests first, favors some groups over others, and confidence)
might also be better indicators of specific support for an institution. While these results are
somewhat expected, given recent research done by Weinschenk, Fettig, and Benesh (2013), the
role that trust plays in institutional legitimacy is far from settled. Further, the findings outlined
here suggest that, perhaps, the scholarship on legitimacy is underdeveloped and may need a new
conceptualization if we are to speak accurately about institutional legitimacy and, thus, policy
acceptance emanating from those institutions. As such, it is extremely important that future
research focus heavily on examining and explaining both legitimacy and trust in American
governance. Here, not only do I argue that the traditional variables in the legitimacy index
should be disaggregated and examined, but I also argue that questions seeking to capture longterm support must be relevant to the specific institution. Therefore, instead of asking if
respondents would countenance constitutional changes to the structure of the institution, I asked
respondents questions unique to the specific institutions (see the previous chapter for question
wording). As a result, I can be comfortable that, when voicing legitimacy for an institution,
respondents were considering very real and possible changes to actual constitutional powers
imbued in that institution. I have shown that these variables, along with the question of doing
away with the institution if it started making a string of “bad” decisions, are more closely
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correlated to each other than they are to questions about decidedly more short-term behaviors
or actions that may be more associated with the inhabitants of an institution, as opposed to the
institution itself.
It has been argued that both trust (Gibson 2011) and confidence (Gibson, Caldeira, and
Spence 2003) are measures of both short- and long-term legitimacy, but that each is much closer to a
measure of specific, rather than diffuse, support. My findings comport with this, with factor analysis
revealing that trust and confidence hang much closer to other short-term variables in the index –
perception that the institution favors some groups/people over others and the perception that the
institution gets too mixed up in politics/puts party interests first. When two separate indices are
created, one comprised of solely these short-term measures, and one comprised of long-term
measures, we see that this impacts conclusions drawn about respondents’ perceptions of legitimacy.
For each institution, a higher percentage of respondents assign higher levels of legitimacy to each
branch when the index contains only long-term measures, as compared with an index containing only
short-term measures (see Table 7). Conversely, for each branch, a higher percentage of respondents
assign lower levels of legitimacy to each branch when the index contains only short-term measures,
than when the index contains only long-term measures. While this is not definitive proof that these
short-term measures do not measure legitimacy, it does suggest that further investigation is necessary
if we want to be able to say something substantively interesting about the role that these measures
play in governance and institutional legitimacy. Some evidence has been provided here that shortterm measures do impact institutional legitimacy, and that the measures that matter to each
institution are rooted in the role that each institution plays in our American system of government.
For instance, Supreme Court legitimacy is negatively impacted by the perception that it puts politics
or party interests before
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the public interest and that it favors some groups over others. This may be due to the fact that
the Court is expected to be apolitical, removed from the influence of electoral politics and
public opinion. Congressional legitimacy, on the other hand, is not impacted by these factors,
perhaps because the institution is expected to participate fully in the political process, warts and
all. Finally, presidential legitimacy is negatively affected by the perception that the office puts
politics or party interests first, and this may be due to the fact that the President is expected to
represent all Americans, and not just his/her party.
While the findings here move the debate forward, our understanding of institutional
legitimacy is far from settled. We still need more research into the influence of short- and longterm indicators of legitimacy in our American institutions. It is well established that the health
of a democracy stands (and falls) on the acquiescence of its people. If legitimacy is truly an
enduring loyalty to an institution, then we must be able to parse short- from long-term indicators
of this loyalty in order to accurately measure it and determine which factors are influencing the
standing of our governing bodies with the public. And, by doing so comparatively, we can track
how specific actions taken by those bodies influence both short- and long-term support for the
institution. Here, I have offered a new understanding of what influences legitimacy across the
three branches of American government, as well as a fresh perspective on the individual
variables in the traditional legitimacy index. I argue that some measures are inadequate
measures of institutional legitimacy and, as such, should not be included in the index, but that
they are still valuable indicators of legitimacy. While they do not measure long-term
institutional support, they do impact that support in critical ways. In an effort to advance the
conversation started here, and in keeping with the findings highlighted in this chapter, all
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relevant models in this dissertation will include indices of short- and long-term legitimacy
separately as independent variables, unless otherwise noted.
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Table 4: Institutional Legitimacy38
*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01

Female
Black
Asian
Hispanic
Conservative
Republican
Ideological
Distance
Education
(Increasing)
Age
(Increasing)
Family
Income
(Increasing)
Institution
Fulfills Role
Institution
Uses Fair
Procedures
Institution
Considers
People
Attention to
News
N=
Adj/Pseudo
R2

Supreme
Court
0.08605
(0.1232)
-0.0446
(0.2424)
-0.2647
(0.2485)
-0.0486
(0.2886)
0.0291
(0.1883)
-0.2019
(0.2019)
-0.0338
(0.0560)
0.2215***
(0.0388)
-0.0994**
(0.0406)
-0.0011
(0.0194)

Congress
-0.1765
(0.1442)
-0.6703**
(0.2741)
-0.4709*
(0.2853)
-0.4488
(0.3344)
0.6949***
(0.2614)
0.3905
(0.2596)
-0.0277
(0.0727)
0.1228***
(0.0451)
0.0611
(0.0475)
-0.0128
(0.0227)

0.2914**
(0.1334)
0.4816*
(0.2625)
-0.4287
(0.2750)
-0.1111
(0.3126)
-0.1974
(0.2350)
-0.4586**
(0.2263)
-0.2380***
(0.0803)
0.0618
(0.0421)
-0.0082
(0.0441)
-0.0177
(0.0211)

1.1268***
(0.1165)
1.1871***
(0.1083)

0.8755***
(0.1367)
1.1767***
(0.1281)

1.4264***
(0.1334)
1.3900***
(0.1254)

0.1300
(0.0827)

0.9600***
(0.1155)

1.4103***
(0.1113)

0.1341***
(0.0311)

0.0131
(0.0365)

0.1593***
(0.0340)

1638
0.3012

1349
0.4085

38

Presidency

1626
0.6232

In this model, institutional legitimacy is an additive index of seven oft-used questions in the legitimacy literature – trust
in the institution, confidence in the institution, perception that the institution favors some groups or people over others,
perception that the institution puts party interests before the people, and then two questions each that are specific to the
particular institution that reflect a structural change to the institution (see Chapter II). All variables are coded, such that a
positive increase in coefficient reflects an increase in legitimacy. Note that the perceptions that the institution fulfills its
role and uses fair procedures predict institutional legitimacy for all branches of government. The perception that the
institution considers the people predicts legitimacy for Congress and the presidency, but not the Supreme Court. This may
be capturing some countermajoritarian sentiment for the Court.
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Figure 1: Institutional Legitimacy (Mean) – Full Traditional Index39

Supreme Court
Congress

39

President

This graph reflects the mean response of institutional legitimacy, when the index includes the traditional
variables. Here, it is apparent that, when employing the traditional legitimacy index, the Supreme Court outperforms
the other branches; however, the presidency shares near equal space.
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Table 5: Institutional Legitimacy (Trust Disaggregated)40
*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01

Female
Black
Asian
Hispanic
Conservative
Republican
Ideological
Distance
Education
(Increasing)
Age
(Increasing)
Family
Income
(Increasing)
Institution
Fulfills Role
Institution
Uses Fair
Procedures
Institution
Considers
People
Attention to
News
Trust in
Institution
(Increasing)
N=
Adj/Pseudo

Supreme
Court
0.0991
(0.1199)
-0.2112
(0.2359)
-0.4920**
(0.2419)
-0.2216
(0.2808)
0.2269
(0.1833)
-0.1696
(0.1964)
-0.0622
(0.0550)
0.1883***
(0.0378)
-0.1061***
(0.0395)
-0.0194
(0.0189)

Congress

Presidency

-0.2170*
(0.1293)
-0.6114**
(0.2457)
-0.5479**
(0.2558)
-0.5333*
(0.2998)
0.5355**
(0.2345)
0.3528
(0.2327)
-0.0064
(0.0652)
0.1278***
(0.0404)
0.0698
(0.0425)
-0.0023
(0.0203)

0.2186**
(0.1065)
0.1782
(0.2099)
-0.6164***
(0.2197)
-0.1726
(0.2496)
-0.1868
(0.1876)
0.1113
(0.1817)
0.0683
(0.0649)
0.0135
(0.0337)
-0.0308
(0.0353)
-0.0181
(0.0168)

0.8389***
(0.1184)
0.7874***
(0.1117)

0.2696**
(0.1270)
0.5506***
(0.1199)

0.7360***
(0.1090)
0.4870***
(0.1045)

-0.0905
(0.0819)

0.5676***
(0.1057)

0.5867***
(0.0930)

0.1256***
(0.0303)
1.3385***
(0.1012)

0.0732**
(0.0329)
0.9853***
(0.1097)

0.1467***
(0.0271)
1.6050***
(0.0861)

1638
0.3963

1349
0.3480

1626
0.6320

R2

40

Here, the traditional legitimacy additive legitimacy index is employed to explain comparative legitimacy across
institution; however, trust has been disaggregated and is, instead, utilized as an independent variable. Again, we see
that the perception that the institution considers the people is not a significant indicator of Supreme Court
legitimacy, further suggesting that the Court is insulated from public opinion.
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Table 6: Legitimacy Index Variable Correlations41
Supreme
Court
Trust
Trust
1
Too Political
.4082
Favors Some
.4606
Groups
Limit Terms
.0721
(Change
Constitution)
Elect
.1471
Justices
(Change
Constitution)
Do Away
.2859
Confidence
.7860

41

Congress

Presidency

Trust
1
.3838
.4578

Trust
1
.6829
.6212

.0690

.1917

.0831

.2675

.0954
.7855

.2571
.8766

This table reflects correlations between each of the variables in the legitimacy index with each of the other
variables. The results highlight that, for each of the institutions, trust, confidence, perception that the institution is
too political, and perception that the institution favors some groups over others correlate at much higher levels than
do structural changes to the institution (change the constitution to limit terms and elect justices) and commitment
to doing away with the institution.
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Figure 2a: Factor Loading Plot (Supreme Court): Legitimacy Variables

42

.4

scdoaway11

.2

Factor 2

.6

.8

scelect11
sclimit11

0

scpol11 sctrust1
scconf1
scfavors11

0

42

.2

.4
Factor 1

.6

.8

For Figures 2a, 2b, and 2c (graphic representation of factor analysis) it is apparent that the legitimacy index
variables cluster together distinctly. The variables capturing trust, confidence, perception that the institution favors
some groups over others, and perception that the institution is too involved in politics all load together, and can be
seen in each of these figures grouped in the bottom right corner. On the other hand, the structural variables, along
with willingness to do away with the institution, all load together on a different factor, and cluster closer to the upper
left corner of each figure, as can be seen here.
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Figure 2b: Factor Loading Plot (President): Legitimacy Variables

.6

presveto11
preslifea~11

.4
.2

Factor 2

presdoaway11

prestrust1
presconf1
presparty~11

0

presfavors11

0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 Factor 1

Figure 2c: Factor Loading Plot (Congress): Legitimacy Variables
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Figure 3a: Short-Term Institutional Legitimacy (Mean)43

Supreme Court
Congress
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These results reflect the mean ranking of short-term legitimacy for each of the institutions. An additive index was
created with the four shorter-term variables (trust, confidence, perception that the institution favors some groups
over others, and perception that the institution gets too mixed up in politics). An increasing mean translates to
increased legitimacy. Here, we see that when the index includes only short-term measures of legitimacy, the
Supreme Court is most legitimacy, followed by the presidency, and then Congress.
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Figure 3b: Long-Term Institutional Legitimacy (Mean)44
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These results reflect the mean legitimacy for each institution when the index is comprised of only the longer-term
measures (do away with the institution, and limit two powers inherent in the institution). Here, we see that when we
do this the President is the most legitimate institution, while the Supreme Court and Congress share nearly equal
legitimacy. Figures 3a and 3b highlight the difference in our understanding of legitimacy when we measure it
differently.
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Table 7: Mean Short- versus Long-Term Legitimacy, by Variables45

Trust
Confidence
Politics
Favors
Groups
Do Away
SC Limit
Cong
Appoint
Pres Life
Appoint
SC Elect
Cong Rules
Pres Veto
Average

Supreme Court
Short
Long
Term
Term
1.7648
1.8440
1.5294
1.2085

1.5867

Short
Term
1.0061
1.0000
0.6428
0.5108

Congress
Long
Term

Presidency
Short
Long
Term
Term
1.5636
1.5441
1.4282
1.0078

2.0648
1.4267

1.9401
1.7778

2.3102
1.8094

1.7921

1.6444

2.0874

1.7612

0.7899

45

1.7874

1.3859

2.0690

Table 7 presents the mean for each of the variables in the index. For each institution, the short-term index
variables are in the left-hand column, while the long-term are in the right. Remember that, for each variable, there is
a 4 point scale, and they are all coded, such that an increasing mean is a positive reflection of the institution.
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Table 8: Distribution of Legitimacy Measures, by Institution46
Low
Legitimacy
6.07%

19.82%

44.60% 26.56%

High
Legitimacy
2.95%

3.68%

16.56%

31.94% 32.39%

15.44%

Congress –
Short Term
Congress –
Long Term

41.12%

34.56%

21.48%

4.32%

14.47%

29.88% 35.76%

15.58%

Presidency –
Short Term
Presidency –
Long Term

18.19%

19.53%

34.87% 22.16%

5.25%

1.57%

7.23%

22.64% 42.88%

25.68%

Supreme
Court – Short
Term
Supreme
Court – Long
Term

46

2.67%

.17%

This table reflects percentage of respondents that express legitimacy (both short- and long-term) for each
institution, broken into a five-point scale of increasing legitimacy. The results reveal that, for all three institutions,
respondents express much greater institutional legitimacy when only the long-term measures are included in the
index, than when just the short-term measures are included .
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Table 9a: Influences on Short Term Measures of Support, Supreme Court47
*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01
Supreme Court
Trust
Short Term
Legitimacy
Long Term
Legitimacy
Female
Black
Asian
Hispanic
Conservative
Republican
Ideological
Distance
Education
(Increasing)
Age
(Increasing)
Family
Income
(Increasing)
Institution
Fulfills Role
Institution
Uses Fair
Procedures
Institution
Considers
People
Attention to
News
N=
Adj/Pseudo

0.1980***
(0.0098)
0.0110*
(0.0066)
-0.0016
(0.0262)
0.0601
(0.0515)
0.0831
(0.0529)
0.0505
(0.0613)
-0.0529
(0.0401)
0.0117
(0.0429)
0.0117
(0.0121)
0.0008
(0.0083)
0.0178**
(0.0086)
0.0113***
(0.0041)

Party/Political
Interest
0.0578***
(0.0120)
0.0230***
(0.0081)
-0.0212
(0.0323)
0.1270**
(0.0635)
-0.0994
(0.0652)
-0.0475
(0.0756)
-0.1355***
(0.0494)
0.0280
(0.0529)
-0.0057
(0.0150)
0.0175*
(0.0103)
-0.0404***
(0.0107)
-0.0134***
(0.0051)

Favors
Groups
0.1540***
(0.0108)
0.0123*
(0.0074)
0.0157
(0.0296)
-0.0118
(0.0583)
-0.0280
(0.0598)
-0.0488
(0.0693)
0.0363
(0.0454)
0.0366
(0.0485)
-0.0669***
(0.0136)
-0.0146
(0.0094)
0.0156
(0.0098)
0.0034
(0.0047)

0.2037***
(0.0096)
0.0033
(0.0064)
0.0756***
(0.0255)
-0.0524
(0.0502)
0.1371***
(0.0515)
0.0125
(0.0597)
0.0153
(0.0391)
-0.0354
(0.0418)
-0.0419***
(0.0118)
0.0135*
(0.0081)
0.0076
(0.0084)
0.0075*
(0.0040)

0.1912***
(0.0259)
0.1922***
(0.0245)

0.0501
(0.0324)
0.0861***
(0.0307)

0.1228***
(0.0295)
0.0700**
(0.0282)

0.1067***
(0.0254)
0.2041***
(0.0239)

0.0982***
(0.0179)

0.0394*
(0.0222)

0.0145
(0.0203)

0.0699***
(0.0174)

-0.0020
(0.0067)

-0.0157*
(0.0083)

-0.0099
(0.0076)

0.0020
(0.0065)

1638
0.5645

1638
0.2854

1638
0.3348

Confidence

1638
0.5554

R2

47

Tables 9a, 9b, and 9c are OLS regression models, wherein, for each institution, the dependent variable is each
of the short-term variables on its own. The results are mixed, but a general pattern emerges wherein short-term
legitimacy impacts all of these variables for each of the institutions. Long-term legitimacy matters for some
institutions, but not at all for Congress.
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Table 9b: Influences on Short Term Measures of Support, Congress
*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01
Congress
Trust

Short Term
Legitimacy
Long Term
Legitimacy
Female
Black
Asian
Hispanic
Conservative
Republican
Ideological
Distance
Education
(Increasing)
Age
(Increasing)
Family
Income
(Increasing)
Institution
Fulfills Role
Institution
Uses Fair
Procedures
Institution
Considers
People
Attention to
News
N=
Adj/Pseudo

Party/Political
Interest
0.1931*** 0.1664***
(0.0111)
(0.0141)
0.0048
-0.0026
(0.0070)
(0.0088)
0.0179
-0.1160***
(0.0367)
(0.0292)
-0.0519
0.0227
(0.0556)
(0.0700)
0.0314
0.0154
(0.0578)
(0.0727)
0.0687
0.0198
(0.0676)
(0.0851)
0.0202
0.0398
(0.0530)
(0.0666)
-0.0196
0.0066
(0.0525)
(0.0660)
-0.0062
0.0020
(0.0147)
(0.0185)
0.0001
0.0090
(0.0092)
(0.0115)
-0.0120
0.0232*
(0.0096)
(0.0121)
-0.0027
-0.0092
(0.0046)
(0.0058)

Favors
Groups
0.0157***
(0.0104)
-0.0106
(0.0069)
0.0121
(0.0287)
0.1106**
(0.0547)
0.0392
(0.0568)
-0.0516
(0.0664)
0.1408***
(0.0520)
0.0429
(0.0516)
-0.0082
(0.0144)
-0.0125
(0.0090)
0.0098
(0.0094)
-0.0016
(0.0045)

Confidence

0.2267***
(0.0280)
0.1883***
(0.0269)

0.0040
(0.0279)
0.0850***
(0.0267)

0.1748***
(0.0292)
0.1684***
(0.0280)

0.0950*** 0.1061***
(0.0241)
(0.0304)

0.0472**
(0.0238)

0.0995***
(0.0250)

-0.0116
(0.0075)

-0.0064
(0.0074)

-0.0198**
(0.0078)

1349
0.5925

-0.0598*
(0.0360)
0.0252
(0.0346)

-0.0239**
(0.0095)
1349
0.2476

R2
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1349
0.3559

0.1929***
(0.0116)
0.0028
(0.0073)
0.1056***
(0.0303)
-0.0401
(0.0578)
-0.0469
(0.0600)
-0.0780
(0.0702)
-0.0194
(0.0550)
0.0732
(0.0545)
-0.0040
(0.0153)
-0.0049
(0.0095)
-0.0052
(0.0100)
0.0047
(0.0048)

1349
0.5530

Table 9c: Influences on Short Term Measures of Support, Presidency
*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01
Presidency
Trust
Short Term
Legitimacy
Long Term
Legitimacy
Female
Black
Asian
Hispanic
Conservative
Republican
Ideological
Distance
Education
(Increasing)
Age
(Increasing)
Family
Income
(Increasing)
Institution
Fulfills Role
Institution
Uses Fair
Procedures
Institution
Considers
People
Attention to
News
N=
Adj/Pseudo

0.2500***
(0.0094)
0.0280***
(0.0071)
-0.0346
(0.0256)
0.0096
(0.0504)
0.0465
(0.0529)
0.0060
(0.0599)
0.0158
(0.0450)
-0.1509***
(0.0434)
-0.0576***
(0.0156)
0.0261***
(0.0081)
0.0110
(0.0085)
0.0030
(0.0040)

Party/Political
Interest
0.1716***
(0.0104)
0.0131
(0.0083)
0.0756**
(0.0297)
0.0585
(0.0585)
0.0765
(0.0614)
0.1232*
(0.0695)
0.0042
(0.0522)
-0.0289
(0.0504)
-0.0259
(0.0182)
-0.0142
(0.0094)
-0.0122
(0.0098)
-0.0050
(0.0047)

Favors
Groups
0.1416***
(0.0095)
-0.0006
(0.0078)
0.0403
(0.0280)
0.0875
(0.0551)
0.0492
(0.0579)
-0.0011
(0.0655)
0.0081
(0.0492)
0.0450
(0.0476)
-0.0470***
(0.0171)
-0.0301***
(0.0088)
0.0079
(0.0092)
-0.0088**
(0.0044)

0.2461***
(0.0104)
0.0062
(0.0078)
0.0242
(0.0280)
0.0648
(0.0551)
-0.0457
(0.0578)
-0.0752
(0.0654)
-0.0518
(0.0492)
-0.0744
(0.0475)
-0.0246
(0.0171)
0.0091
(0.0088)
-0.0061
(0.0092)
0.0080*
(0.0044)

0.0955***
(0.0264)
0.1296***
(0.0253)

0.0309
(0.0308)
0.0967***
(0.0295)

0.0450
(0.0290)
0.1243***
(0.0277)

0.1628***
(0.0287)
0.1167***
(0.0277)

0.1072***
(0.0227)

0.1981***
(0.0261)

0.0427*
(0.0250)

0.0863***
(0.0248)

-0.0025
(0.0066)

-0.0078
(0.0076)

0.0070
(0.0072)

0.0040
(0.0072)

1626
0.7561

1626
0.5865

R2
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1626
0.4962

Confidence

1626
0.7087

Table 10a: Long-Term Legitimacy, by Short-Term Variables48
*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01
Supreme
Congress
Court
0.2122**
Trust
0.0491
(0.1060)
(0.1195)
Confidence
0.0349
0.0022
(0.1083)
(0.1158)
Politics/Party 0.2144***
0.0092
(0.0767)
Interest
(0.0884)
Favors
0.1277
-0.1624
Groups
(0.0836)
(0.1116)
Female
-0.0047
-0.2127*
(0.1144)
(0.0990)
-0.7552***
Black
-0.2982
(0.1944)
(0.2164)
-0.4304**
-0.5561
Asian
(0.1993)
(0.2250)
Hispanic
-0.0592
-0.3756
(0.2310)
(0.2639)
Conservative 0.3430**
0.3337
(0.1512)
(0.2068)
Republican
-0.2094
0.1848
(0.1616)
(0.2049)
Ideological
0.0054
0.1084**
Distance
(0.0458)
(0.0574)
0.1523***
0.1401***
Education
(Increasing)
(0.0312)
(0.0356)
-0.0644**
Age
0.0290
(0.0327)
(Increasing)
(0.0375)
Family
-0.0094
0.0057
Income
(0.0156)
(0.0179)
(Increasing)
Institution
0.4128***
0.1666
Fulfills Role (0.0988)
(0.1121)
0.2496***
0.2228**
Institution
(0.0943)
(0.1070)
Uses Fair
Procedures
Institution
-0.2467*** 0.2462***
(0.0677)
(0.0944)
Considers
People
Attention to 0.1560***
0.1419***
(0.0250)
(0.2203)
News
N=
Adj/Pseudo

1638
0.1414

1349
0.0867

Presidency
0.4036***
(0.0991)
-0.0776
(0.0930)
0.1367*
(0.0763)
-0.0113
(0.0813)
-0.0048
(0.0896)
-0.1217
(0.1760)
-0.7195***
(0.1840)
-0.2599
(0.2091)
-0.1296
(0.1571)
0.1252
(0.1521)
0.1846***
(0.0545)
0.0775***
(0.0283)
-0.0108
(0.0295)
-0.0065
(0.0141)
0.4394***
(0.0921)
0.0498
(0.0890)
0.1403*
(0.0800)
0.1400***
(0.0227)
1626
0.1686

R2
48

Here, long-term legitimacy (the dependent variables) is modeled with each of the short-term variables utilized as
independent variables. Confidence and perception that the institution favors some groups are not significant for any
of the institutions, while trust and perception that the institution puts politics/party first matter for the Supreme
Court and the presidency.
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Table 10b: Short-Term Legitimacy, by Long-Term Variables49
*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01

Do Away
SC Limit
Cong Appoint
Pres Life Appoint
SC Elect
Cong Rules
Pres Veto
Female
Black
Asian
Hispanic
Conservative
Republican
Ideological
Distance
Education
(Increasing)
Age (Increasing)
Family Income
(Increasing)
Institution Fulfills
Role
Institution Uses
Fair Procedures
Institution
Considers People
Attention to News

N=
Adj/Pseudo R2

Supreme
Court
0.2149***
(0.0539)
0.1468***
(0.0500)

-0.1245**
(0.0505)
0.0206
(0.0680)

-0.0026
(0.0574)
0.2280***
(0.0601)

0.0065
(0.0506)

0.0458
(0.0631)

0.0886
(0.0685)

0.1469*
(0.0838)
0.2581
(0.1644)
0.2048
(0.1690)
-0.0718
(0.1956)
-0.2927**
(0.1278)
0.0744
(0.1371)
-0.2974***
(0.0382)
0.0351
(0.0267)
-0.0043
(0.0276)
0.0181
(0.0131)
0.9892***
(0.0808)
1.1673***
(0.0742)
0.4698***
(0.0562)

0.0141
(0.0911)
0.1125
(0.1735)
0.0650
(0.1797)
-0.0710
(0.2102)
0.3655**
(0.1646)
0.2156
(0.1630)
-0.0351
(0.0458)
-0.0103
(0.0287)
0.0434
(0.0300)
-0.0188
(0.0142)
0.7234***
(0.0860)
0.9741***
(0.0805)
0.7357***
(0.0728)

0.2672***
(0.0880)
0.5458***
(0.1732)
0.3036*
(0.1823)
0.1305
(0.2063)
-0.0516
(0.1554)
-0.4972***
(0.1492)
0.3876***
(0.0531)
-0.0261
(0.0279)
0.0094
(0.0293)
-0.0080
(0.0139)
0.8365***
(0.0891)
1.1777***
(0.0828)
1.0913***
(0.0737)

-0.0565***
(0.0214)

-0.1249***
(0.0232)

0.0032
(0.0227)

1638
0.5200

1349
0.5406

49

Congress

Presidency

1626
0.7189

Here, short-term legitimacy (the dependent variables) is modeled with each of the long-term variables utilized as
independent variables. The results are mixed (see the text for more discussion), but we do see that some long-term
variables do influences short-term legitimacy.
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Table 11: Short- vs. Long-Term Legitimacy50
*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01

Long-Term
Legitimacy
Short-Term
Legitimacy
Female
Black
Asian
Hispanic
Conservative
Republican
Ideological
Distance
Education
(Increasing)
Age
(Increasing)
Family
Income
(Increasing)
Institution
Fulfills Role
Institution
Uses Fair
Procedures
Institution
Considers
People
Attention to
News
N=
Adj/Pseudo
R2

Supreme Court
Short Term
Long Term
Legitimacy
Legitimacy
0.1071***
(0.0209)
0.1488***
(0.0290)
0.1434*
-0.0138
(0.0836)
(0.0987)
0.2685
-0.2836
(0.1645)
(0.1940)
-0.4451**
0.1848
(0.1988)
(0.1689)
-0.0778
-0.0594
(0.1959)
(0.2309)
-0.2958**
0.3315**
(0.1279)
(0.1508)
0.0916
-0.2050
(0.1371)
(0.1615)
-0.3034***
0.1127**
(0.0380)
(0.0456)
0.1524***
0.0364
(0.0311)
(0.0266)
-0.0669**
-0.0006
(0.0325)
(0.0276)
0.0180
-0.0104
(0.0132)
(0.0155)

Congress
Short Term
Long Term
Legitimacy
Legitimacy
-0.0124
(0.0219)
-0.0194
(0.0343)
-0.2145*
0.0360
(0.1136)
(0.0908)
-0.7733***
0.0955
(0.2159)
(0.1731)
-0.5605**
0.0844
(0.2248)
(0.1798)
-0.0882
-0.3668
(0.2104)
(0.2635)
0.3876**
0.3186
(0.1645)
(0.2064)
0.2166
0.1802
(0.1632)
(0.2047)
-0.0344
0.0061
(0.0457)
(0.0573)
0.1420***
-0.0178
(0.0355)
(0.0285)
0.0345
0.0276
(0.0298)
(0.0374)
-0.0187
0.0056
(0.0143)
(0.0179)

Presidency
Short Term
Long Term
Legitimacy
Legitimacy
0.1145***
(0.0244)
0.1177***
(0.0251)
0.2755***
-0.0183
(0.0881)
(0.0896)
0.5608***
-0.1361
(0.1734)
(0.1764)
0.3281*
-0.7086***
(0.1824)
(0.1843)
0.1464
-0.2452
(0.2065)
(0.2094)
-0.0548
-0.1198
(0.1552)
(0.1574)
-0.4989***
0.0944
(0.1494)
(0.1520)
-0.3885***
0.1789***
(0.0531)
(0.0546)
0.0856***
-0.0309
(0.0282)
(0.0279)
0.0011
-0.0084
(0.0292)
(0.0296)
-0.0094
-0.0063
(0.0139)
(0.0141)

1.0054***
(0.0799)
1.1749***
(0.0740)

0.4113***
(0.0982)
0.2413***
(0.0936)

0.7099***
(0.0860)
0.9706***
(0.0806)

0.1814*
(0.1104)
0.2275**
(0.1062)

0.8213***
(0.0891)
1.1699***
(0.0829)

0.4389***
(0.0921)
0.0561
(0.0891)

0.4716***
(0.0562)

-0.2476***
(0.0674)

0.7261***
(0.0728)

0.2509***
(0.0943)

1.0880***
(0.0739)

0.1572**
(0.0797)

-0.0559***
(0.0214)

0.1553***
(0.0249)

-0.1288***
(0.0232)

0.1412***
(0.0291)

0.0023
(0.0227)

0.1388***
(0.0227)

1638
0.5186

1638
0.1421

1349
0.5391

50

1349
0.0873

1626
0.7179

1626
0.1648

Table 11 presents the results of modeling the individual short- and long-term legitimacy indices as dependent
variables for each of the institutions. Primarily, we see that both short- and long-term legitimacy matter to each
other for both the Supreme Court and the presidency, but not Congress. We also see that structural variables matter
to both short- and long-term legitimacy, although with a couple of exceptions. Additionally, demographic
information reveals some intriguing findings. For instance, African Americans express significantly more shortterm legitimacy in the presidency (the first African American president), while Republicans express less short-term
legitimacy in the sitting Democratic president. Also, Asians have significantly less long-term legitimacy in all
institutions. I do not have a developed explanation for this finding.
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CHAPTER IV
INFLUENCES ON INSTITUTIONAL PREFERENCE
In the last chapter, I deconstructed the traditional institutional legitimacy index (see
Chapter II for an explanation of the index), arguing that 1) the index, as traditionally comprised,
has some weaknesses, and 2) that a better index can be utilized to capture enduring support for
institutions. Further, for the first time, I applied this index, and analysis, to Congress and the
presidency, allowing for comparative analysis that has, heretofore, been lacking in the literature.
This thorough understanding of legitimacy across institutions, including the factors that drive
said legitimacy, brings us one step closer to understanding a key variable in policy acceptance,
which is the ultimate goal of this dissertation. In this chapter, another large step is taken in fully
understanding the role of institutions in policy acceptance by examining respondent notions of
the institution best-suited to make policy in three salient issue areas: online sales taxation, samesex marriage, and the operation of Guantanamo Bay. The question being examined is which
institution – the Supreme Court, Congress, or the presidency – is best-suited to make decisions in
each of these areas and what drives respondents to rank one institution higher than another?
While respondents were asked to rank each of the institution in order of their suitability to
handle each issue (see Chapter II for a thorough discussion of these questions), the responses are
conceptualized as respondent preference of institution to handle issues.
Relying on data gathered from the nationally sampled survey, I attempt to understand
what drives respondent opinion on the fitness of institutions to make policy in each of the
aforementioned policy areas. Data were collected on respondent levels of support for the
policies, as well as their perception about each institution’s authority to make policies in each of
the three issue areas. Institutional preference is distinct from authority, in that the latter captures
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the idea that institutions may have the authority to make policy in certain areas, while the former
captures the idea that, while each institution can make policy in each area, respondents may
have preferences about which institution(s) is the best institution to make the policy. Here, I am
interested in how respondents rank institutions to handle certain issues and, specifically, what
predicts that ranking, that preference.
I suggest, for the first time in the literature, that respondents might have preferences over the
institution that should be entrusted with making policy in a given issue area, and posit a theory for
what might drive those preferences. Some issues may be deemed to be “legislative” or “judicial” or
“executive,” and that choice over best-suited institution could plausibly affect the evaluation of the
policy emanating from an institution, and hence, acceptance of, and compliance with, the policy, our
ultimate interest. Chapter II outlined how institutional role influences how the American public
perceives each branch of American government, with Congress expected to handle monetary policy,
the President assigned foreign policy, and the Supreme Court expected to interpret the Constitution
and protect the rights of citizens. Some roles are codified in the Constitution, while others have
developed over time. Further, institutional characteristics may drive public perception about the
appropriate institution to handle certain issues. As was discussed in Chapter III, Congress and the
presidency are designed to be political institutions, expected to consider public opinion when making
policy, whereas the Supreme Court is insulated from public opinion and may be expected to actively
avoid consideration of it when making decisions. These expectations may drive how respondents
determine which branch is most appropriate to make policy in certain areas. Finally, intertwined with
these institutional characteristics are issue-level characteristics that may influence perception of
institutional appropriateness to make policy on those issues. For instance, same-sex marriage may be
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considered a “rights” issue, leading respondents to then assign that issue to the institution that is
designed to handle “rights” issues – the Supreme Court. Likewise, issues related to money may
be assigned to Congress, given its constitutionally ordained “power of the purse.” And, the
President may be expected to handle the operation of the Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility,
specifically because the office is assigned foreign policy responsibility. I expect respondents to
rank highly, or prefer, Congress to handle online sales taxation, the presidency to handle the
issue of Guantanamo Bay, and the Supreme Court to handle same-sex marriage.
While much literature has considered whether one institution over the others is better
able to legitimate public policy, as cited in Chapter II, none has considered whether that ability
has anything to do with the perceptions respondents have about the authority of the various
institutions to make policy in a given arena. Authority is different from preference to make
policy in an issue area. While an individual may feel that an institution has authority to make
policy on an issue, they may not necessarily prefer that institution to make policy on that issue.
To parse the difference here, though, respondents were asked, of each institution on each issue,
to what degree each institution has authority to make decisions in that issue area. They were
asked to choose from four options, capturing the intensity of their agreement that each institution
had authority. On the issue of same-sex marriage, more respondents agreed that the Supreme
Court has authority to make policy on the issue, than does Congress or the presidency.51
Congress is viewed by the most respondents as authoritative on the issue of online sales

51

73.74% of respondents said the Supreme Court had authority to make policy in this area, as opposed to
55.33% for Congress and 35.83% for the presidency.
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taxation,52 and the President is viewed as the most authoritative on the issue of Guantanamo
Bay (just above the Supreme Court).53
[Insert Figures 5a, 5b, and 5c Here]54
Respondents were also asked to rank institutions from the one that is best-suited to make
federal policy requiring same sex marriage benefits, detention of combatants at the Guantanamo
Bay facility, and tax regulation of online sales, to the one that is least-suited to make policy on
these same issues, giving them the choice of the President, Congress, or the Supreme Court.
This chapter considers their responses and attempts to understand what drives them. These
rankings are conceptualized as respondent institutional preference to handle each issue.
It appears that people are, generally, perceive the Court to be the best-suited policymaker
on the issues of same-sex marriage and Guantanamo Bay, than they are of the other two
institutions, while Congress is ranked first to handle the issue of online sales taxation.55 On the
issue of same-sex marriage (67.30%), and on the issue of Guantanamo Bay (46.70%),
respondents ranked the Supreme Court first. On the issue of online sales taxation, 54.69% ranked
Congress first. On the issues of same-sex marriage and online taxation, the President was ranked
first by only 12.13% and 11.01% of respondents, respectively. And, on the issue of Guantanamo
Bay, Congress was ranked last to make policy in this area, with only 19.37% of respondents
ranking the institution first. Clearly, people are making distinctions among the
52

81.55% of respondents said Congress has authority to make policy in this area, as opposed to 56.20% for the
Supreme Court and 30.80% for the presidency.
53
77.10% of respondents said the presidency has authority to make policy in this area, as opposed to 74.56% for the
Supreme Court and 70.16% for Congress.
54

On the issue of same-sex marriage, the mean authority positions are: Supreme Court – 1.87; Congress – 1.51;
President – 1.20. On the issue of online sales taxation, the mean positions are: Congress – 1.94; Supreme Court –
1.54; President – 1.13. On the issue of Guantanamo Bay, the mean positions are: President – 1.91; Supreme Court –
1.90; Congress – 1.76.
55

On the issue of same-sex marriage, the percentage of first rankings are: Supreme Court – 67.30%; Congress
– 20.57%; President – 12.13%. On the issue of online sales taxation, the percentages are: Congress – 54.69%;
Supreme Court – 34.30%; President – 11.01%. On the issue of Guantanamo Bay, the percentages are: Supreme
Couirt – 46.70%; President – 33.93%; Congress – 19.37%.
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branches as to their aptitude for policy making in this area, even though their distinctions are not
exactly as expected.
[Insert Figure 6]
Further examination reveals that, when certain demographics (whites, African
Americans, Republicans, Democrats, women, men, liberals, and conservatives) are examined
separately, all survey respondents do indeed prefer Congress to handle online taxation and the
Supreme Court to handle same-sex marriage (see Figures 7a and 7b). Interestingly, however, the
Supreme Court is preferred on the issue of Guantanamo Bay (see Figure 7c), despite respondents
also holding that the President is the most authoritative policymaker in this area. This may be
due to some conflict between the perception that the Guantanamo Bay issue is a foreign policy
issue and the perception that it is a criminal justice or rights issue. As was discussed earlier,
foreign policy issues might be assigned to the presidency, but if this is, instead, perceived as a
criminal justice issue that may lead respondents to believe it should be assigned to the Court.
Here, all demographics, except African Americans, hold this preference.
[Insert Figures 7a, 7b, and 7c Here]
These findings may be due to respondent perception of the three issues – that they are
primarily social, moral, economic, political, or rights-based (see Chapter II for a discussion
about these choices). In the case of Guantanamo Bay, Figure 7 shows that respondents deem it,
like same-sex marriage, to be primarily about rights. As such, the Supreme Court is seen as bestsuited to handle these issues, as courts are perceived as protectors of rights (see, i.e., Gibson and
Caldeira 2009; Rosenberg 1991; Scheingold 2004; McClain and Stewart 2006).56 Nonetheless,

56

This is not true across demographics, however. African Americans rank the President first to handle the issue of
Guantanamo Bay. The fact that African Americans narrowly rank the President higher than the Supreme Court on
this issue may suggest a strong specific loyalty to the sitting President over the current Supreme Court, although no
further data is available to clarify this finding.
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these findings bear out the theoretical argument that authority and preference are
distinctly different concepts.
[Insert Figure 7 Here]
And, these preferences differ significantly from one another. Employing Spearman’s
Rho on the two institutions that are ranked the highest for each issue – Congress and the
Supreme Court for both same-sex marriage and online taxation; President and the Supreme Court
for Guantanamo Bay – versus those that are ranked the lowest on each issue, we see that, the
mean rankings for each institution are significantly different from each other.57 In fact, we also
see that the mean rankings between the two highest ranked institutions on each issue are also all
significantly different from each other.58 The natural next question, then, becomes, what drives
these preferences? I turn, now, to an examination of this.
Descriptives: Institutional Reference
First, I consider the likelihood that a respondent will prefer one of the three institutions as
best-suited to make policy in each of the issue areas. Multinomial logistic regression allows a
differential comparison across institutions on each of the issues, providing some analysis about
the variables that drive respondents to choose one institution over another to handle
policymaking.
The primary argument is that the likelihood that a respondent will prefer one institution
over the other will first depend on institutional legitimacy (see Chapter II for a discussion about
this) and authority imbued in that institution to make policy in a certain issue area (see Chapter
II). I expect that both institutional legitimacy and institutional authority to handle an issue will
drive preferences of that institution to make policy in that issue area. As discussed in Chapter II,

57

Same-sex marriage: -1.4851***; online sales taxation: -1.1305***; Guantanamo Bay: -0.4125***.

58

Same-sex marriage: -0.4775***; online sales taxation: -0.6497***; Guantanamo Bay: -0.6424***.
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authority is linked with acceptance and, as such, it makes sense that it should also drive
preferences of institutions to handle certain issues. The dependent variable for the models is
ranking of each institution that is best-suited (so, a first ranking) to make policy on each of the
issues. The primary independent variables included in the models are institutional legitimacy
(long- and short-term)59 and whether each institution has authority to handle the issue.
Therefore, the argument is that institutional legitimacy (both short- and long-term) and authority
to handle an issue drive ranking of each of the institutions, as to their suitability, relative to the
other institutions, to make policy in each of the policy areas, such that as an increase in
institutional legitimacy and authority to handle an issue increases, so too will ranking of that
institution’s suitability, over the other institutions, to handle the issue.
When asked the degree to which each institution has authority to handle the issue of
same-sex marriage, respondents listed the Supreme Court first (see Figure 4a). Also, remember
that respondents overwhelming preferred the Supreme Court to handle the issue (see Figure 6).
As such, I expect that perception that the Supreme Court has authority to make policy on the
issue of same-sex marriage to significantly matter to preference, such that as perceived
authority for the Court on this issue increases, so does the likelihood that it will be ranked first,
over the other branches, to handle the issue.
On the issue of online sales taxation, respondents preferred Congress to make policy in
this area (see Figure 6), and also granted it more authority than the presidency or Supreme
Court to handle the issue (see Figure 4b). This leads me to expect that, on this issue,
congressional authority will drive ranking more so than presidential and judicial authority.
59

Note that legitimacy is included here in models of rank, while it will also be included in models of acceptance,
wherein rank will also be utilized as an independent variable. This may seem to pose a methodological challenge,
but I will argue in the next chapter that rank may be acting as an intervening variable between legitimacy and
acceptance. In that case, legitimacy and rank may influence each other, while still having an independent impact on
policy acceptance.
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Finally, on the issue of Guantanamo Bay, descriptive findings are mixed. When asked
which institution is best-suited to make policy on the issue, respondents chose the Supreme
Court by a wide margin (see Figure 6); however, when asked the degree to which institution has
authority to make decisions in this area, more respondents narrowly imbued the presidency with
this authority, over the percentage that chose the Court (see Figure 4c). As such, I expect that
congressional authority will drive ranking on this issue less so than presidential and Court
authority.
Many of the same controls and demographic variables that were utilized in the
legitimacy models in the previous chapter are also included in the models here for, essentially,
the same reasons.
MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION
In the first analysis, I use whether or not each institution is ranked first as my dependent
variables, and so I employ a multinomial logit, the results of which are in Tables 13-15. The base
outcome for each model is the institution that I expect to be ranked highly to make policy in each
area (for same-sex marriage, the Supreme Court; for online sales taxation, Congress; for
Guantanamo Bay, the President). So, to explain what drives preference of an institution to make
policy on the issue of same-sex marriage, the results of that model predict the likelihood that a
respondent will rank the President or Congress first, as opposed to the Supreme Court. To
explain what drives preference of an institution to make policy on the issue of online sales
taxation, the results of that model predict the likelihood that a respondent will rank the President
or the Supreme Court first, as opposed to Congress. And, to explain what drives preference of an
institution to make policy on the issue of Guantanamo Bay, the results of that model predict the
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likelihood that a respondent will rank Congress or the Supreme Court first, as opposed to
the President. I discuss expectations and findings by issue.
Same-Sex Marriage
As the belief that the Supreme Court has the authority to make policy on the issue of samesex marriage increases, the likelihood that a respondent will rank the presidency or Congress first
as compared with the Supreme Court decreases. This comports with my expectation. It stands to
reason that as authority for an institution in one area increases, presidency for that institution to
handle the issue over the other institution would also increase. Additionally, as the belief that
Congress has the authority to make policy on the issue increases, the likelihood that the respondent
will rank the presidency first also increases. Additionally, as short-term legitimacy in the Supreme
Court increases, the likelihood that a respondent will rank the presidency or Congress first
compared with the Supreme Court decreases. This stands to reason. Interestingly, though, as shortterm legitimacy in Congress increases, so too does the likelihood that respondents will rank the
presidency and Congress first over the Supreme Court to make policy on this issue. While the
finding related to Congress makes sense, it is less understandable why respondents would also rank
the presidency over the Supreme Court here. Perhaps, Congress and the presidency, being more
political institutions, are linked as such.

Specific to ranking the presidency first, long-term congressional legitimacy matters, such
that as long-term legitimacy in Congress increases, so does the likelihood that a respondent will
rank the presidency over the Supreme Court to make policy on the issue of same-sex marriage.
And, as congressional authority to make policy on the issue of same-sex marriage increases, the
likelihood that a respondent will rank the presidency first, over the Supreme Court, also
increases. These results may be due to the fact that Congress and the presidency are perceived as
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making decisions in similar ways, with consideration for public opinion, whereas, as mentioned,
the Court is expected to engage in decisionmaking that is removed from the political process. In
this context, then, perhaps respondents are more likely to associate the decisionmaking processes
of Congress and the presidency similarly. Therefore, these preferences may be linked on this
issue.
Specific to ranking Congress first, short-term presidential legitimacy matters, such that
as short-term legitimacy in the presidency increases, so does the likelihood that a respondent
will rank Congress over the Supreme Court to make policy in this issue area. And, as the belief
that the President has the authority to make policy on this issue increases, the likelihood that a
respondent will rank Congress first as compared with the Supreme Court also increases. As
discussed earlier, this may be due to the linking of the presidency and Congress to similar
decisionmaking environments.
The legitimacy findings deserve some further discussion. Long-term and short-term
legitimacy seem to behave in different ways. For instance, very rarely does long-term legitimacy
influence ranking (except for those few circumstances mentioned above). On the other hand,
short-term legitimacy matters to ranking in some way for all institutions (with the exception of
short-term presidential legitimacy on presidential ranking). This comports with the findings in
Chapter III, that short-term measures of legitimacy operate differently, and influence different
things, that do long-term measures of legitimacy. Here, it seems that short-term legitimacy
measures drive preference (the perception of which institution is best-suited to make policy on
same-sex marriage) more so than do long-term measures. This suggests that the inhabitants of an
institution and/or current perceptions of how the institution is behaving, or perceived to be
acting, where respondents assign issues for policymaking.
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As it pertains to demographic variables, other interesting findings emerge. African
Americans are more likely to rank Congress first, as compared with the Supreme Court on the
issue of same-sex marriage. Women are less likely to rank the presidency first, as compared
with the Supreme Court, to make policy on this issue. These findings may be due to short-term
evaluations of the institution. Increasing attention to news leads to a decrease in ranking
Congress over the Supreme Court first on this issue. Finally, as education increases, the
likelihood that the respondent will rank Congress first as compared with the Supreme Court
decreases. These last two variables may each be speaking to respondent knowledge, albeit in
different ways, and suggest that as knowledge increases, respondents are more likely to rank
the Supreme Court over Congress to handle the issue of same-sex marriage.
[Insert Table 13 Here]
Online Sales Taxation
On the issue of online sales taxation, for both the presidency and the Supreme Court, as
congressional authority increases, the likelihood of ranking the presidency or the Supreme
Court over Congress to make policy on the issue decreases. This is to be expected. And, as
long-term legitimacy in the Supreme Court increases, the likelihood that a respondent will rank
the presidency over Congress on this issue decreases, but the likelihood that a respondent will
rank the Supreme Court over Congress increases.
Specific to ranking the presidency first on this issue, presidential authority matters, such
that as presidential authority to make policy on the issue of online sales taxation increases, so
too does the likelihood of ranking the presidency first, as compared to Congress. And, specific to
ranking the Supreme Court first, Supreme Court authority matters, as expected, such that as the
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Court’s authority increases in this issue are, so does the likelihood of ranking it over Congress
to make policy in this area. These findings are expected and understandable.
As it pertains to demographics, African Americans are more likely to rank the President
first versus Congress on this issue. Again, this may be reflective of a short-term response to the
inhabitants of the institution. Remember that, at the time of the survey, the President, a
Democrat, was the first African American President. Increasing education leads to a lower
likelihood of ranking the Supreme Court over Congress to handle the issue of online sales
taxation.
[Insert Table 14 Here]
Guantanamo Bay
On the issue of Guantanamo Bay and whether or not the facility should continue to detain
enemy combatants, as presidential authority to make policy in this area increases, high ranking to
make policy in the area for both Congress and the Supreme Court decreases. This is an expected
finding, and is in keeping with the ranking highlighted in Figure 2, with the Supreme Court being
ranked first to handle the issue. When it comes to institutional legitimacy, two interesting
findings emerge. As short-term legitimacy in the presidency increases, the likelihood of ranking
Congress or the Supreme Court first over the presidency decreases. This is expected, but it is
especially interesting when compared to the fact that long-term presidential legitimacy does not
influence preference here at all. Long-term congressional legitimacy, on the other hand does.
As long-term legitimacy in Congress increases, the likelihood of ranking both Congress and
the Supreme Court first over the presidency also increases. Interestingly, on the issue of
Guantanamo Bay, short-term legitimacy in Congress does not influence preference.

139

Specific to ranking Congress first on the issue, congressional authority matters as we
might expect. As congressional authority increases, the likelihood of ranking the Congress first
to make policy in the area of Guantanamo Bay over the President increases. And, as long-term
legitimacy in the Supreme Court increases, the likelihood that a respondent will rank Congress
first over the presidency decreases. This comports with the finding above that long-term
legitimacy in Congress leads to an increased likelihood of a first ranking for Congress and the
Supreme Court over the presidency. In some way, Congress and the Supreme Court seem to be
linked on this issue. It may be that when respondents think about this issue, they also believe
that it should be approached from a deliberative perspective, in which case, Congress and the
Supreme Court would seem to embrace that concept more obviously than does the presidency.
Specific to ranking the Supreme Court first on this issue, presidential authority
influences ranking. As the belief that President has authority to make policy in this issue area
increases, the likelihood that a respondent will rank the Supreme Court first as compared with
the President decreases. As the narrative about authority has unfolded, it is clear that this finding
is to be expected.
Again, it is important to note the differences across short- and long-term legitimacy here.
The story on this issue of Guantanamo Bay, as it relates to legitimacy, is a bit different than on the
other issues (where long-term legitimacy hardly mattered at all for same-sex marriage and online
sales taxation policymaking). Here, short-term presidential legitimacy matters to preference, but so
does long-term congressional legitimacy. This may suggest that respondents are thinking about the
current president when determining preferences on this issue (short-term evaluation), whereas they
are thinking about the institution of Congress (long-term evaluation). In essence, respondents may
sometimes, and seemingly on this issue, evaluate appropriateness to
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handle issues differentially across institutions. Additionally, it may also be that evaluating longterm institutional legitimacy in the presidency poses a larger challenge for respondents than it
does for the other institutions, given that the executive office is so greatly associated with the
current officeholder.
Finally, when it comes to demographic variables, some variables matter. Increasing
education increases the likelihood that a respondent will rank Congress first over the presidency.
Age and attention to news matter to ranking the Supreme Court first, as compared with the
presidency. As age increases, the likelihood of ranking the Supreme Court first, as compared
with the presidency, decreases. And, as respondent attention to news increases, so too does the
likelihood of ranking the Supreme Court first, as compared with the President, to make policy
on the issue of Guantanamo Bay.
[Insert Table 15 Here]
RANK-ORDERED LOGISTIC REGRESSION
But, considering which institution is ranked first ignores the fact that any given
respondent is also ranking the other two institutions, and that information is lost when we focus
only on the first-ranked institution. Hence, we need a method that allows use of all available
information in the respondent rank ordering of the three institutions. I utilize a rank-ordered
logistic regression model (Beggs, Cardell, and Hausman 1981), which necessitates “flipping” the
data such that, for each respondent, there are three observations – one for each institution. This
method allows for comparison between rankings as they relate to each other. So, it models the
likelihood of a high ranking, relative to lower rankings. Here, I am not interested in what drives
the rankings specific to each institution, but rather what drives rankings, generally – what drives
preferences. Instead of comparing institutions, I am interested in comparing levels of rank. As
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such, the dependent variable is an index of ranking for all institutions, coded such that the rank
is flipped onto an increasing scale (so a ranking of 1 is coded as 3). A higher institutional rank
translates to a more preferred institution to handle issues. Given the methodological challenges
of including certain demographic variables in a rank-ordered logistic regression model (owing to
their lack of variance by institutional rank), only the independent variables of interest –
institutional legitimacy (both short- and long-term) and institutional authority (see Tables 2-4) are included in this model. I expect that they will significantly drive institutional rankings.
The results of the analysis are shown in Table 16. For all three issues – same-sex
marriage, online sales taxation, and Guantanamo Bay – rankings assigned to the institution are
driven by institutional authority, as expected. Remember, authority differs from preference, in
that respondents may feel that more than one institution has the authority to make policy in a
certain area, but hold a preferences over which institution is more, or less, suited to make policy
in that area. As shown in the table, though, they are related. Higher levels of ascribed authority
to make policy in a given area predict a higher ranked institution.
Legitimacy influences preference a bit differently across issues, though. On the issue of
same-sex marriage, only, does both short- and long-term legitimacy driving increasing ranking.
But, it does so in opposite ways. Increasing short-term legitimacy in an institution drives
increasing ranking, but increasing long-term legitimacy drives decreasing ranking. So, on the
issue of same-sex marriage, short-term legitimacy clearly influences preference, which
supports earlier findings, but the fact that long-term legitimacy significantly decreases ranking
is fascinating. This flies directly in the face of our established understanding that long-term
evaluations of an institution drive our feelings about policy emanating from those institutions.
While this is not an examination of policy acceptance (which occurs in the next chapter), this
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finding suggests that, perhaps, our current understanding of how legitimacy
influences policymaking is wrong.
On the issue of Guantanamo Bay, short-term legitimacy drives preference, while longterm legitimacy does not significantly impact preference at all. And, on the issue of online sales
taxation, short-term legitimacy does not significantly predict preference, but, as with same-sex
marriage, increasing long-term institutional legitimacy significantly decreases ranking of an
institution to make policy on the issue. Again, this is fascinating and the implications of these
findings on policy acceptance will be examined in the next chapter.
[Insert Table 16 Here]
LOGISTIC REGRESSION
Given that the rank-ordered logistic regression did not capture the influence of other
control variables on preference, the results of logistic regression are presented here. On each
issue and for each institution, two logistic regression models were run, one each with the
dummied dependent variables of first rank and third rank. The control variables (outlined in
Chapter II) are included in all models. Table 17a reports results for the Supreme Court, Table
17b for Congress, and Table 17c for the presidency.
First, before examining each institution in detail, it is important to note that for all three
institutions, authority to make policy in each of the three issue areas significantly drives
preference. This is the only variable in all of the models to do so. Increasing authority to decide
drives an increased likelihood of a first rank, while increasing authority drives a decreased
likelihood of a third rank. As expected, authority is very clearly driving institutional preference.
Supreme Court
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On all three issues, long-term legitimacy drives rank in interesting ways. Increasing
long-term legitimacy drives a decreased likelihood of a third ranking for same-sex marriage, but
an increased likelihood of a third ranking for online sales taxation and Guantanamo Bay. It also
drives a decreased likelihood of a first ranking for online sales taxation. Again, while this is not
universal, it does paint the picture that, rather than even not influencing ranking at all, long-term
legitimacy (here, for the Supreme Court) is actually driving lower rankings. Short-term
legitimacy, on the other hand significantly drives first rankings on all three issues for the
Supreme Court. And, it negatively drives a third rank on the issue of same-sex marriage, such
that as short-term legitimacy increases, the likelihood of ranking the Supreme Court third to
handle the issue decreases. Taken together, these findings point to the fact that short-term
legitimacy in the Supreme Court is driving high rankings, while long-term legitimacy in the
institution is actually driving low rankings.
Demographically, a few other interesting findings emerge. African Americans are much
more likely to preference the Supreme Court differentially than others to make policy on the
issues of same-sex marriage and online sales taxation, but not for Guantanamo Bay. African
Americans are much less likely to rank the Supreme Court first, and more likely to rank it third,
to make policy on the issues of same-sex marriage and online sales taxation. Hispanics are much
more likely to rank the Supreme Court third on the issue of online sales taxation. Republicans
are more likely to rank the Supreme Court first on the issue of online sales taxation.
For online sales taxation only, increasing ideological distance negatively drives a first
ranking for the Supreme Court. And, increasing education positively drives a first rank for the
Supreme Court to handle same-sex marriage, but negatively drives a first rank to handle online
sales taxation. In fact, increasing education positively drives a third rank for the Supreme Court
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to make policy on online sales taxation. Clearly, as education increases, the more likely that a
respondent believes the issue of online sales taxation is best handled by an institution other than
the Supreme Court. This same pattern emerges for age on the issue of Guantanamo Bay. As
respondent age increases, the less likely that s/he will rank the Supreme Court first (and the
more likely to rank it third) to handle the issue.
Finally, for the Supreme Court, on the issue of same-sex marriage alone, respondent level
of attention to news drives preference. Increasing attention to news drives a first rank to make
policy on the issue, while it also negatively drives a third rank.
[Insert Table 17a Here]
Congress
In addition to authority driving first and third ranking on all three issues, some other
interesting findings emerge. On the issue of same-sex marriage, both short- and long-term
legitimacy positive drive a first ranking and negatively drive a third ranking. As short- and longterm legitimacy in Congress increase, so does the likelihood of a first ranking. And, as short-and
long-term legitimacy increase, the likelihood of a third ranking decreases. This is to be expected,
given the extant literature (outlined in Chapter II).
Women are less likely to rank Congress first to make policy on same-sex marriage,
and Hispanics are more likely to rank Congress third. Conservatives are more likely to rank
Congress first to make policy on this issue, while both conservatives and Republicans are less
likely to rank Congress third. Finally, increasing family income predicts a lower likelihood of
ranking Congress third on the issue.
On the issue of online sales taxation, long-term legitimacy matters, while short-term
legitimacy does not. As long-term legitimacy in Congress increases, the likelihood of a first
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ranking to handle the issue increases, while the likelihood of a third ranking decreases. On this
issue, the only other significant variable is family income, such that as family income increases,
the likelihood of a third ranking decreases.
On the issue of Guantanamo Bay, long-term legitimacy drives a first rank for Congress,
while increased short-term legitimacy decrease the likelihood of a third ranking. Republicans are
more likely to rank Congress first, and less likely to rank it third, on this issue. And, here
increasing ideological distance predicts a greater likelihood of a first ranking, which is
unexpected and difficult to explain without further information.
[Insert Table 17b Here]
Presidency
As previously noted, authority to decide influences institutional preference in expected
ways. In addition, institutional legitimacy also plays some role. Both short- and long-term
legitimacy drive first and third rankings for the presidency to make policy on the issue of samesex marriage, but in different ways. Here, increasing short-term legitimacy drives increased
likelihood of a first, and decreased likelihood of a third, ranking. Long-term legitimacy is just
the opposite – increasing long-term legitimacy drives decreased likelihood of a first ranking, and
increased likelihood of a third. This sounds confusing, but it may be that respondents have a
difficult time separating the person from the institution when it comes to the presidency. Unlike
the other institutions, the executive branch has just one inhabitant at any given time, so when we
talk about the presidency, respondents may immediately imagine the current inhabitant, as
opposed to the office itself. In this sense, respondents may be conflating job approval with
legitimacy when they think about the presidency, in ways that they do not with Congress or the
Supreme Court.
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Women and African Americans are also more likely to rank the presidency first on the
issue of same-sex marriage. In addition, African Americans are also less likely to rank the
presidency third on the issue. This may provide further evidence that short-term indicators are
driving preference for the presidency.
Education drives both first and third ranking for the presidency on this issue, with
increasing education predicting increased likelihood of a first rank, and decreased likelihood of
a third. Increasing ideological distance drives a decreased likelihood of a first rank, as expected.
And, increased attention to news drives a decreased likelihood of a first rank. Given that this
survey was conducted at a time that the Supreme Court was expected to rule in the very near
future on whether the federal Defense of Marriage Act was constitutional60, it may be that
respondents attuned to the news expected that the issue was now a judicial matter.
On the issue of online sales taxation, increasing short-term legitimacy decreased the
likelihood of a third rank for the presidency to make policy on the issue. Legitimacy does not
rise to significance on this issue in any other way.
Again, though, African Americans are more likely to rank the presidency first, and less
likely to rank the office third. And, here, increased attention to news drives a decreased
likelihood of ranking the presidency first on the issue.
Finally, on the issue of Guantanamo Bay, when it comes to legitimacy, only short-term
legitimacy matters to the presidency, such that increasing short-term legitimacy drives
increased likelihood of a first rank, and decreased likelihood of a third rank.
African Americans are less likely to rank the presidency third to make policy on this
issue. Likewise, increased ideological distance drives an increased likelihood of a third rank, as
expected. Increasing education drives a decreased likelihood of a first ranking, while increasing
60
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age predicts increased likelihood of a first ranking. And, increasing attention to news drives a
decreased likelihood of a first ranking.
[Insert Table 17c Here]
CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I offer a consideration that has previously been left unstudied: that people
may have preferences about the institution best-suited to handle a given policy issue. Source
cues are known to effect policy, but, it appears that, perhaps, the reality is more complicated
than the commonly held belief that policies from the courts are universally preferred (Birnbaum
and Stegner 1979; Chaiken 1980; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1997; Mondak 1993a, 1993b, 1994).
The results here reveal that respondents do, indeed, have preferences about which branch of
American government handles certain issues. Specifically, when asked to rank institutions,
respondents ranked the Supreme Court first to handle policy on the detention of combatants at
the Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility and same-sex marriage. Respondents ranked Congress
first to handle policy related to online sales taxation. Further, these preferences are driven by the
general perception that each institution has some authority to even make policy in these issue
areas.
Of the variables of interest, institutional authority to decide on each issue and short- and
long-term legitimacy, institutional authority is a universal driver of institutional preference to
make policy on each issue. Legitimacy is a more complicated story, however. Short-term
legitimacy seems to drive preference for each institution much more so than long-term
legitimacy, but the pattern is less discernable. When ranking is arranged on an increasing scale,
it becomes clear that, for all institutions, high ranking is driven by short-term legitimacy on the
issues of same-sex marriage and Guantanamo Bay (see Table 16), while high ranking is
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negatively driven by long-term legitimacy for all institutions on the issues of same-sex marriage
and online sales taxation. When first rank is dummied out (see Tables 17a, 17b, and 17c), the
picture becomes clearer, but changes little. Short-term legitimacy drives a first rank for the
Supreme Court on all issues, same-sex marriage and Guantanamo Bay for the presidency, and
same-sex marriage for Congress. Conversely, long-term legitimacy drives a first rank for
Congress on all issues. Interestingly long-term legitimacy negatively drives a first rank for the
Supreme Court on online sales taxation and for the presidency on same-sex marriage. These are
fascinating findings and suggest that short- and long-term legitimacy matter differentially to the
institutions. In a nutshell, the Supreme Court seems much more susceptible to short-term
evaluations than the presidency and Congress. Congress, on the other hand, is susceptible much
more so to changes in long-term legitimacy than are the presidency or the Supreme Court. If
legitimacy matters to acceptance, as has been argued here, then these findings have clear
implications for the policymaking by each of the institutions. Further, the fact that the perception
that an institution has authority to decide on each of the issues is the one consistent driver of
institutional preference suggests that the ability of an institution, or the inhabitants of an
institution, to influence this perception can have strong implications for policy acceptance.
Taken together, findings summarized in the previous chapter and this one have helped to
paint a picture of those variables that may influence policy acceptance – institutional legitimacy
and institutional preference to handle certain issues. In Chapter III, I determined that legitimacy
(across all three institutions) is largely driven by structural factors specific to the institutions.
For instance, it seems that judicial and presidential legitimacy is harmed by the perception that it
engages in politics or party interests, whereas congressional legitimacy is not affected by this. I
also disaggregated and examined the traditional legitimacy index, ultimately arguing that the oft-

149

used index contains both shorter- and longer-term measures of institutional legitimacy. And, I
constructed two separate institutional legitimacy indices (one short- and one long-term) to
capture the differences and more accurately measure legitimacy. In this chapter, I have examined
respondent preference of institutions to handle certain policies and among other things, have
found that authority to make decisions on certain policies is a strong predictor of institutional
preference to handle particular issues. In the next chapter, I will take these findings and use them
to analyze and understand what drives policy acceptance when I consider whether respondent
preferences affect reaction to, and evaluation of, policy emanating from the institution. It is
important to note here that institutional legitimacy and institutional preference will be utilized as
independent variables in the policy acceptance model developed in the next chapter. This may
seem like a methodological error; however, I argue that some path dependence between
legitimacy, preference, and acceptance may exist, in which the legitimacy and preference
variables influence each other, but still have an independent impact on acceptance. As such, it is
entirely appropriate to have also included legitimacy as an independent variable in the rank
models developed here.
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Figure 4a: Authority to Decide on Same Sex Marriage, by Branches (Mean)61
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61
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Figures 5a, 5b, and 5c capture the overall mean response for each institution on the question of which institution
has authority to make policy on each issue. The responses fall on a four-point scale, meaning that total authority
result in a 4.0 score. Here, we see that on the issue of same-sex marriage, most respondents agreed that the Supreme
Court has authority to make policy in this area, more so than the presidency or Congress. On the issue of online
sales taxation, most respondents agreed that Congress has authority in this area, and on Guantanamo Bay, most
respondents agreed that the President has authority (just barely edging out the Supreme Court).
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Figure 4b: Authority to Decide on Online Taxation, by Branches (Mean)
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Figure 4c: Authority to Decide on Guantanamo Bay, by Branches (Mean)
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Figure 5: First Rank, by Branch of Government62
100.00%
90.00%
80.00%
70.00%
60.00%
President
50.00%

Congress

40.00%

Supreme Court

30.00%
20.00%
10.00%
0.00%
Online Taxation

Guantanamo Bay

62

Same Sex Marriage

This figure captures the percentage of respondents that ranked each institution first to handle each of the
issues. Clearly, most respondents ranked Congress first to handle online sales taxation, and the Supreme Court to
handle Guantanamo Bay and same-sex marriage. On the other hand, on the issues of online sales taxation and
same-sex marriage, the least number of respondents ranked the President first. And, on the issue of Guantanamo
Bay, the least number of respondents ranked Congress first.
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Figure 6a: First Rank - Online Taxation, by Demographics63
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Figures 6a, 6b, and 6c reflect the percentages of respondents that rank each institution first to handle each issue;
however, these rankings are broken out by demographics. Largely, the findings reflect the picture provided in
Figure 5 (most respondents rank Congress first to make policy on online sales taxation, and the Supreme Court first
to make policy on Guantanamo Bay and same-sex marriage) with one notable exception. African Americans are the
only demographic (of those displayed) in which most respondents ranked the President first (as opposed to the
Supreme Court) to handle the issue of Guantanamo Bay. This finding could reflect a short-term evaluation of the
institutions.
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Figure 6b: First Rank - Guantanamo Bay, by Demographics
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Figure 6c: First Rank - Same Sex Marriage, by Demographics
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Figure 7: Issue Categorization64
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Respondents were asked, on each issue, if they thought it was primarily a moral, political, social, economic, or
rights-based issue. Here, those percentages for each issue are presented. More respondents view same-sex marriage
and Guantanamo Bay as rights-based issues than any other category; and, more (in fact, a majority) view online
sales taxation as an economic issue.
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Table 12a: Difference of Means – Lowest and Highest Rankings65

Spearman’s
Rho
N=

Same Sex
Marriage
(President and
Supreme Court)
-1.4851***

Online Taxation
(Congress and
President)

1624

Guantanamo Bay
(Supreme Court
and Congress)

-1.1305***

-0.4125***

1344

1621

Table 12b: Difference of Means – Two Highest Rankings

Spearman’s
Rho
N=

Same Sex
Marriage
(Supreme Court
and Congress)
-0.4775***

Online Taxation
(Congress and
Supreme Court)

1624

65

Guantanamo Bay
(Supreme Court
and President)

-0.6497***

-0.6424***

1344

1621

Tables 12a and 12b reflect the results of Spearman’s Rho difference of means tests on each issue – one between
the lowest and highest rankings to handle each issue, and one between the two highest rankings to handle each
issue. On each issue, the rankings are significantly different from each other.
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Table 13: Multinomial Logit of Institution Ranked First: Same Sex Marriage (SC Base Outcome)66
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Variable
Presidency
Legitimacy – Long
Presidency
Legitimacy – Short
Congress Legitimacy
– Long
Congress Legitimacy
– Short
Supreme Court
Legitimacy – Long
Supreme Court
Legitimacy - Short
President Authority
Congress Authority
Supreme Court
Authority
Female
Black
Asian
Hispanic
Conservative
Republican
Ideological Distance
Education
Age
Family Income
Attention to News

Coefficient (Standard Error)
President
Congress
-0.0413
-0.0352
(0.0542)
(0.0723)
0.0408
0.1819***
(0.0455)
(0.0328)
0.1304**
-0.0854
(0.0511)
(0.0625)
0.1900*** 0.1505***
(0.0375)
(0.0487)
-0.0019
0.0543
(0.0494)
(0.0663)
-0.2464*** -0.3211***
(0.0414)
(0.0557)
1.1471***
0.0184
(0.1468)
(0.1129)
0.7391*** 0.1154
(0.1120)
(0.1341)
-0.9364*** -0.9382***
(0.1076)
(0.1386)
-0.3861**
0.3352
(0.1570)
(0.2076)
0.6357*
0.3976
(0.3261)
(0.3053)
-0.4504
0.2730
(0.3417)
(0.3940)
-0.1150
-0.1335
(0.3640)
(0.4354)
-0.0446
0.4171
(0.2649)
(0.3488)
0.1222
-0.0176
(0.2515)
(0.3710)
0.1321
-0.1824
(0.1088)
(0.1444)
-0.2466***
-0.0445
(0.0727)
(0.0506)
-0.0613
0.0042
(0.0521)
(0.0691)
0.0034
-0.0462
(0.0243)
(0.0336)
-0.1258**
-0.0365
(0.0525)
(0.0407)

LL = -947.56187; LR chi2(40) = 524.59, prob > chi2 = 0.0000; pseudo R2 = 0.2168; N = 1430.

66

Tables 13, 14, and 15 highlight the results of multinomial logistic regression, in which the dependent variable is
a first ranking of each institution to make policy in the issue area. In each model, the base outcome is the institution
that most respondents say has authority to make policy in that issue area: the Supreme Court for same-sex
marriage, Congress for online sales taxation, and the presidency for Guantanamo Bay. Largely, the results highlight
the fact that increasing authority matters to increased institutional ranking to make policy in each area.
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Table 14: Multinomial Logit of Institution Ranked First: Online Taxation (Congress Base
Outcome)
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Variable
Presidency Legitimacy –
Long
Presidency Legitimacy –
Short
Congress Legitimacy –
Long
Congress Legitimacy –
Short
Supreme Court
Legitimacy – Long
Supreme Court
Legitimacy – Short
President Authority
Congress Authority
Supreme Court Authority
Female
Black
Asian
Hispanic
Conservative
Republican
Ideological Distance
Education
Age
Family Income
Attention to News

Coefficient (Standard Error)
President
Supreme Court
-0.0116
-0.0423
(0.0764)
(0.0499)
0.0363
-0.0445
(0.0479)
(0.0296)
-0.1033
-0.0107
(0.0649)
(0.0430)
0.0539
-0.0681**
(0.0336)
(0.0520)
-0.0120
-0.0520
(0.0699)
(0.0450)
-0.1074**
0.1314***
(0.0573)
(0.0369)
1.2296***
0.1770
(0.1725)
(0.1120)
-0.9865***
-0.8778***
(0.1640)
(0.1127)
0.1569
0.8796***
(0.0996)
(0.1479)
0.0487
0.0005
(0.2213)
(0.1444)
1.0199***
-0.1491
(0.3250)
(0.3139)
0.2876
0.0765
(0.4230)
(0.2859)
-0.0704
-0.4926
(0.4614)
(0.3543)
-0.1957
-0.0686
(0.3776)
(0.2515)
0.2582
0.3476
(0.3711)
(0.2430)
0.0794
-0.0250
(0.1505)
(0.1006)
-0.0381
-0.0829*
(0.0736)
(0.0462)
-0.0160
-0.0027
(0.0749)
(0.0476)
-0.0091
-0.0004
(0.0363)
(0.0228)
-0.0103
-0.0370
(0.0581)
(0.0384)

LL = -956.34888; LR chi2(40) = 315.80, prob > chi2 = 0.0000; pseudo R2 = 0.1417; N = 1188.
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Table 15: Multinomial Logit of Institution Ranked First: Guantanamo Bay (President Base
Outcome)
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Variable
Presidency Legitimacy
– Long
Presidency Legitimacy
– Short
Congress Legitimacy –
Long
Congress Legitimacy –
Short
Supreme Court
Legitimacy – Long
Supreme Court
Legitimacy - Short
President Authority
Congress Authority
Supreme Court
Authority
Female
Black
Asian
Hispanic
Conservative
Republican
Ideological Distance
Education
Age
Family Income
Attention to News

Coefficient (Standard Error)
Congress
Supreme Court
-0.0624
-0.0630
(0.0612)
(0.0507)
-0.1382***
-0.1223***
(0.0352)
(0.0297)
0.2257***
0.0929**
(0.0546)
(0.0297)
0.0190
-0.0310
(0.0400)
(0.0331)
-0.0646
-0.1367**
(0.0550)
(0.0455)
0.1070***
0.0464
(0.0430)
(0.0355)
-0.9862***
-1.0932***
(0.1371)
(0.1186)
-0.0248
0.8074***
(0.1377)
(0.1023)
-0.0211
1.0604***
(0.1021)
(0.1102)
0.0223
0.0864
(0.1719)
(0.1401)
0.2333
0.0061
(0.3256)
(0.2741)
-0.1221
0.0789
(0.3539)
(0.2776)
-0.4252
0.0503
(0.4479)
(0.3177)
-0.2312
-0.1168
(0.3001)
(0.2623)
0.0296
-0.0430
(0.2880)
(0.2570)
0.1561
-0.0458
(0.1213)
(0.1043)
0.0367
0.1090**
(0.0450)
(0.0542)
-0.0027
-0.1354***
(0.0465)
(0.0559)
-0.0088
-0.0180
(0.0268)
(0.0219)
0.0334
0.0658*
(0.0454)
(0.0367)

LL = -1249.2602; LR chi2(40) = 484.92, prob > chi2 = 0.0000; pseudo R2 = 0.1625; N = 1433.
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Table 16: Rank Ordered Logistic Regression, by Issue67
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

Long-Term
Legitimacy
Short-Term
Legitimacy
Institutional
Authority

Same Sex
Marriage
-0.0947***
(0.0192)
0.1102***
(0.0102)
1.1301***
(0.0479)

Guantanamo
Bay
0.0027
(0.0180)
0.1043***
(0.0096)
0.8699***
(0.0453)

Online
Taxation
-0.0537***
(0.0194)
-0.0075
(0.0105)
1.0139***
(0.0468)

N=

4775

4777

3945

67

Here, a rank-ordered logistic regression on the primary independent variable that drives the likelihood of a first
ranking to handle certain issues (see Tables 13, 14, and 15), reveals that ranking, in general (as the dependent
variable here is the likelihood of an increasing ranking), is driven by institutional authority to make policy on each
of the issues.
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Table 17a: Logistic Regression, Supreme Court by First and Third Rank68
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Same Sex Marriage
Rank One
Rank Three
Legitimacy
0.0199
-0.0815**
(Long)
(0.0310)
(0.0412)
0.1526***
-0.1611***
Legitimacy
(Short)
(0.0292)
(0.0387)
-0.4103***
Authority to 0.6354***
Decide
(0.0742)
(0.0944)
Female
0.0089
-0.0674
(0.1255)
(0.1700)
-0.6300***
0.5414*
Black
(0.2331)
(0.2850)
Asian
0.0290
-0.3991
(0.2602)
(0.3984)
Hispanic
-0.2098
0.5331
(0.2804)
(0.3381)
Conservative -0.1029
-0.0892
(0.1871)
(0.2605)
Republican
-0.0654
-0.1043
(0.2029)
(0.2810)
Ideological
-0.0410
0.1069
Distance
(0.0575)
(0.0763)
Education
0.0816**
0.0473
(0.0417)
(0.0556)
Age
0.0367
0.0078
(0.0419)
(0.0573)
Family
0.0256
-0.0121
Income
(0.0201)
(0.0274)
-0.1539***
Attention to 0.1018***
News
(0.0320)
(0.0441)

Online Sales Taxation
Rank One
Rank Three
-0.0629*
0.0647**
(0.0328)
(0.0325)
0.0696**
0.0036
(0.0301)
(0.0294)
0.6808***
-0.5656***
(0.0858)
(0.0806)
-0.0263
-0.0572
(0.0858)
(0.1314)
-0.5706**
0.6227***
(0.2871)
(0.2413)
0.0527
-0.2684
(0.2580)
(0.2697)
0.6830**
-0.3347
(0.3108)
(0.2826)
-0.0612
-0.0884
(0.1996)
(0.2024)
0.3889*
-0.3132
(0.2109)
(0.2211)
-0.1047*
0.0844
(0.0615)
(0.0607)
-0.0972**
0.0781*
(0.0424)
(0.0415)
0.0154
-0.0440
(0.0437)
(0.0432)
-0.0009
0.0016
(0.0209)
(0.0209)
-0.0200
-0.0133
(0.0341)
(0.0337)

Guantanamo Bay
Rank One
Rank Three
-0.0284
0.0031*
(0.0291)
(0.0313)
0.0503*
-0.0359
(0.0266)
(0.0287)
0.8863***
-0.7748***
(0.0814)
(0.0800)
0.0064
-0.1320
(0.1159)
(0.1253)
-0.2226
0.2495
(0.2287)
(0.2334)
0.0997
0.0974
(0.2335)
(0.2465)
0.0476
0.2110
(0.2684)
(0.2859)
-0.0468
-0.0746
(0.1814)
(0.1916)
0.1406
0.0186
(0.1955)
(0.2090)
-0.0398
-0.0087
(0.0543)
(0.0584)
-0.0221
0.0612
(0.0370)
(0.0399)
-0.1536***
0.1122***
(0.0388)
(0.0413)
-0.0163
-0.0150
(0.0184)
(0.0201)
0.0339
0.0124
(0.0297)
(0.0324)

N=
Adj R2

1232
0.0634

1479
0.0867

1475
1140

1475
0.0868

68

1232
0.0494

1479
0.0720

Table 17a reflects logistic regression, in which the dependent variable (a first and third rank for the Supreme
Court on each issue), is modeled to determine the primary indicators of these rankings. The variables of interest,
authority to decide and short- and long-term legitimacy operate in interesting ways. First, perception that the Court
has the authority to decide determines rank in expected ways for all issues. Second, short-term legitimacy
significantly drives a first ranking for all issues, while long-term legitimacy negatively drives a first rank for online
sales taxation only. Clearly, short-term legitimacy matters more to Supreme Court ranking as best-suited to make
policy on all three issues than does long-term legitimacy.
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Table 17b: Logistic Regression, Congress by First and Third Rank69
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Same Sex Marriage
Rank One
Rank Three
Legitimacy
0.0820**
-0.1676***
(Long)
(0.0391)
(0.0341)
0.1074***
-0.0847***
Legitimacy
(Short)
(0.0342)
(0.0326)
-0.3877***
Authority to 0.3524***
Decide
(0.0958)
(0.0844)
Female
-0.4936***
0.1546
(0.1443)
(0.1579)
Black
0.1343
0.0950
(0.2958)
(0.2593)
Asian
-0.4122
0.0338
(0.3173)
(0.2957)
0.5117*
Hispanic
-0.1533
(0.3693)
(0.3020)
Conservative 0.4562*
-0.5967**
(0.2620)
(0.2945)
Republican
0.1674
-0.6049*
(0.2570)
(0.3176)
Ideological
0.0629
-0.0182
Distance
(0.0783)
(0.0720)
Education
0.0037
-0.0582
(0.0493)
(0.0474)
Age
-0.0663
0.0062
(0.0525)
(0.0481)
-0.0525**
Family
-0.0101
Income
(0.0247)
(0.0238)
Attention to -0.0401
0.0408
News
(0.0410)
(0.0369)

Online Sales Taxation
Rank One
Rank Three
0.0746**
-0.2086***
(0.0329)
(0.0500)
-0.0053
0.0172
(0.0295)
(0.0454)
0.6969***
-0.7351***
(0.1024)
(0.1347)
-0.0381
0.1155
(0.1383)
(0.2167)
0.0416
0.1095
(0.2640)
(0.3758)
-0.0902
0.1946
(0.2680)
(0.4052)
0.1363
-0.6237
(0.3135)
(0.5630)
0.0503
-0.1737
(0.2459)
(0.3884)
-0.2141
-0.1113
(0.2447)
(0.3971)
0.0912
-0.0989
(0.0681)
(0.1046)
0.0493
-0.0900
(0.0442)
(0.0742)
0.0018
0.0175
(0.0454)
(0.0699)
-0.0935**
0.0170
(0.0222)
(0.0382)
0.0339
0.0660
(0.0361)
(0.0557)

Guantanamo Bay
Rank One
Rank Three
0.1085***
-0.0418
(0.0398)
(0.0300)
-0.0680**
0.0375
(0.0348)
(0.0280)
0.6070***
-0.4406***
(0.1209)
(0.0876)
0.0348
0.1506
(0.1608)
(0.1264)
0.3612
-0.1305
(0.2877)
(0.2366)
0.1045
-0.1788
(0.3142)
(0.2539)
-0.0593
-0.2135
(0.3822)
(0.2984)
-0.2149
0.1138
(0.2802)
(0.2383)
0.5995**
-0.7300***
(0.2638)
(0.2596)
0.2007**
-0.0851
(0.0807)
(0.0635)
0.0064
0.0315
(0.0486)
(0.0397)
0.0824
-0.0368
(0.0528)
(0.0417)
0.0206
-0.0074
(0.0253)
(0.0202)
-0.0222
0.0189
(0.0420)
(0.0329)

N=
Adj R2

1019
0.0564

1238
0.0578

1237
0.0579

1237
0.0811

69

1019
0.1021

1238
0.0432

Table 17b reflects logistic regression, in which the dependent variable (a first and third rank for Congress on
each issue), is modeled to determine the primary indicators of these rankings. The variables of interest, authority to
decide and short- and long-term legitimacy drive rank in interesting ways.. First, as with the Supreme Court,
perception that Congress has the authority to decide determines rank in expected ways for all issues. Second, shortterm legitimacy significantly drives a first ranking for same-sex marriage only, while long-term legitimacy drives a
first ranking for all issues. This is strikingly different from the way that legitimacy operates for the Supreme Court.
For the Court, short-term legitimacy drove a first ranking. For Congress, though, it appears that long-term
legitimacy is what drives first ranking to make policy on all issues.
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Table 17c: Logistic Regression, Presidency by First and Third Rank70
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Same Sex Marriage
Rank One
Rank Three
Legitimacy
-0.1078**
0.0997***
(Long)
(0.0515)
(0.0348)
0.1187***
-0.0955***
Legitimacy
(Short)
(0.0384)
(0.0256)
-0.8039***
Authority to 0.9640***
Decide
(0.1218)
(0.0822)
Female
0.4718**
0.0897
(0.1226)
(0.1862)
Black
0.7486***
-0.5173**
(0.2793)
(0.2278)
Asian
0.2184
0.2026
(0.3677)
(0.2488)
Hispanic
-0.0853
-0.3538
(0.3865)
(0.2669)
Conservative 0.4712
0.0984
(0.3005)
(0.2172)
Republican
-0.0261
0.3264
(0.3365)
(0.2282)
-0.1922*
Ideological
0.0039
Distance
(0.1065)
(0.0733)
Education
-0.2628***
0.0736*
(0.0657)
(0.0400)
Age
-0.0331
0.0171
(0.0621)
(0.0415)
Family
-0.0487
0.0213
Income
(0.0299)
(0.0195)
Attention to -0.1267***
0.0285
News
(0.0461)
(0.0311)

Online Sales Taxation
Rank One
Rank Three
-0.0899
0.0068
(0.0557)
(0.0349)
-0.0654**
0.0608
(0.0415)
(0.0256)
0.9772***
-0.6854***
(0.1495)
(0.0946)
0.0766
0.1190
(0.2003)
(0.1273)
1.0239***
-0.6481***
(0.2902)
(0.2515)
0.1507
0.2709
(0.3949)
(0.2544)
0.3181
-0.3200
(0.3844)
(0.2841)
-0.0135
-0.0876
(0.3365)
(0.2180)
0.2326
0.0481
(0.3423)
(0.2178)
-0.0704
0.0679
(0.1146)
(0.0753)
-0.0747
-0.0239
(0.0670)
(0.0402)
0.0255
0.0211
(0.0680)
(0.0418)
-0.0363
0.0221
(0.0332)
(0.0202)
-0.0569*
-0.0228
(0.0512)
(0.0329)

Guantanamo Bay
Rank One
Rank Three
0.0076
-0.0038
(0.0352)
(0.0341)
0.1170***
-0.0943***
(0.0251)
(0.0249)
0.0888***
-1.0322***
(0.0993)
(0.0964)
-0.0282
-0.0111
(0.1225)
(0.1234)
0.1148
-0.4670*
(0.2312)
(0.2657)
0.1001
0.0602
(0.2396)
(0.2475)
-0.1198
0.2164
(0.2789)
(0.2733)
0.3186
-0.2946
(0.2162)
(0.2136)
-0.1484
0.1133
(0.2217)
(0.2058)
0.1562**
-0.0383
(0.0750)
(0.0760)
-0.0745*
-0.0063
(0.0388)
(0.0387)
0.0877**
-0.0268
(0.0401)
(0.0408)
0.0124
0.0044
(0.0192)
(0.0194)
-0.0519*
-0.0242
(0.0314)
(0.0320)

N=
Adj R2

1220
0.1065

1475
0.0967

1476
0.1755

1476
0.1185

70

1220
0.0701

1475
0.1280

Table 17c reflects logistic regression, in which the dependent variable (a first and third rank for the presidency on
each issue), is modeled to determine the primary indicators of these rankings. The variables of interest, authority to
decide and short- and long-term legitimacy drive these preferences in interesting ways. First, as with the other
institutions, perception that the presidency has the authority to decide determines preference in expected ways for all
issues. Second, short-term legitimacy significantly drives a first ranking for same-sex marriage and Guantanamo
Bay, but not online sales taxation. Long-term legitimacy, on the other hand, matters to preference only on the issue
of same-sex marriage, and it matters in the negative. It appears that short-term legitimacy is driving institutional
preference for the presidency more so than long-term legitimacy.
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CHAPTER V
INFLUENCES ON POLICY ACCEPTANCE
Research on acceptance has sought to explain characteristics of an issue that may
influence how well the public accepts policy related to the issue. It has not, however, explicitly
considered the idea that institutional preference over issue resolution may also matter. Other
factors considered by the literature on policy acceptance include salience (Grosskopf and
Mondak 1998), religion (Olson, Cadge, and Harrison 2006); ideology (Kramer 1975), the degree
to which a policy benefits a majority (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Ingram, Schneider, and
Deleon 2007), or threatens other groups (Hetherington and Globetti 2002), and the level of
controversy and incivility surrounding the issue (Nie and Wyman 2005; Mutz and Reeves 2005).
Where the literature is lacking, however, is in explaining how institutional preference may drive
policy acceptance, regardless of policy preference. We do know that source effects can influence
perceptions of information (Chaiken 1980; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1997; Mondak 1993a;
Birnbaum and Stegner 1979), as well as perceptions of policy (Mondak 1993b); and that the
same policy may be accepted differentially dependent upon which institution made the policy
(Mondak 1990). If, as was discussed in Chapter II, legitimacy drives authority which, in turn,
drives acceptance, then it is important to fully examine how institutional legitimacy and other
institutional characteristics inform our understanding of policy acceptance. Here, I make the
argument that regardless of policy preference, institutional characteristics drive policy
acceptance. The data presented in Chapter IV suggests that, rather than an overriding and
consistent preference for the courts and away from Congress, as might be hypothesized given the
research on legitimation, the courts are not always viewed as the most appropriate institution to
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address certain issues. Indeed, the presidency and Congress may be the preferred institution to
make policy in certain issue areas.
Most policy could be made by any one of the three branches of government. Indeed, all
three have weighed in on issues like same-sex marriage, online taxation, and Guantanamo Bay.
As mentioned earlier, I found that the public may deem some issues to be more appropriately
resolved by one branch over the others. We might expect, then, that the public will be more
willing to accept policies emanating from the “right” institution. Policy acceptance, in this view,
is not simply a story about the court’s special ability to enhance acceptance due to its increased
legitimacy (Hibbing and Theiss Morse 1995, 2002; Mondak 1994). Instead, the ability of the
institution to legitimate policy may be directly related to the public’s view of its authority to do
so in the particular area of policy in which it is working, in addition to our existing understanding
about the influence of institutional legitimacy. The purpose of this chapter is to begin to examine
this phenomenon.
Previous research has led us to believe that people “like” the courts more than the
legislative and executive branches. We surmise that this is due, in part, to the fact that the courts
are often seen to be less conflictual and more fair in their decision making processes (Benesh
2006; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002; Tyler and Rasinski 1991). I argue that the reality is more
complicated; that people may prefer the courts to handle some issues, but may prefer other
institutions to handle others. And, people can vary in their acceptance of policies, based on
certain aspects of the policy making process.
Here, I am interested in examining what factors influence a respondent’s acceptance of a
policy (same-sex marriage, closing of Guantanamo Bay, and online sales taxation), expecting
both institutional and issue characteristics to matter. As noted above, legitimacy likely matters,
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as institutions in which people imbue more legitimacy make policies that, in turn, people are
more likely to accept. As I discussed in Chapter III, legitimacy can be conceptualized as both
short- and long-term, so, I construct two separate indices – the short-term legitimacy index
comprised of only short-term variables, and the long-term legitimacy index comprised of only
long-term variables. I include both indices in the modeling here, as they may inform acceptance
differentially. It may be that short- and long-term legitimacy matter in different ways to
acceptance of each of the policies. Respondent preference, conceptualized as rank to handle
each issue (discussed in Chapter IV) may influence policy acceptance. Countermajoritarianism,
a characteristic of the American Constitutional design, could have both institutional- and issuelevel influence: for example, an issue perceived to be about preserving rights may seem best
resolved by an institution removed from majority influence. As such, a variable is included in
the acceptance models that captures respondent perception about an issue being primarily about
rights. Finally, the level of politicization and controversy of an issue could also be important to
policy acceptance. Variables representing respondent perception that an issue is primarily
political and that an issue is controversial are included in the models.
DATA AND ANALYSIS
Recall (from Chapter IV) the differences across institutions in terms of authority to make
decisions and preference across institutions for each of the three issues considered here. There, I
found that most respondents chose the United States Supreme Court as having the most authority
to make same-sex marriage policy, followed by Congress, and then the presidency. On the issue
of online taxation, most respondents chose Congress, followed by the Supreme Court, and then
the presidency. Finally, on the issue of Guantanamo Bay, the presidency was chosen by most
respondents, followed very closely by the Supreme Court, and then Congress. So, for each issue,
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we see that a different branch of government is deemed the “caretaker” of making policy in that
area. This clear distinction is valuable for this research, in that it helps to bolster the underlying
argument here, which is that Americans do view policies in different ways and, further, hold
beliefs that specific branches of government should handle certain types of policies. These
findings do seem to make sense, in that taxation issues might be assigned to Congress (as it
manages the country’s finances), Guantanamo Bay might be assigned to the presidency (foreign
policy), and same-sex marriage to the Supreme Court (as the courts are often viewed through a
lens of minority rights protection). So, there does seem to be some logic behind these
assignments.
On the other hand, acceptance of decisions (as measured by an acceptance index
compiled of oft-used questions, and outlined in Chapter II)71 made on all three issues is highest
when the decisionmaking is done by the Supreme Court (see Figures 9a, 9b, and 9c), which runs
counter to the rankings and the assignment of authority to make decisions in certain areas (see
Chapter IV for a discussion about this). For instance, while most respondents chose Congress as
having authority to make decisions on the issue of online taxation, and is preferred most to
handle the issue, decisions in this area made by Congress are accepted at lower rates than when
decisions in this area are made by the Supreme Court. This may be due to the fact that Congress
is also the least-liked of the three by the American public which, if this is the case, has very
interesting policy implications, suggesting that specific support may, in part, be driving
acceptance of policies. Specifically, it may be that people feel as if an institution is the “right,”

71

Table 18 contains Cronbach’s Alpha on the index for each decision made by each of the branches (both in
support and against on each issue for each institution). It reveals that, largely, the index performs well as a measure
of policy acceptance. Most indices of policy acceptance fall above .6; however, for some institutional decisions, the
index falls below .6. Generally, it appears the index is less strong for each decision when the decision does not
support same-sex marriage. Also, the indices for the Supreme Court appear to be less strong than they are for the
other branches.
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preferred, or most authoritative policymaker on a certain issue, but have such low specific
support for that institution, and/or its inhabitants, that they accept the decisions on that issue area
more when it comes from a less “right,” but more liked, institution. Likewise, the most
respondents chose presidency as having authority to make policy on the issue of Guantanamo
Bay, while the Supreme Court was most preferred to handle it. Respondents accepted decisions
in this area at higher rates when they came from the Supreme Court.
These acceptance levels, overall, are relatively low, though. Remember, in the analysis
here, only the respondents that received a policy that ran counter to their stated preference is
included in each of the models of acceptance. Theoretically, I am interested in the influence of
an institution to garner acceptance for policies that people do not want. It stands to reason that
people will accept decisions from an institution that comport with their own preferences.
Therefore, the models here consider only those respondents that received the policy outcome on
an issue as it emanates from one of the institutions – a policy outcome that they do not desire.
This allows me to more accurately observe policy acceptance (see Chapter II for a more
thorough discussion of this). Table 19 reflects the actual percentages of acceptance for each
policy coming from each institution. On each issue there are two possible outcomes. On each
issue respondents received an outcome that ran counter to their stated preference from one of
the three institutions (randomly chosen). For same-sex marriage they received either a policy
outcome in which the institution supported same-sex marriage, or one that in which the
institution opposed it. For online sales taxation, they received an outcome in which the
institution requires businesses to collect online states sales tax, or one in which the institution
does not require it. And, for Guantanamo Bay, respondents received an outcome in which the
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institution required the closing of the detention facility, or one in which the institution required
it remain open and accepting detainees.
[Insert Table 19 Here]
The analysis in Chapter IV identified some factors that influence institutional preference
to make decisions. This preference may, in turn, influence acceptance of decisions. What
explains these variable acceptance levels? Perhaps approval of the branch or person(s)
occupying an institution at any given time influences acceptance. Or, perhaps long-term
commitment to an institution matters. Maybe aspects of perception of the issues matter.
[Insert Figures 9a, 9b, and 9c Here]
Chapter II discusses the theoretical framework for the expectations outlined here.
Remember that the results here, capturing acceptance of each of the policies, is based on policy
outcomes that run counter to a respondent’s stated preference. So, if a respondent supports samesex marriage, s/he received a policy outcome from one of the institutions that opposes same-sex
marriage. This is done in order to adequately measure acceptance of a policy. Of course
respondents will accept policies with which they agree. Instead, I am interested in capturing
respondent agreement with policies with which they may not, necessary, agree.
I expect that institutional legitimacy will influence policy acceptance, but in different ways.
The legitimacy index is divided into short- and long-term legitimacy, in accordance with the
findings reported in Chapter III, and each was included in each model. Given that policies are
developed and passed (or not passed) by current inhabitants of each institution, I expect that shortterm legitimacy will significantly matter to policy acceptance, while long-term legitimacy will
matter less so – although, given the fact that the literature theoretically supports the idea that
institutional legitimacy impacts policy acceptance (see Chapter II for a discussion about this),
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this is as much an exploratory analysis as it is firmly hypothesized. Since short-term legitimacy
is tied to job approval (Hetherington 1998; Keele 2007; Mishler and Rose 2001), it makes sense
that policies passed by incumbents may be utilized as information in respondent assessment of
that job approval. Likewise, I expect that preference of an institution to handle policy in each
area to matter in the same ways that I expect legitimacy to matter. Here, institutional preference
is dummied as a first ranking (the previous chapter revealed that results do not change when this
variable is dummied, as opposed to being coded onto an increasing scale). Additionally, an
interaction variable of preference and legitimacy (for both short- and long-term) is included in
each model, as it may be that institutional legitimacy levels may differ across level of
institutional preference, such that policy acceptance is impacted.
A variable capturing general diffuse support for government (an additive index of longterm legitimacy variables for each institution) is included, as it may be that a general warm
sentiment for the government, overall, my influence policy acceptance. Those that have high
levels of diffuse support in the government may also be more likely to accept policies emanating
from its institutions, regardless of whether they agree with the outcomes. Increasing perception
that an issue is controversial should matter to acceptance, with acceptance levels being lower
when a controversial issue is decided by the Court, and higher when it is decided by Congress
and the presidency. This is rooted in the expectation that Congress and the presidency will
engage in politics, whereas the Court is not expected to do so (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995;
2002). To be sure, extant literature highlights the fact that this business of politics is distasteful
and, thus, reflects poorly on Congress and the presidency; however, it also stands to reason that
the political institutions may also be seen as equipped to deal in controversial and political areas
more so than the Court. Finally, I expect that issues that are deemed to be rights-based to predict
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increased policy acceptance when the Supreme Court decides the issue, and I expect this to
matter more on the issue of same-sex marriage than online sales taxation or Guantanamo Bay.

Tables 20a, 20b, and 20c are linear regressions of acceptance of each of the issues for
each branch of government, in which the dependent variable is an index of questions often
utilized to measure policy acceptance (see Chapter II). Recall that the models explain level of
acceptance for policies that run counter to respondent preference. Each model includes only
those respondents that received the vignette that speaks to the issue presented in the model. So,
on the issue of online sales taxation, only those respondents that received a vignette on that
issue for that institution are included in the model. And, as explained in Chapter II, respondents
received only vignettes in which the institution made policy that ran counter to their policy
preferences. So, for example, respondents that support same-sex marriage received only one of
the vignettes in which one of the institutions made policy against same-sex marriage. This holds
true for the other two issues, as well.
[Insert Tables 20a, 20b, and 20c Here]
It is immediately apparent that the two legitimacy indices (short- and long-term) are
functioning differently in the models. While long-term legitimacy carries significance on some
issues (same-sex marriage policy emanating from the presidency and Guantanamo Bay and
online sales taxation policies emanating from Congress), it is negatively related to acceptance
of these policies. This is a fascinating outcome, revealing that long-term institutional legitimacy
may not factor into policy acceptance on some issues some of the time, and may actually
negatively impact acceptance on some issues sometimes. I am unsure how to explain this, but it
seems to suggest that long-term legitimacy for some institutions on some issues actually harms
that institution’s ability to make policy in that area.
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On the other hand, short-term legitimacy is significantly related to decision acceptance
for all issues from all institutions. And, the signage is all positive, meaning that as short-term
legitimacy in an institution increases, so does acceptance for any decision on each issue coming
from that institution. More so than this speaks to long-term legitimacy, it may be that short-term
legitimacy is much more the driver of policy acceptance than is long-term. These findings,
alone, provide new scholarship to our understanding of policy acceptance and the role of
institutional legitimacy in legitimating policy.
Additionally, these findings highlight the importance of accurately measuring
institutional legitimacy. It may be that respondents are very distinctly separating the institution
from its inhabitants, and these findings may be capturing it very clearly. And, on the issue of
policy acceptance, it appears that short-term factors matter much more than long-term factors
do, meaning that people consider an institution’s inhabitants, and not necessarily the institution,
when choosing whether to accept policies emanating from an institution. This has startling
implications for democracy, especially the Court. In American democracy, members of the
federal judiciary are appointed for life and, thus, cannot be removed through the political
process. Should it engage in “bad” decisionmaking, there is no process by which Americans can
replace members of the Court.
Further, these findings may be capturing the idea that respondents might feel that the
inhabitants of an institution are appropriately handling an issue, but that the institution itself is
not necessarily imbued with the authority to handle an issue. For instance, respondents may feel
as if policy about Guantanamo Bay’s operation is not properly situated with the presidency, but
also feel as if the current president is appropriately situated to make policy in this area, and this
consideration may be associated with short-term evaluations of that president. This suggests
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that, even if an institution’s long-term legitimacy is flagging, current inhabitants of that
institution can still legitimate policy and, thus, enhance acceptance, if s/he/they can elevate
his/her/their own approval in the public’s opinion.
Preference for an institution to make policy (first ranking) reveals no consistent pattern.
This runs directly counter to the argument in this dissertation that preferences should drive
acceptance. The results here, being inconsistent and without uniformity, do not support the
suggestion. It appears that, for the presidency, a preference to make policy on same-sex
marriage predicts acceptance; for Congress, it matters to policymaking on the issue of
Guantanamo Bay; and for the Supreme Court, preference to make policy on the issues of
Guantanamo Bay and online sales taxation drive increased acceptance. Preference does not rise
to significance on any other issue for any other branch.
As it relates to the interaction between long-term legitimacy and preference, increased
diffuse support for an institution and increased preference assignment matters to Congress (see
Figure 9a) on the issue of online sales taxation. Of those who do not rank the institution first to
make policy on the issue of online sales taxation, as their long-term legitimacy in the
institution increases, so does their estimated acceptance of online sales taxation policy coming
from the presidency.
The interaction between short-term legitimacy and first rank only rises to the level of
significance for Congress – and, here, it is significantly related to acceptance of policy on all
issues. On the issue of same-sex marriage, for those who rank Congress first and for those who
do not, as short-term legitimacy in the institution increases, so does acceptance of same-sex
marriage policy coming from the institution. But, the effect is stronger for those who do not rank
Congress first on this issue. On the issue of Guantanamo Bay, again, for those who rank
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Congress first and those who do not, as short-term legitimacy increases, so does acceptance of
policy on this issue coming from Congress. Here, though, the effect of short-term legitimacy is
greater for those who rank Congress first on this issue. Finally, on the issue of online sales tax,
the same general relationship exists; for those who rank Congress first to make policy on this
issue, and for those who do not, increasing short-term legitimacy positively predicts policy
acceptance. And, again, the slope for those who rank Congress first on this issue is more
pronounced, meaning the effect of short-term legitimacy on first-rankers is greater.
It is also worth noting that policy acceptance on the issue of Guantanamo Bay and online
sales taxation is higher for those who have short-term legitimacy in Congress and do not rank
the institution first to handle the two issues. On the issue of same-sex marriage, respondents with
low short-term legitimacy in Congress, regardless of whether they ranked the institution first to
make policy on the issue, hold about the same level of low policy acceptance.
Clearly, the effect of short-term legitimacy, interacted with a first ranking, influences
policy acceptance for issues coming from Congress. For two of the issues, Guantanamo Bay and
online sales taxation, the effect of short-term legitimacy on policy acceptance is greater for those
who prefer Congress to make policy in those issue areas than for those who do not.
[Insert Figures 9a, 9b, 9c, and 9d Here]
As it pertains to general governmental diffuse support, there is no discernible pattern,
except that it does not predict policy acceptance for any policy outcome emanating from the
Supreme Court. It does, however, significantly predict policy acceptance for same-sex marriage
policy coming from the presidency, and Guantanamo Bay and online sales taxation policy
coming from Congress. For each, as diffuse government support increases, so does acceptance
of policy on those issues emanating from the respective institutions.

176

In addition to these findings, I turn now to some scattered interesting findings
more specific to each branch of government on specific issues.
Guantanamo Bay
Presidency
Aside from the aforementioned relationships, the perception of the issue of Guantanamo
Bay to be controversial impacts policy acceptance. Specifically, as perception of the issue to be
controversial increases, the level of acceptance of policy emanating from the presidency
decreases. This may mean that perception of issue controversy drives respondents on this issue
to prefer a different branch to make policy in this area. Additionally, for the presidency, on the
issue of Guantanamo Bay, as ideological distance increases, acceptance of policy decreases.
And, conservatives are significantly more likely to accept Guantanamo Bay policy coming
from the presidency. This may be related to a perception that such policy coming from the
executive branch is appropriate, given the presidency’s foreign policy supremacy.
Congress
Beyond the previous mentioned predictors of policy acceptance on this issue, females are
less likely to accept Guantanamo Bay policy coming from Congress, while Republicans are
more likely. Perception of the issue as being controversial predicts decreased acceptance of the
policy, while increasing family income predicts increasing acceptance. Finally, increasing
attention to news predicts decreased policy acceptance on this issue coming from Congress.
Supreme Court
Increasing attention to news is significantly and negatively related to acceptance of
Guantanamo Bay policy coming from the Court, as well. An increasing attention to news may
suggest that certain narratives frame the perception of which branch of government should be

177

handling certain issues, or may insinuate that certain branches are more aptly designed
or structured to handle certain issues.
As with the presidency and Congress on this issue, perception that the issue is
controversial negatively predicts acceptance for policy coming from the Supreme Court. This
would support the argument that respondents are just less likely to accept policy on any issue
when it is controversial, regardless of the institution making the policy. This, coupled with the
fact that perception of the issue as being primarily political also leads to decreased acceptance,
suggests that, for Guantanamo Bay policy anyway, politicization and conflict surrounding the
issue depress acceptance. On the other hand, and interestingly, perception that the issue is about
rights also predicts decreased acceptance of Guantanamo policy coming from the Court.
Additionally, increasing ideological distance predicts decreased acceptance of
Guantanamo Bay policy coming from the Supreme Court. Finally, Asians and conservatives are
significantly more likely to accept decisions on Guantanamo Bay coming from the Supreme
Court.
Online Sales Taxation
Presidency
In addition to the aforementioned significant relationships, increasing age is significantly and
negatively related to acceptance of a decision in this area coming from the presidency. This may be
due to an increased level of economic comfort associated with age or, perhaps, an increasing anxiety
associated with losing financial security, leading respondents to prefer another branch handle
taxation issues. Increasing attention to news also depresses acceptance, suggesting that, perhaps,
increased knowledge leads respondents to accept this type of policy less
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when it comes from the presidency. Alternatively, it may also suggest that the news narrative
frames this issue as one “belonging” to another branch, such as Congress.
Supreme Court
Aside from the aforementioned variables, only increasing education also matters to
acceptance of online sales taxation policy, such that increased education predicts increased
acceptance. Given extant literature about the relationship between education and the Supreme
Court (see, i.e., Benesh 2006), the findings here are expected.
Same-Sex Marriage
Presidency
Increasing perception of same-sex marriage as being an issue about rights leads to less
acceptance of same-sex marriage decisions coming from the presidency, while increasing
perception that the issue is about morals leads to more acceptance of policy in this area coming
from the presidency. While these two designations may seem intertwined, it is entirely possible
that respondents hold a belief that rights-based issues should be handled by one institution (here,
perhaps, the Court), while also believing that issues believed to be, primarily, about morals could
be handled by any institution. Further, this may be reflecting a short-term consideration.
Respondents may hold a perception that the current president is a moral individual, or holds high
morals, and, therefore, might assign an issue that is perceived to be based in morality to the
presidency, as a result.
Additionally, increasing age is significantly and positively related to acceptance of samesex marriage policy emanating from the presidency.
Congress
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The perception of same-sex marriage as being a rights issue predicts decreased
acceptance of decisionmaking in the area coming from Congress. This might suggest that
respondents perceive rights issues to be better handled elsewhere.
Demographically, women are less likely than men to support same-sex marriage
decisions coming from Congress. This could be related to the fact that 62.70% of women in the
survey view Congress as conservative, while 77.21% of the women hold a liberal position on
same-sex marriage.
Supreme Court
The increased belief that same-sex marriage is a moral or rights issue predicts decreased
acceptance of same-sex marriage decisionmaking coming from the Court. This runs counter to
my hypothesis and earlier findings. Given that the courts are often seen as protectors of rights,
we might expect to find that when the courts make decisions on rights issues acceptance of those
decisions is greater. Here, I do not find that. Again, though, this may have something to do with
the policy positions of respondents running up against perceived policy that might come from
the Court. Indeed, 75.33% of survey respondents support same-sex marriage, while only 21.84%
perceive the Supreme Court to be liberal. Interestingly though, this finding about rights holds
true for all three institutions on the issue of same-sex marriage.
Demographically, women are less likely than men to accept same-sex marriage decisions
coming from the Supreme Court. This may be due to the fact that 77.21% of women hold a
liberal position on same-sex marriage, while only 21.37% of women perceive the Court to be
liberal.
For all respondents, increasing ideological distance predicts decreased acceptance of
same-sex marriage policy emanating from the Supreme Court. Further, as we already know,
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education influences acceptance of policy coming from the Court (see i.e., Gibson and
Caldeira 1992; Benesh 2006); here, same-sex marriage policy is accepted at greater rates as
education increases. And, increasing family income predicts decreased acceptance.
Taken together, these findings provide an array of differing predictive indicators of
acceptance for each branch of government, overall highlighting the fact that our understanding of
support and acceptance of decisions cannot be universally applied across all branches of
government and across issues. Indeed, unique indicators influence acceptance for each branch of
government and for policymakers to make policy that can enhance public acceptance, they must
be aware of the valuable predictors for each branch of government. In fact, clear patterns emerge
when it comes to acceptance of policies on each of the issues. On the issue of same-sex marriage,
short-term legitimacy and perception that the issue is about rights predicts acceptance across all
institution. On Guantanamo Bay, short-term legitimacy and perception that the issue is
controversial predicts acceptance across all institutions. And, as it pertains to online sales
taxation, short-term legitimacy matters across all institutions.
Institutionally, across all issues, short-term legitimacy predicts acceptance of policies
coming from all three institutions. Additionally, the interaction between short-term legitimacy
and preference also predicts acceptance of all policies coming from Congress. Essentially, the
effect of short-term legitimacy on policy acceptance is differentially impacted for those who
prefer Congress to make policy in each issue area than for those who do not. Finally, it bears
repeating, that short-term considerations seem to matter to policy acceptance emanating from
an institution much more so than do long-term institutional considerations.
CONCLUSION
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Public acceptance of policies is integral to governing. Democratic governments rely on
acceptance and, thus, acquiescence to their policies in order to thrive. Without acceptance of
policies, governments would fail. Within this context, then, it is important to understand what
drives acceptance in order that policymakers can govern well. Here, indicators of acceptance for
Guantanamo Bay, online sales taxation, and same-sex marriage policies were examined across
all three branches of government – the presidency, Congress, and the Supreme Court.
Perhaps most interesting, institutional preference (rank) to make policy in certain issue
areas seems to have very little influence on policy acceptance. Findings highlighted in the
previous chapter reveal that respondents do have preferences about which branch of
government should make certain types of policies. The authority that respondents believe that
each institution has to make policy drives these preferences. I have suggested that these
rankings, these preferences, should also influence policy acceptance. The findings here suggest
that this may not be accurate. Preference matters inconsistently to policy acceptance across both
branch and issue. While respondents do have clear preferences about which branch they would
like to make certain types of policies, this does not translate to some consistent level of
acceptance of those policies.
Further, when the findings on authority (see the previous chapter) are examined in
tandem with the findings in this chapter on acceptance, another interesting relationship emerges.
We see that most survey respondents assign the Supreme Court as having the most authority to
make decisions on the issues of same-sex marriage and, accordingly, also accept same-sex
marriage policy most when it emanates from the Supreme Court. Most respondents also assign
Congress as having the most authority to make decisions on the issue of online sales taxation and
the presidency as having the most authority to decide on the issue of Guantanamo Bay (just
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barely ahead of the Supreme Court). Acceptance of decisions in these areas, however, is highest
when it comes from the Supreme Court – for all three issues. These findings seem contradictory
and, so, it becomes important to understand what factors into acceptance for each branch of
government. Previous legitimacy research suggest that, to some degree, we should expect to find
this – that the courts, experiencing high degrees of legitimacy should, thus, be able to legitimate
that policy more so than the other branches (Mondak 1990). The reality is more complex than
that, however. Certain institution- and issue-level characteristics also matter to acceptance, of
which legitimacy is just one. But, extant legitimacy research has erred in its construct. Here, I
have argued that, when it comes to legitimacy, specific (short-term) and diffuse (long-term)
support matter in different ways. And, surprisingly, perhaps, short-term specific legitimacy
matters much more to policy acceptance than does long-term diffuse legitimacy.
Indeed, legitimacy, long understood to be an imperative indicator of the ability of an
institution to command acquiescence to its policies, is not a universal predictor of acceptance for
specific policies coming from institutions. The models included two legitimacy indices – one
short- and long-term. This clarifies the picture a bit, revealing that long-term legitimacy is rarely
relevant to acceptance of policies. Short-term legitimacy, on the other hand, is a strong predictor
of policy acceptance for all issues and all branches. The short-term legitimacy index consists of
questions that tap into short-term sentiment for the institutions, thereby, suggesting that
acceptance of policies hinges on short-term considerations (i.e. job approval, salience, etc.), more
so than long-term institutional legitimacy. This is fascinating and informative for policymakers,
as those interested in making good policy – policy that is met with high degrees of acceptance –
should consider the current public perception of the institution to ensure policy acceptance.
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On the other hand, there is no consistent pattern that emerges between issue
categorization factors – moral, political, economic, social, or and rights – and policy acceptance
across all institutions. So, despite theoretical suggestion that issue type may matter, there is no
consistent significance between issue type and policy acceptance. Specifically, the assignment
of online sales taxation as an economic issue did not influence respondent acceptance of such
policy emanating from any particular institution. The same holds true for Guantanamo Bay – no
significant relationships emerge. Interestingly, though, those respondents who view same-sex
marriage as, primarily, a rights issue, are significantly less likely to accept same-sex marriage
policy coming from any of the institutions. And, level of perceived controversy around the issue
matters to all institution on just the issue of Guantanamo Bay, suggesting that this issue activates
something unique that is not present for the other two issues examined here.
As it relates to some demographics, this research finds that females are less accepting of
decisions coming from Congress and the Supreme Court on the issue of same-sex marriage, and
from Congress on the issue of Guantanamo Bay. Asians are more accepting of decisions about
Guantanamo Bay policy coming from the Supreme Court. Other than that, however, race does not
seem to drive policy acceptance. Additionally, party identification and ideology have little influence
on acceptance, with the exception of Republicans on acceptance for Guantanamo Bay policy coming
from Congress, and conservatives on acceptance of Guantanamo Bay policy coming from the
Supreme Court – both positive. The results here also help us to understand the influence of
ideological distance on policy acceptance. Increasing ideological distance predicts less acceptance
for same-sex marriage policy emanating from the Supreme Court, as well as Guantanamo Bay policy
coming from the presidency and the Supreme Court. On demographics, while there is no clear story
about what is happening here, this nuance is interesting and deserves
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some further analysis to be helpful to policymakers. Indeed, parsing out the details about why
certain groups of individuals might prefer certain branches of government to handle certain
policy areas could prove to be very valuable, in the future. At minimum, the findings here
highlight the fact that some unique differences do exist across demographics and this deserves
further examination.
It is important to note, while digesting these results, that policy acceptance for decisions
that run counter to respondent preference is relatively low for all institutions on all issues,
suggesting that the influence of acceptance on compliance is understudied. The Supreme Court,
however, garners the highest levels of acceptance when it makes policies that run counter to
respondent preference (see Figures 9a, 9b, and 9c). This finding brings us full circle, though,
suggesting that, perhaps, despite institutional legitimacy and institutional preference to make
policy, the Supreme Court remains the institution most able to “legitimate” polices – foster
acceptance for even unliked policies.
These findings help policymakers to understand which factors influence public
acceptance of Guantanamo Bay, online taxation, and same-sex marriage policymaking and
where it “should” come from. While future research is necessary to discern how these same
variables influence acceptance in other areas of policy, as well as to further understand why
certain variables matter for certain branches, these findings are a valuable first step, if only to
establish the fact that the public does consider different factors for each branch of government
when choosing to accept, or not accept, policy emanating from the branch.
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Figure 8b: Acceptance of Decision on Online Taxation, All Branches (Mean)
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Figure 8c: Acceptance of Decision on Guantanamo Bay, All Branches (Mean)
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Table 18: Cronbach’s Alpha, Policy Acceptance Index72

Presidency
Congress
Supreme Court

Guantanamo Bay

Same-Sex Marriage

Keep
Open
0.6444
0.6395
0.5705

Close

Marriage

0.7445
0.7448
0.6683

0.8071
0.7300
0.7445

72

No
Marriage
0.5775
0.5785
0.5723

Online Sales
Taxation
Collect
Do Not
Collect
0.7688
0.6821
0.6646
0.5971
0.7191
0.4744

Table 18 offers Cronbach’s Alpha scores for each index of policy acceptance, predicated on the policy outcome
emanating from each of the institutions. Generally, the scores are acceptable; however, some scores that fall below
about .6 suggest that the policy acceptance index may not be performing consistently well across institutions.
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Table 19: Policy Acceptance by Institution73

Same-Sex
Marriage
Support Oppose
Presidency 18.80%
Supreme
26.80%
Court
Congress
14.53%

Guantanamo Bay
Close

6.68%
21.56%

Keep
Open
23.95%
32.77%

34.90%
50.84%

Online Sales
Taxation
Collect
Do Not
Collect
8.19%
26.46%
32.98% 64.81%

6.42%

8.92%

32.14%

18.23%

73

34.98%

Table 19 reflects the percentage of respondents who have high levels of policy acceptance (a score of 6 or higher on a
12 point additive index scale) for the policy outcome that they received. Remember, these respondents all received
outcomes that ran counter to a stated preference. While all institutions fare relatively poorly, the United States Supreme
Court receives the highest levels of policy acceptance on each issue, regardless of the outcome.
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Table 20a: Acceptance of Policy Decision, Presidency74
*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01
Guantanamo
Long Term
Legitimacy
Short Term
Legitimacy
Ranking
LT
Legitimacy*Rank
ST
Legitimacy*Rank
Government
Support
Female
Black
Asian
Hispanic
Conservative
Republican
Ideological Distance
Education
Age
Family Income
Attention to News
Controversial Issue
Moral Issue
Political Issue
Economic Issue
Rights Issue

N=
Adjusted R2

-0.0594
(0.0943)
0.2425***
(0.0424)
0.4086
(0.7601)
0.0183
(0.1145)
0.0542
(0.0679)
-0.0039
(0.0324)
0.0078
(0.1848)
0.4368
(0.3598)
0.1711
(0.3726)
0.0860
(0.3947)
0.8205***
(0.3153)
-0.2291
(0.3134)
-0.2831**
(0.1109)
-0.0695
(0.0584)
0.0143
(0.0599)
-0.0312
(0.0291)
-0.0178
(0.0464)
-0.2375*
(0.1258)
-0.0798
(0.3818)
0.5012
(0.3433)
0.8998
(0.9832)
-0.0478
(0.3449)
470
0.2641

PRESIDENCY
Online
Taxation
-0.1677
(0.1061)
0.3340***
(0.0440)
-0.4730
(1.1609)
0.2932
(0.2088)
-0.0128
(0.1259)
0.0010
(0.0358)
0.0146
(0.2087)
-0.1261
(0.3944)
-0.4600
(0.4135)
-0.2514
(0.5367)
0.3393
(0.3842)
0.2741
(0.3594)
-0.0474
(0.1260)
0.0503
(0.0647)
-0.2022***
(0.0719)
-0.0259
(0.0324)
-0.1179**
(0.0560)
-0.1199
(0.1342)
0.6653
(2.1389)
-0.6910
(0.7244)
-0.7058
(0.6051)
-0.4574
(0.9686)
416
0.2354

74

Same Sex
Marriage
-0.2174**
(0.0918)
0.2407***
(0.0391)
2.0599*
(1.2349)
-0.0598
(0.1794)
-0.0902
(0.1102)
0.0740**
(0.0322)
0.0134
(0.1895)
0.4984
(0.4777)
0.3230
(0.3659)
0.3809
(0.4223)
0.2454
(0.3461)
0.3396
(0.3197)
0.0055
(0.1139)
-0.0402
(0.0604)
0.1109*
(0.0624)
-0.0037
(0.0307)
-0.0117
(0.0502)
-0.0379
(0.1155)
0.5509**
(0.2853)
-0.2093
(0.5102)
-0.9125
(1.4042)
-0.6957***
(0.2309)
457
0.1576

Tables 20a, 20b, and 20c all highlight regression analysis, in which the dependent variable of policy acceptance
(an additive index of commonly used questions) is modeled on the three issues. The most consistent finding is that
short-term legitimacy predicts policy acceptance for all issues and all institutions.
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Table 20b: Acceptance of Policy Decision, Congress
*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01

Guantanamo
Long Term
Legitimacy
Short Term
Legitimacy
Ranking
LT
Legitimacy*Rank
ST
Legitimacy*Rank
Government
Support
Female
Black
Asian
Hispanic
Conservative
Republican
Ideological
Distance
Education
Age
Family Income
Attention to News
Controversial Issue
Moral Issue
Political Issue
Economic Issue
Rights Issue

N=
Adjusted R2

-0.2459**
(0.0980)
0.3889***
(0.0559)
1.7110*
(0.9934)
-0.0066
(0.1736)
-0.3085**
(0.1352)
0.0800*
(0.0415)
-0.4802**
(0.2250)
0.3467
(0.4728)
-0.0292
(0.4256)
-0.2544
(0.5250)
0.4838
(0.3979)
1.1803***
(0.3977)
-0.0440
(0.1105)
-0.0967
(0.0700)
0.0447
(0.0771)
0.0901**
(0.0364)
-0.1036*
(0.0615)
-0.3718**
(0.1667)
-0.6374
(0.4789)
-0.0229
(0.4527)
0.8627
(1.2152)
-0.6873
(0.4440)
440
0.2024

CONGRESS
Online
Taxation
-0.3360***
(0.1224)
0.3465***
(0.0814)
0.0928
(0.7146)
0.2095*
(0.1189)
-0.1805*
(0.1031)
0.1310***
(0.0483)
0.2393
(0.2611)
-0.2311
(0.4955)
0.3734
(0.5144)
-0.4620
(0.7144)
-0.3494
(0.4166)
0.6573
(0.4399)
-0.2109
(0.1314)
0.0613
(0.0829)
-0.0570
(0.0818)
0.0037
(0.0412)
-0.0106
(0.0668)
-0.2263
(0.1740)
0.4601
(1.5958)
0.0376
(1.3773)
0.2889
(1.2867)
-0.4932
(1.4236)
315
0.1115
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Same Sex
Marriage
0.0874
(0.0869)
0.2145***
(0.0487)
0.1211
(0.7529)
-0.1099
(0.1154)
0.2156**
(0.1051)
0.0127
(0.0376)
-0.3837**
(0.1932)
0.5156
(0.3532)
0.5373
(0.3888)
-0.2455
(0.4169)
0.1050
(0.3635)
-0.1810
(0.3599)
-0.0397
(0.1002)
-0.0186
(0.0630)
-0.0036
(0.0691)
0.0338
(0.0323)
-0.0165
(0.0492)
0.1168
(0.1130)
-0.1718
(0.2999)
-0.0565
(0.5556)
-0.3419
(0.8925)
-0.9068***
(0.2478)
430
0.1607

Table 20c: Acceptance of Policy Decision, Supreme Court
*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01

Long Term
Legitimacy
Short Term
Legitimacy
Ranking
LT
Legitimacy*Rank
ST
Legitimacy*Rank
Government
Support
Female
Black
Asian
Hispanic
Conservative
Republican
Ideological
Distance
Education
Age
Family Income
Attention to News
Controversial Issue
Moral Issue
Political Issue
Economic Issue
Rights Issue

N=
Adjusted R2

SUPREME COURT
Guantanamo
Online
Same Sex
Taxation
Marriage
0.1212
0.0345
0.0705
(0.0878)
(0.1126)
(0.1098)
0.2445***
0.3044***
0.2857***
(0.0609)
(0.0644)
(0.0714)
1.3649**
1.6363*
0.8196
(0.6168)
(0.8730)
(0.6711)
-0.1437
-0.1676
-0.0337
(0.0881)
(0.1176)
(0.1040)
0.0069
-0.0182
0.0008
(0.0819)
(0.1086)
(0.0904)
0.0009
0.0294
-0.0149
(0.0319)
(0.0409)
(0.0387)
-0.5146**
-0.1592
0.2846
(0.1818)
(0.2414)
(0.2080)
0.2922
0.4853
-0.4206
(0.3150)
(0.4835)
(0.3840)
0.8834**
0.2525
-0.1638
(0.3674)
(0.4886)
(0.4516)
0.5877
-0.4839
-0.6707
(0.4074)
(0.4709)
(0.5263)
0.5320*
-0.3747
0.4549
(0.3027)
(0.3820)
(0.3243)
-0.0819
0.0779
0.2053
(0.3379)
(0.4136)
(0.3383)
-0.1542*
-0.2504***
0.1373
(0.0831)
(0.0957)
(0.1128)
0.1440*
0.1562**
0.0320
(0.0567)
(0.0789)
(0.0654)
0.0694
-0.1229
0.0835
(0.0573)
(0.0822)
(0.0651)
-0.0625**
-0.0007
-0.0031
(0.0313)
(0.0275)
(0.0393)
-0.1048**
-0.0177
-0.0186
(0.0460)
(0.0606)
(0.0516)
-0.4441***
-0.2089
-0.1176
(0.1175)
(0.1423)
(0.1306)
-0.6230**
-0.3552
1.2301
(0.4125)
(1.0677)
(0.2865)
-0.8053**
0.3388
-0.4728
(0.3961)
(0.8216)
(0.5812)
-0.9785
0.4904
2.9202
(1.8891)
(0.7018)
(2.1335)
-0.6702*
-0.5501**
-0.0163
(0.3828)
(0.2401)
(0.9037)
464
0.1982

401
0.1347
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473
0.1926

Figure 2a: Predicted Levels of Acceptance for Congress Policy on Online Sales Tax
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Figure 2b: Predicted Levels of Acceptance for Congress Policy on Same Sex Marriage
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Figure 2c: Predicted Levels of Acceptance for Congress Policy on Guantanamo Bay
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Figure 2d: Predicted Levels of Acceptance for Congress Policy on Online Sales Tax
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
Researchers have come to believe that highly legitimate institutions can legitimate their
policies more so than institutions with low legitimacy. This ability to legitimate policy is
considered to be critical to legitimate governance – that legitimate policy garners acquiescence
and compliance. In essence, highly legitimate institutions can foster acceptance of their policies.
If this is the case, then it becomes important to understand what matters to legitimacy, how the
public prefers institutions to make policy in certain areas, and how this legitimacy and
preference influence acceptance, if at all. More so, it is incredibly important that measurement of
these concepts is truly tapping into the sentiment that we expect that they are. It is not enough to
argue that legitimacy, or high preference to make policy in certain areas, can enhance policy
acceptance. Indeed, we must be confident that our measures of these concepts are adequate and
accurate. If they are not, then our understanding of policy acceptance and, thus, our ability to
manipulate this acceptance, is badly harmed.
This dissertation project has examined institutional legitimacy and institutional
preference to make policy on three particular issues – online sales taxation, same-sex marriage,
and continued operation of Guantanamo Bay – in pursuit of understanding these variables
influence policy acceptance. In essence, the general argument posited here was that people have
preferences about which branch of government makes certain types of policies and that these
preferences influence acceptance of those policies. In pursuit of answering these questions, the
traditionally-used legitimacy index has been thoroughly examined, deconstructed, and an
argument is offered that our understanding of legitimacy, and how it is measured, is flawed. A
more adequate measure has been developed and utilized in the analysis here. Further,
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institutional preference to make policy on certain issues was examined, and it was found that
both institutional legitimacy and authority to make decisions on certain issues drives how and
why respondents rank, or prefer, each institution – Congress, the presidency, and the Supreme
Court - in a particular way to handle each of the three issues studied here. Specifically, the
findings show that respondents do, indeed, have preference about which institution makes which
types of policies. Finally, relying on these findings, policy acceptance of the three issue areas
was examined, taking a closer look at the influence of institutional legitimacy and preference on
such acceptance. Here, it became clear that, despite having preferences for specific institutions to
make certain policies, acceptance of those policies is not consistently linked to that preference.
In fact, the greatest predictor of policy acceptance is short-term institutional legitimacy.
Legitimacy
Extant institutional legitimacy literature has focused almost entirely on the judicial
branch of American government. Given that the courts have been viewed as such strong policy
legitimators, specifically because of their high public approval (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse
2002), it stands to reason that this may also be an important indicator of the legitimation
capacity of the other policymaking branches of government – Congress and the presidency. As
such, our understanding of how legitimacy matters to each branch of government and, further,
how legitimacy influences acceptance of policies coming from each of the institutions, needs to
be clear and accurate, if we are to posit any relevant prediction about policy acceptance.
This project has, thus, applied the traditional legitimacy index to all three branches of
government, finding that, largely, the same indicators that matter to the courts also matter to the
other branches of government. In essence, general institutional legitimacy is driven by the same
things. Here, it was found that the perception that the institution fulfills its role and perception
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that the institution uses fair procedures matters to legitimacy for all branches of government.
These are theoretically supported (see Chapter II) and, therefore, these findings are not
particularly surprising. In addition, respondent happiness with federal laws also matters to
institutional legitimacy for all institutions. This is less supported, but may be due to respondent
knowledge. If so, this would fit with extant literature about judicial legitimacy. Beyond these
findings, there is little consistency across branches, but the general outcome supports the idea
that institutional legitimacy, as it has been measured, can be applied to all branches of
government with results that support the idea that legitimacy, as a concept, is driven by similar
variables.
The research here moves beyond this application of the traditional measure, however, and
examines the index of questions, arguing that the measure, as it has been utilized, is flawed and,
therefore, an inadequate measure of true institutional legitimacy. Indeed, institutional legitimacy is a
long-term sentiment associated with an institution that is removed from its inhabitants and its
outcomes. As such, in pursuit of such a measurement, it is imperative that all variables included in
the index act as an additive component to the whole. Emerging research (Weinschenk, Fettig, and
Benesh 2012) suggests that measures of trust, along with confidence, may be inadequate measures of
legitimacy. At minimum, they are theoretically unsound, given the difference of understanding and
application of trust in American political research. Here, each variable in the index was examined for
its contribution to the index and it was determined that, indeed, variables measuring trust,
confidence, perception of the influence of politics, and perception that the institution favors some
groups, or people, over others are all more closely related to short-term sentiments about an
institution, while willingness to do away with, and makes
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structural/constitutional changes to, an institution are more likely tapping into long-term
sentiment for an institution.
These findings strike a fatal blow to the traditional measure of legitimacy, instead
offering a new, more accurate, index that truly taps into only long-term sentiment. This more
closely comports with the theoretical conceptualization of legitimacy and, therefore, also tells
us much more about what influences legitimacy and how legitimacy might influence policy
acceptance – the goal of this project. To more fully understand the influence of both long- and
short-term legitimacy on policy acceptance, separate indices – one capturing each – was utilized
in all relevant models in subsequent chapters.
Institutional Preference
Poll data suggests that the public may believe that certain branches of government are
better designed, or situated, to make policy in certain issue areas (see, i.e., Chapter I for some
examples). When asked, on certain issues, survey respondents have stated a preference for one
institution over another to make decision and policy on those issues. In essence, it appears that
members of the American public do deem some issues to be more or less “legislative,”
“judicial,” or “executive.” The argument being made here is that this designation influences the
suitedness of an institution to make policy in a given issue area, which can, in turn, affect the
evaluation and acceptance of that policy. Respondents were asked to rank each institution as to
which is best-suited to make policy about each of the three issues. Institutional authority to make
decisions in each policy area is the one consistent, and significant, predictor of a high ranking to
make policy on each issue. For each institution, and on each issue, increased assigned authority
to make policy in an issue area positively drives a high ranking to make policy in that
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issue area. This bolsters our understanding that perceived authority to operate within some
policy arena has a dramatic impact on suitedness to make policy.
Further, institutional legitimacy matters, but in difference ways across each issue. Short-term
legitimacy significantly predicts a high ranking for an institution to make policy on the issues of
same-sex marriage and Guantanamo Bay, but not online sales taxation. Long-term legitimacy, on the
other hand, reveals a vastly different influence on preference. Increased long-term legitimacy in an
institution predicts a lower ranking on the issues of same-sex marriage and online sales taxation.
These findings suggest that 1) preference of institutions to make policy in certain issue areas may be
linked to the current environment and an institution’s current inhabitants, and 2) long-term
legitimacy may actually act as a drag on suitedness of an institution to make policy in certain issue
areas. These findings reveal a dramatic schism between short-and long-term legitimacy. And, if
institutional legitimacy does, indeed, enhance policy acceptance (see Chapter II for a discussion
about this), then the phenomenon uncovered here must be further examined if we are to understand
legitimacy, preference, and policy acceptance.

Acceptance
All three branches of government have some policymaking capacity in almost any issue
area. Here, respondents were presented with numerous policy outcomes, emanating from each of
the institutions, on three issues. In fact, each of the branches has weighed in on the three issues
presented here – online sales taxation, same-sex marriage, Guantanamo Bay – making the
possible outcome options both relevant and believable.
This project argues that individuals have preferences about which branch of government
handles which types of policies and that these preferences drive policy acceptance. As
mentioned earlier, the findings here are mixed. It appears that people do have preferences about
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which branch makes policy in certain issue areas – most respondents prefer Congress most to
make policy on online sales taxation and the Supreme Court to make policy on same-sex
marriage and Guantanamo Bay – but, acceptance of those policies is not driven by these
preferences. Instead, the findings here reveal that policy acceptance is driven, almost
exclusively, by short-term institutional legitimacy.
Long-term legitimacy has a lesser impact on policy acceptance, and preference has no
consistent significant influence on policy acceptance. While the findings related to preference
are surprising, they are not entirely unbelievable. Indeed, it is acceptable that people may have
preferences about which branch of government makes policy on certain issues, but that they
would still accept outcomes from another branch. The question, then, becomes, what does
influence acceptance? And, here by disaggregating the traditional institutional legitimacy index,
and reconstructing it into two separate indices – one long- and one short-term – a heretofore
hidden influence was revealed. Short-term legitimacy is the only variable that universally
predicts policy acceptance for all policies coming from all three branches.
This has immense policymaking implications. While we have come to believe that longterm legitimacy is necessary to policy legitimation (see Chapter II for a discussion of this), it
would appear that this is not so. Instead, short-term evaluations of an institution drive policy
acceptance. The American public seems to hang acceptance of public policies on short-term
evaluations of an institution and, perhaps, its inhabitants. As such, it is imperative that
policymakers not only be aware of their own levels of public esteem, but that these same
policymakers take care to nurture that esteem if they want to enhance policy acceptance. And,
this is important, because policy acceptance is linked to compliance (see Chapter II), and
compliance is necessary to a healthy democracy. These findings underscore the importance of
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responsible governance. It would appear that policies are accepted, not on their merit alone, but
contingent on short-term factors related to the institutions and policymakers crafting them.
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APPENDIX
SURVEY INSTRUMENT
PART A
In a typical week, how many days do you pay attention to national or local news about politics?
0=1 day
1=2 days
2=3 days
3=4 days
4=5 days
5=6 days
6=7 days
When you think about the federal government, generally speaking how happy are you
with federal laws?
0=Very Unhappy
1 =Unhappy
2=Somewhat Unhappy
3=Somewhat Happy
4=Happy
5=Very Happy
When it comes to the state you live in, generally speaking how happy are you with your
state laws?
0=Very Unhappy
1 =Unhappy
2=Somewhat Unhappy
3=Somewhat Happy
4=Happy
5=Very Happy
Same-sex marriage should be recognized as a legitimate and legal institution by the United States
government.
0=Disagree Strongly
1=Disagree Somewhat
2=Agree Somewhat
3=Agree Strongly

Businesses that sell items online should be required to collect the purchaser's state and local
sales tax.
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0=Disagree Strongly
1=Disagree Somewhat
2=Agree Somewhat
3=Agree Strongly

The United States government should continue to detain prisoners without trial offshore at
the Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility.
0=Disagree Strongly
1=Disagree Somewhat
2=Agree Somewhat
3=Agree Strongly

PART B
VIGNETTES
Guantanamo Bay
The President of the United States has the ability to issue executive orders in certain
circumstances that have the force of law. Keeping this in mind, consider the following situation.
After the other institutions failed to act, suppose the President of the United States issued an
executive order ensuring the continued use of the Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility to
hold and interrogate prisoners offshore.
The President made the right decision.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
The President’s decision ought to be the final decision on the matter.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
I would encourage groups with opposing views to challenge the President’s decision.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
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Issues like this ought to be kept out of the President’s office.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
Consider the following situation. After the other institutions failed to act, suppose Congress
passed legislation, by a veto-proof margin, requiring that the Guantanamo Bay Detention
Facility stay in operation and continue to accept and hold prisoners for interrogation
offshore.
Congress made the right decision.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
Congress’ decision ought to be the final decision on the matter.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
I would encourage groups with opposing views to challenge Congress’ decision.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
Issues like this ought to be kept out of Congress.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
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Consider the following situation. After the other institutions failed to act, suppose the United
States Supreme Court, which sits in Washington, D.C., heard a case challenging the
constitutionality of the United States government’s practice of holding prisoners offshore
indefinitely without trial. The Supreme Court then issued a ruling upholding the constitutionality
of the facility’s use, thereby ensuring that the Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility continue
to accept and hold prisoners for interrogation offshore.
The Supreme Court made the right decision.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
The Supreme Court’s decision ought to be the final decision on the matter.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
I would encourage groups with opposing views to challenge the Supreme Court’s decision.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
Issues like this ought to be kept out of the Supreme Court.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
The President of the United States has the ability to issue executive orders in certain
circumstances that have the force of law. Keeping this in mind, consider the following situation.
After the other institutions failed to act, suppose the President of the United States issued an
executive order to close the Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility and transfer all of its
prisoners to super-max prisons on the United States mainland by August 1, 2013.
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The President made the right decision.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
The President’s decision ought to be the final decision on the matter.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
I would encourage groups with opposing views to challenge the President’s decision.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
Issues like this ought to be kept out of the President’s office.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
Consider the following situation. After the other institutions failed to act, suppose Congress
passed legislation, by a veto-proof margin, requiring the closure of the Guantanamo Bay
Detention Facility and the transfer of all of its prisoners to super-max prisons on the
United States mainland by August 1, 2013.
Congress made the right decision.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
Congress’ decision ought to be the final decision on the matter.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
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I would encourage groups with opposing views to challenge Congress’ decision.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
Issues like this ought to be kept out of Congress.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree

Consider the following situation. After the other institutions failed to act, suppose the United
States Supreme Court, which sits in Washington, D.C., heard a case challenging the
constitutionality of the United States government's practice of holding prisoners offshore
indefinitely without trial. The Supreme Court then issued a ruling ordering the closing of the
Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility and the transfer of its prisoners to super-max prisons
on the United States mainland by August 1, 2013.
The Supreme Court made the right decision.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
The Supreme Court’s decision ought to be the final decision on the matter.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
I would encourage groups with opposing views to challenge the Supreme Court’s decision.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
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Issues like this ought to be kept out of the Supreme Court.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
Same-Sex Marriage
The President of the United States has the ability to issue executive orders in certain
circumstances that have the force of law. Keeping this in mind, consider the following
situation. After the other institutions failed to act, suppose the President of the United States
issued an executive order requiring all federal agencies to provide same-sex marriage
benefits to all federal employees equal to those provided to opposite-sex married couples, to
begin August 1, 2013.
The President made the right decision.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
The President’s decision ought to be the final decision on the matter.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
I would encourage groups with opposing views to challenge the President’s decision.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
Issues like this ought to be kept out of the President’s office.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
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Consider the following situation. After the other institutions failed to act, suppose Congress
passed a law, by a veto-proof margin, recognizing same-sex marriage as a legal institution in
the United States.
Congress made the right decision.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
Congress’ decision ought to be the final decision on the matter.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
I would encourage groups with opposing views to challenge Congress’ decision.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
Issues like this ought to be kept out of Congress.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
Consider the following situation. After the other institutions failed to act, suppose the United
States Supreme Court, which sits in Washington, D.C., heard a case challenging the federal
Defense of Marriage Act, which limits marriage to relationships between one man and one
woman. The Supreme Court subsequently issued a ruling that the Defense of Marriage Act
discriminates against same-sex couples and established a federal right to marry for same-sex
couples in the United States.
The Supreme Court made the right decision.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
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The Supreme Court’s decision ought to be the final decision on the matter.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
I would encourage groups with opposing views to challenge the Supreme Court’s decision.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
Issues like this ought to be kept out of the Supreme Court.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
The President of the United States has the ability to issue executive orders in certain
circumstances that have the force of law. Keeping this in mind, consider the following
situation. After the other institutions failed to act, suppose the President issued an executive
order that same-sex couples working for the federal government are not to receive federal
marriage benefits equal to those benefits offered to opposite-sex couples.
The President made the right decision.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
The President’s decision ought to be the final decision on the matter
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree
3=Strongly Agree
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I would encourage groups with opposing views to challenge the President’s decision.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
Issues like this ought to be kept out of the President’s office.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
Consider the following situation. After the other institutions failed to act, suppose Congress
passed a law, by a veto-proof margin, that went further than the federal Defense of Marriage Act,
which defines marriage as an institution between one man and one woman, explicitly outlawing
same-sex marriage in the United States.
Congress made the right decision.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
Congress’ decision ought to be the final decision on the matter.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
I would encourage groups with opposing views to challenge Congress’ decision.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
Issues like this ought to be kept out of Congress.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
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Consider the following situation. After the other institutions failed to act, suppose a case was
presented to the United States Supreme Court, which sits in Washington, D.C., by a samesex couple, challenging the federal Defense of Marriage Act, which defines marriage as an
institution between one man and one woman. After hearing arguments, the Supreme Court
rendered a decision supporting the constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act, affirming
that same-sex marriage is not required to be federally recognized.
The Supreme Court made the right decision.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
The Supreme Court’s decision ought to be the final decision on the matter.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
I would encourage groups with opposing views to challenge the Supreme Court’s decision.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
Issues like this ought to be kept out of the Supreme Court.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
Online Sales Taxation
The President of the United States has the ability to issue executive orders in certain
circumstances that have the force of law. Keeping this in mind, consider the following
situation. After the other institutions failed to act, suppose the President of the United States
issued an executive order requiring all online businesses conducting transactions to collect
state and local sales taxes, just like physical stores in your community must, beginning
August 1, 2013.
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The President made the right decision.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
The President’s decision ought to be the final decision on the matter.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
I would encourage groups with opposing views to challenge the President’s decision.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
Issues like this ought to be kept out of the President’s office.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
Consider the following situation. After the other institutions failed to act, suppose Congress
passed a bill, by a veto-proof margin, that required all online businesses conducting
transactions to collect state and local sales taxes, just like physical stores in your community
must, beginning August 1, 2013.
Congress made the right decision.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
Congress’ decision ought to be the final decision on the matter.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
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I would encourage groups with opposing views to challenge Congress’ decision.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
Issues like this ought to be kept out of Congress.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
Consider the following situation. After the other institutions failed to act, suppose the United
States Supreme Court, which sits in Washington, D.C., heard a case alleging that treating
online businesses differently from physical stores in your community violates the
Constitution. The Supreme Court subsequently ruled that online businesses conducting
transactions must collect state and local sales taxes, just as physical businesses in your
community must, beginning August 1, 2013.
The Supreme Court made the right decision.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
The Supreme Court’s decision ought to be the final decision on the matter.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
I would encourage groups with opposing views to challenge the Supreme Court’s decision.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
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Issues like this ought to be kept out of the Supreme Court.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
The President of the United States has the ability to issue executive orders in certain
circumstances that have the force of law. Keeping this in mind, consider the following
situation. After the other institutions failed to act, suppose the President of the United States
issued an executive order exempting online businesses from collecting state and local sales
taxes in the same way that physical businesses in your community must.
The President made the right decision.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
The President’s decision ought to be the final decision on the matter.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
I would encourage groups with opposing views to challenge the President’s decision.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
Issues like this ought to be kept out of the President’s office.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
Consider the following situation. After the other institutions failed to act, suppose Congress
passed legislation, by a veto-proof margin, that exempted online businesses from collecting state
and local taxes in the same way that physical businesses in your community must.
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Congress made the right decision.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
Congress’ decision ought to be the final decision on the matter.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
I would encourage groups with opposing views to challenge Congress’ decision.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
Issues like this ought to be kept out of Congress.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
Consider the following situation. After the other institutions failed to act, suppose the United
States Supreme Court, which sits in Washington, D.C., heard a case alleging that treating
online businesses differently from physical stores in your community violates the
Constitution. The Supreme Court subsequently ruled that businesses are not constitutionally
required to collect state and local taxes and could not be compelled to do so in the same way
that physical stores in your community must.
The Supreme Court made the right decision.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
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The Supreme Court’s decision ought to be the final decision on the matter.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
I would encourage groups with opposing views to challenge the Supreme Court’s decision.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
Issues like this ought to be kept out of the Supreme Court.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
PART C
By clicking on each institution and moving it into position, please rank the following
institutions from the one that is the best suited to make decisions about same-sex marriage
(ranked 1 at the top) to the one that is the least suited to make decisions about same-sex
marriage (ranked 3 at the bottom).
0=Ranked Congress First
1=Ranked Congress Second
2=Ranked Congress Third

By clicking on each institution and moving it into position, please rank the following
institutions from the one that is the best suited to make decisions about same-sex marriage
(ranked 1 at the top) to the one that is the least suited to make decisions about same-sex
marriage (ranked 3 at the bottom).
0=Ranked Supreme Court First
1=Ranked Supreme Court Second
2=Ranked Supreme Court Third
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By clicking on each institution and moving it into position, please rank the following
institutions from the one that is the best suited to make decisions about same-sex marriage
(ranked 1 at the top) to the one that is the least suited to make decisions about same-sex
marriage (ranked 3 at the bottom).
0=President Ranked First
1=President Ranked Second
2=President Ranked Third

By clicking on each institution and moving it into position, please rank the following institutions
from the one that is best suited to make decisions about the online sales tax (ranked 1 at the top)
to the one that is least suited to make decisions about the online sales tax (ranked 3 at the
bottom).
0=Ranked Congress First
1=Ranked Congress Second
3=Ranked Congress Third

By clicking on each institution and moving it into position, please rank the following institutions
from the one that is best suited to make decisions about the online sales tax (ranked 1 at the top)
to the one that is least suited to make decisions about the online sales tax (ranked 3 at the
bottom).
0=Ranked Supreme Court First
1=Ranked Supreme Court Second
2=Ranked Supreme Court Third
By clicking on each institution and moving it into position, please rank the following institutions
from the one that is best suited to make decisions about the online sales tax (ranked 1 at the top)
to the one that is least suited to make decisions about the online sales tax (ranked 3 at the
bottom).
0=President Ranked First
1=President Ranked Second
2=President Ranked Third

By clicking on each institution and moving it into position, please rank the following institutions
from the one that is best suited to make decisions about the Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility
(ranked 1 at the top) to the one that is least suited to make decisions about the Guantanamo Bay
Detention Facility (ranked 3 at the bottom).
0=Ranked Congress First
1=Ranked Congress Second
3=Ranked Congress Third

219

By clicking on each institution and moving it into position, please rank the following institutions
from the one that is best suited to make decisions about the Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility
(ranked 1 at the top) to the one that is least suited to make decisions about the Guantanamo Bay
Detention Facility (ranked 3 at the bottom).
0=Ranked Supreme Court First
1=Ranked Supreme Court Second
2=Ranked Supreme Court Third
By clicking on each institution and moving it into position, please rank the following institutions
from the one that is best suited to make decisions about the Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility
(ranked 1 at the top) to the one that is least suited to make decisions about the Guantanamo Bay
Detention Facility (ranked 3 at the bottom).
0=President Ranked First
1=President Ranked Second
2=President Ranked Third

Overall, how much confidence would you say you have in the United States Supreme Court?
0=No confidence at all
1=Only a little confidence
2=Some confidence
3=A great deal of confidence
Overall, how much confidence would you say you have in Congress?
0=No confidence at all
1=Only a little confidence
2=Some confidence
3=A great deal of confidence
Overall, how much confidence would you say you have in the President of the United States?
0=No confidence at all
1=Only a little confidence
2=Some confidence
3=A great deal of confidence
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What is your perception of the ideological makeup of the United States Supreme Court, which
sits in Washington, D.C.? Is it:
0=Strongly Conservative
1=Moderately
Conservative 2=Evenly
Balanced 3=Moderately
Liberal 4=Strongly Liberal
What is your perception of the ideological makeup of the United States House of
Representatives? Is it:
0=Strongly Conservative
1=Moderately
Conservative 2=Evenly
Balanced 3=Moderately
Liberal 4=Strongly Liberal
What is your perception of the partisan makeup of the United States Senate? Is it:
0=Strongly Conservative
1=Moderately
Conservative 2=Evenly
Balanced 3=Moderately
Liberal 4=Strongly Liberal
What is your perception of the ideological inclinations of the President of the United States? Is
he:
0=Strongly Conservative
1=Moderately
Conservative 2=Evenly
Balanced 3=Moderately
Liberal 4=Strongly Liberal
Overall, how much trust would you say you have in the United States Supreme Court, which
sits in Washington, D.C., to make decisions that are right for the country?
0=No trust at all
1=Only a little
trust 2=Some Trust
3=A great deal of trust
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Overall, how much trust would you say you have in the President of the United States to make
decisions that are right for the country?
0=No trust at all
1=Only a little
trust 2=Some Trust
3=A great deal of trust

Overall, how much trust would you say you have in Congress to make decisions that are
right for the country?
0=No trust at all
1=Only a little
trust 2=Some Trust
3=A great deal of trust
Do you happen to recall which of the following institutions made the policy regarding
the Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility's operation in this survey? Was it:
0=Congress
1=The President of the United States
2=The United State Supreme Court
3=Don’t Recall
Do you happen to recall which of the following institutions made the policy regarding same-sex
marriage in this survey? Was it:
0=Congress
1=The President of the United States
2=The United State Supreme Court
3=Don’t Recall
Do you happen to recall which of the following institutions made the policy regarding online
sales taxation in this survey? Was it:
0=Congress
1=The President of the United States
2=The United State Supreme Court
3=Don’t Recall
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The United States Supreme Court gets too mixed up in politics.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
The decisions made by the United States Supreme Court favor some groups more than others.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
It would make no difference to me if the United States Constitution were rewritten to
eliminate lifetime appointments of Supreme Court Justices, limiting their terms to 20 years.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
It would make no difference to me if the United States Constitution were rewritten to provide for the
election of Supreme Court Justices by the people, rather than appointment by the President.

0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
If the United States Supreme Court started making decisions that most people disagree with, it
might be better to do away with the United States Supreme Court altogether.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
Members of Congress put the interests of their party over the interests of the American people.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
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The decisions made by Congress favor some groups more than others.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
It would make no difference to me if the United States Constitution were rewritten to
reduce Congress' power to approve or deny presidential appointments.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
It would make no difference to me if the United States Constitution were rewritten to
reduce Congress' power to make its own procedural rules, such as the filibuster.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
If Congress started making decisions that most people disagree with, it might be better to
do away with Congress altogether.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
The President of the United States puts the interests of his party over the interests of
the American people.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
The decisions made by the President of the United States favor some groups more than others.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
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It would make no difference to me if the United States Constitution were rewritten to reduce
the President's power to make lifetime appointments to the judiciary.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
It would make no difference to me if the United States Constitution were rewritten to reduce
the President's power to veto congressional legislation.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
If the President of the United States started making decisions that most people disagree with, it
might be better to do away with the Office of the President altogether.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
Do you consider the issue of same-sex marriage to be primarily:
0=a moral or religious
issue 1=a political issue
2=a social issue
3=an economic issue
4=an issue about rights
Do you consider the issue of the online sales tax to be primarily:
0=a moral or religious
issue 1=a political issue
2=a social issue
3=an economic issue
4=an issue about rights

225

Do you consider the issue of the Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility's operation to
be primarily:
0=a moral or religious
issue 1=a political issue
2=a social issue
3=an economic issue
4=an issue about rights
Thinking about the role of the President of the United States in our democratic system of
government, would you say that the President fulfills the role you perceive he ought to play:

0=Never
1=Rarely
2=Some of the time
3=All of the time
Thinking about the role of the United States Supreme Court, which sits in Washington, D.C.,
in our democratic system of government, would you say that the Supreme Court fulfills the role
you perceive it ought to play:
0=Never
1=Rarely
2=Some of the time
3=All of the time
Thinking about the role of Congress in our democratic system of government, would you say
that Congress fulfills the role you perceive it ought to play:
0=Never
1=Rarely
2=Some of the time
3=All of the time
The President of the United States uses fair procedures to makes decision in a fair way:
0=Almost never
1=Rarely
2=Some of the time
3=Almost always
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Congress uses fair procedures to make decisions in a fair way:
0=Almost never
1=Rarely
2=Some of the time
3=Almost always
The United States Supreme Court, which sits in Washington, D.C., uses fair procedures
to make decisions in a fair way:
0=Almost never
1=Rarely
2=Some of the time
3=Almost always
It is within the authority of the President's office to make policy on the issue of same-sex
marriage.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
It is within the authority of Congress to make policy on the issue of same-sex marriage.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
It is within the authority of the United States Supreme Court, which sits in Washington, D.C.,
to rule on the issue of same-sex marriage.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
The President of the United States considers the interests of the people when making decisions.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
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Congress considers the interests of the people when making decisions.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
The United States Supreme Court, which sits in Washington, D.C., considers the interests of
the people when making decisions.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
It is within the authority of the President's office to make policy on the issue of online
sales taxation.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
It is within the authority of Congress to make policy on the issue of online sales taxation.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
It is within the authority of the United States Supreme Court, which sits in Washington, D.C.,
to rule on the issue of online sales taxation.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
The issue of same-sex marriage is controversial.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
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The issue of online sales taxation is controversial.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
The issue of the Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility's operation is controversial.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
It is within the authority of the President's office to make policy on the issue of the
Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility's operation.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
It is within the authority of Congress to make policy on the issue of the Guantanamo Bay
Detention Facility's operation.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree
It is within the authority of the United States Supreme Court, which sits in Washington, D.C.,
to rule on the issue of the Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility's operation.
0=Strongly Disagree
1=Disagree
2=Agree 3=Strongly
Agree

What is your gender?
0=male
1=female

229

What is your age?
0=18-21
1=22-25
2=26-30
3=31-40
4=41-50
5=51-60
6=61 or Over
What is the highest level of education you have completed?

0=Less than High School
1=High School/GED
2=Some College
3=2-Year College Degree (Associates)
4=4-Year College Degree (BA/BS)
5=Some Graduate Work (No Degree)
6=Master’s Degree
7=Doctoral Degree
8=Professional Degree (MD/JD)
What is your race?
0=white
1=Black or African American
2=Asian
3=Native American
4=Hispanic
5=Biracial
6=Multiracial
7=Other
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In which of these groups did your total family income, from all sources, fall last year
before taxes?
0=Less than $10,000
1=$10,000 to $19,999
2=$20,000 to $29,999
3=$30,000 to $39,999
4=$40,000 to $49,999
5=$50,000 to $59,999
6=$60,000 to $69,999
7=$70,000 to $79,999
8=80,000 to $89,999
9=$90,000 to $99,999
10=$100,000 to $149,999
11=$150,000 to $199,999
12=$200,000 to $249,999
13=$250,000 to $299,999
14=More Than $300,000

Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a/n:
0=Republican?
1=Independent?
2=Democrat?
Do you consider yourself to be a strong or not so strong Democrat? (of those who chose
Democrat in the party1 question, they were asked strong or not)
0=Not So
Strong 1=Strong
Do you consider yourself to be a strong or not so strong Republican? (of those who chose
Republican in the party1 question, they were asked strong or not)
0=Not So
Strong 1=Strong
Do you find that you tend to lean toward one or the other of the political parties, the
Democratic or the Republican? (of those who chose Independent in the party1 question, they
were asked how they lean)
0=Lean Republican
1=Lean Democratic
2=Neither
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When it comes to politics, do you usually think of yourself as:
0=Conservative
1=Moderate
2=Liberal
Do you consider yourself to be a strong or not so strong liberal? (of those who chose liberal in
the ideology1 question, they were asked strong or not)
0=Not So
Strong 1=Strong
Do you consider yourself to be a strong or not so strong conservative? (of those who chose
conservative in the ideology1 question, they were asked strong or not)
0=Not So
Strong 1=Strong
Do you find that you tend to lean toward one or the other, liberal or conservative? (of those who
chose Moderate in the party1 question, they were asked how they lean)
0=Lean Conservative
1=Lean Liberal
2=Neither

State of residence:
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EDUCATION
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Doctorate Awarded, December 2015
Subfields: American Politics and Public Administration
GPA: 3.704
DISSERTATION
Preferred Institutions: Public View on Policy
In my dissertation, I ask why people might prefer one institution of government (courts,
legislatures, executives) over another to handle certain issues. Previous research has
focused on legitimacy of the courts, whether institutions can legitimate policy, and how
public opinion is thus informed. This research is invaluable in understanding support for
and influence of specific institutions, but this only gets us so far. We still do not know
why people might feel that one institution is more legitimate than another to handle
policymaking on a specific issue. In this dissertation, I begin to examine this question
arguing that institutions act as source cues to individuals and that those individuals
evaluate the appropriateness of institutions to handle issues by considering institutional
design (majoritarianism v. countermajoritarianism), politics (political v. nonpolitical
institutions and issues), trust, and regret/disappointment. In short, I suggest that
numerous factors play into an individual’s preferences for one branch to handle certain
issues and that these factors have to do both with beliefs about the institution(s), and
perceptions of the issue(s).
Public Administration, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
Master’s Degree Awarded, May 2007
GPA: 3.693
Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
Bachelor’s Degree Awarded, May 2004
GPA: 3.510
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Politics: The Impact of Divisiveness in the U.S. Political System. William Crotty (ed).
New York: Lynne Reinner Publishers.
Fettig, Shawn C. and Sara C. Benesh. 2016. “Be Careful with my Court: The Chief Justice and
Supreme Court Legitimacy.” The Chief Justice: Appointment and Influence. David J.
Danelski and Artemus Ward (eds). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Forthcoming.
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Fettig, Shawn C. 2015. “Institutional Legitimacy: A Comparison Across Branches.” Presented
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the U.S. Supreme Court.” Presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political
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Fettig, Shawn C. “Institutional Legitimacy: A Comparison Across Branches.”
Fettig, Shawn C. “Institutional Legitimacy: A True Measure of Long-Term Sentiment?”
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TEACHING EXPERIENCE
2015


2012–2015

2013-2015

2009–2012








Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Denver
• The American Presidency (Autumn 2015) 
• Political Inquiry (Autumn 2015/Winter 2016) 
• Marginalized Communities and the Law (Winter 2016) 
• Law and Society (Spring 2016) 
• Judicial Process (Spring 2016) 
Instructor, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
• Introduction to Political Science (Fall 2013/Spring 2014/Spring 2015) 
• Introduction to Public Administration (Fall 2014) 
• Law and Society (Spring 2013/Fall 2012) 
Adjunct Lecturer, University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point
• Judicial Process (Summer 2015/Fall 2013- Online)
Teaching Assistant, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
• Introduction to Political Science (Fall 2011; Spring 2012): Developed
lesson plans for discussion section meetings weekly; Facilitated five
discussion section meetings weekly; Graded all exams and papers 
• Ethnicity, Religion, and Race (Spring 2011): Developed, implemented,
and monitored the online course; Graded all relevant exams and papers 
• Constitutional Law: Federalism (Fall 2010): Administered and graded
exams; Monitored attendance; Facilitated group discussions and mock
trials 
• Constitutional Law: Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (Spring 2010): 
Facilitated all portions of the online offering of the course, including
grading weekly student responses to questions 
• State Politics (Fall 2009): Administered and graded exams; Monitored
attendance 
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OTHER RELEVANT PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE
2014













2013-2014






Management Analyst III, Denver Police Department, Planning, Research, and
Support Division
• Collect and analyze data and existing policies, procedures, methods,
practices, and/or operational areas for possible alternatives/solutions and the
feasibility of recommended changes, based on Police Chief's requests. 
• Develop proposals and recommendations based on research and
analysis for new, revised, and/or improved work processes, policies,
procedures, practices, methods, and/or other tools to implement
improvements and determine the impact of proposed recommendations
and the positive or negative effects to the Police Department. 
• Present study findings and recommendations to management staff
including budget implications for proposed recommendations and seeks
support and approval of proposed recommendations. 
• Plan and participate in the implementation of approved recommendations,
furnish advice and technical assistance to staff during implementation of
recommendations, and take corrective action or recommends
modifications to ensure the outcomes defined for the study are achieved. 
• Respond daily to public inquiries, via phone, in-person and email,
regarding Denver Police Department policy and procedure, best
practice, and survey requests. 
• Cultivate, foster, and maintain positive working relationships with
managers, supervisors, employees, and other stakeholders to gain their
cooperation and support in assigned projects/studies. 
• Prepare written reports that summarize research, analysis,
recommendations, and implementation strategies. 
• Conduct business process analysis and redesign using the accepted tools,
methods, and concepts. 
• Adapt the results of business process analysis to specifying the functional
requirements of automated business application 
•
Research/Policy Graduate Intern, Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission
• Research case and statutory law related to fire and police activities 
• Conduct policy analysis and literature reviews 
• Update job descriptions in compliance with local, state, and federal laws 
• Administer and proctor exams and training for fire and police 
• Develop reports and presentations 
• Establish and maintain contacts in comparable fire and police departments
nationwide 
• Developed policy recommendations for police handling of citizen
recording of police behavior and expanded use of Electronic
Control Weapons 
• Assist in investigations (related to citizen complaints) 
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RECOGNITIONS/HONORS/AWARDS
• First Year Student Success Award, 2013: Recognized by first-year students as the
instructor on campus who has helped them most in their college success 

• Graduate School Travel Support, 2011: Awarded to present original research at the
annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, January 2011 

• Graduate Research Improvement Grant, 2013: Awarded funding from the Department of
Political Science to field dissertation survey via a competitive process 

• Nominated for Distinguished Graduate Student Fellowship, 2012: Department
nomination for competitive campus-wide fellowship for graduate students 

• Nominated for Graduate School Dissertation Fellowship, 2013: Department nomination
for competitive, campus-wide fellowship for dissertators 
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